WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Property of
Elmer E. Rasmuson Library
University of Alaska Fairbanks

Volume 49, Number 2 January 1997

[15537]
PER
D
WITHDRAWN
WS7
v.49
no.2
Jan. 1997

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF
CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
PUBLISHED BY THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD
John Waterbury, *Chair*
Suzanne Berger, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Benjamin J. Cohen, Matthew Evangelista, Judith Goldstein, Peter A. Hall, James R. Hines Jr., Jack Levy, Joel S. Migdal, James D. Morrow, Elizabeth Perry, Jonas Pontusson, Henry Shue, Jack Snyder, Robert C. Tucker

Editors: Richard D. Challener, George W. Downs, Michael W. Doyle, Richard Falk, Aaron L. Friedberg (*Review Articles*), Robert G. Gilpin, Jeffrey Herbst, Atul Kohli, John Waterbury, Lynn T. White III

Associate Editors: Jeremy Adelman, Sheri Berman, Harold A. Feiveson, Keisuke Iida, Harold James, Pei Minxin, Gilbert Rozman, Anna Seleny, Paul E. Sigmund, Kathryn E. Stoner-Weiss, Robert L. Tignor
Executive Editor: Ilene P. Cohen; *Assistant Editor:* Susan Bindig
Secretary: Patricia D. Zimmer

The editors invite submission of articles (up to 10,000 words, including footnotes) bearing upon problems in international relations and comparative politics. Manuscripts and footnotes should be double-spaced throughout and submitted in triplicate, together with an abstract. Footnotes should be placed at the end of the manuscript. Address: WORLD POLITICS, Bendheim Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544. The WORLD POLITICS home page can be found at http:/www.wws.princeton.edu/world_politics.

Authors may expect to be notified of the editors' decision within four months. Procedures for reviewing manuscripts are based on the anonymity of the author and the confidentiality of readers' and editors' reports. Editorial policy does not provide for transmitting readers' evaluations to authors of rejected manuscripts. Exceptions may be made if, in the opinion of the editors, such comments contain substantive suggestions. WORLD POLITICS does not accept manuscripts that have already been published, are scheduled for publication elsewhere, or have been simultaneously submitted to another journal. Statements of fact and opinion appearing in the journal are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publisher. The journal does not publish communications to the editor or rejoinders to specific articles. Scholars who believe they have been challenged are encouraged to submit an article that will advance the scholarly debate.

Reprint permission: Permissions Department, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319. Phone: (410) 516-6987; FAX: (410) 516-6968; toll-free (800) 548-1784. Individuals: $26 per year; institutions: $61 per year. Single copies: individuals, $8.00; institutions, $16.50. For postage and handling in Canada and Mexico, add $3.80 per year; outside of North America, $9.00.

Back Issues: WORLD POLITICS is available in microfilm or xerographic copies from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. Two years after publication, complete volumes are available in microfiche form from KTO Microform, Route 100, Millwood, NY 10546. Individual issues in the current and two preceding volumes may be ordered from The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319.

Advertising: Journals Advertising Coordinator, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI, Book Review Index, Combined Retrospective Index Sets (CRIS), Combined Retrospective Index to Book Reviews in Scholarly Journals, 1886–1974 (RSJ), PAIS Bulletin Social Science Index,* and *Periodica Islamica;* it is abstracted and indexed in *United States Political Science Documents, International Bibliograpy of Periodical Literature (IBZ), International Bibliography of Book Reviews (IBR),* and *Current Military and Political Literature.* Abstracts of articles also appear in *Book Review Digest, Historical Abstracts, International Development Abstracts, International Political Science Abstracts, Political Science Abstracts,* and *Social Sciences Abstracts.*

Copyright © 1997 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

WORLD POLITICS (ISSN 0043-8871). Published quarterly by The Johns Hopkins University Press. Vol. 49, No. 2, January 1997. Periodicals postage paid at Baltimore, MD, and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to WORLD POLITICS, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton Academic Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

Vol. 49 • January 1997 • No. 2

CONTENTS

Modernization: Theories and Facts — *Adam Przeworski* and *Fernando Limongi* 155

Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS — *Gerald M. Easter* 184

Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order — *Daniel S. Treisman* 212

Gender, Feminism, and Attitudes toward International Conflict: Exploring Relationships with Survey Data from the Middle East — *Mark Tessler* and *Ina Warriner* 250

REVIEW ARTICLE

Germany after Unification: Normal at Last? — *A. James McAdams* 282

The Contributors ii

Abstracts iii

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

ADAM PRZEWORSKI is Professor of Politics at New York University. His recent books include *Democracy and the Market* (1991), *Economic Reforms in New Democracies* (with Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira and José María Maravall, 1993), and *Sustainable Democracy* (coauthored, 1995). He is currently working on a project concerning the impact of political institutions on economic performance.

FERNANDO LIMONGI is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of São Paulo, Brazil, and the author of recent articles on the Brazilian legislative process and the party system. He is currently working on a project concerning the impact of political institutions on economic performance.

GERALD M. EASTER is Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at Miami University of Ohio and the author of *Reconstructing the State: The Informal Sources of Power in Postrevolutionary Soviet Russia* (forthcoming).

DANIEL S. TREISMAN is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Los Angeles. He writes about Russian politics and is completing a book on the politics of regional crises in post-Soviet Russia.

MARK TESSLER is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. He is the author of *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (1994) and coauthor (with David Garnham) of *Democracy, War, and Peace in the Middle East* (1995).

INA WARRINER is currently working toward a Ph.D. in Demography and Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania.

A. JAMES MCADAMS is Associate Professor of Government and Faculty Fellow of the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. He is author, most recently, of *Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification* (1994) and editor of the forthcoming *Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies.* He is currently writing a book entitled *Retrospective Justice in the Spirit of Liberalism: German Democracy and the History of the GDR.*

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by The Johns Hopkins University Press for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) Transactional Reporting Service, provided that the fee of $3.25 per article is paid directly to CCC, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923. 0043-88 71/94 $03.25

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABSTRACTS

Modernization

Theories and Facts

By ADAM PRZEWORSKI and FERNANDO LIMONGI

What makes political regimes rise, endure, and fall? The main question is whether the observed close relation between levels of economic development and the incidence of democratic regimes is due to democracies being more likely to emerge or only more likely to survive in the more developed countries. We answer this question using data concerning 135 countries that existed at any time between 1950 and 1990. We find that the level of economic development does not affect the probability of transitions to democracy but that affluence does make democratic regimes more stable. The relation between affluence and democratic stability is monotonic, and the breakdown of democracies at middle levels of development is a phenomenon peculiar to the Southern Cone of Latin America. These patterns also appear to have been true of the earlier period, but dictatorships are more likely to survive in wealthy countries that became independent only after 1950. We conclude that modernization need not generate democracy but democracies survive in countries that are modern.

Preference for Presidentialism

Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS

By GERALD M. EASTER

The recent wave of democratic transitions has stimulated scholarly interest in a previously undeveloped area of study: comparative presidentialism. Comparative presidentialism seeks to define variant types of presidentialism that have emerged from transition processes, to identify the conditions that shape institutional choice and to understand more clearly the causal relationship between institutional choice and democratic regime outcomes. Using the postcommunist transitions, this paper contributes to the emerging comparative presidentialism literature by suggesting a revision to the argument that presidentialism leads to failed democratic transitions. The paper focuses attention away from the institutional rules of the game and toward the actors who actually make the institutional choice. Three postcommunist cases, distinguished by their different regime outcomes, are compared: Russia, Uzbekistan, and Estonia.

Russia's "Ethnic Revival"

The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order

By DANIEL S. TREISMAN

Since 1990 Russia has experienced an unexpected "ethnic revival." Varying widely in geography, culture, economic development, and institutional history, the country's thirty-two ethnic regions offer a chance to weigh the evidence for alternative theories of separatist activism. This paper examines statistically why some—such as Chechnya and Tatarstan—have come to epitomize demands for greater independence, while others—such as Mordovia or Chukotka—have remained largely quiescent. It finds that, while a Muslim religious tradition predisposed a region's leaders to press greater separatist demands, such primordial factors were filtered through a rational calculus of the region's relative bargaining power in negotiations with the center and of the leader's own organizational interests. Contrary to some leading theories, the most developed, resource-rich, and high-income groups and regions were more separatist than more economically backward ones.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GENDER, FEMINISM, AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
EXPLORING RELATIONSHIPS WITH SURVEY DATA FROM THE MIDDLE EAST
By MARK TESSLER and INA WARRINER

In an effort to contribute to the dialogue between gender studies and international studies, this report presents findings from an empirical investigation based on the integrated secondary analysis of survey data from Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait. The goal is to assess the utility of both gender and attitudes pertaining to the circumstances of women in accounting for variance in views about war and peace, and thereafter to examine the degree to which political system attributes constitute conditionalities associated with important variable relationships. Major findings include the absence of gender-linked differences in attitudes toward international conflict in all four of the societies studied and a significant relationship in each of these societies between attitudes toward gender equality and attitudes toward international conflict. Based on data from the Arab world and Israel, with attitudes about a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict treated as the dependent variable, the research also aspires to shed light on more practical considerations pertaining to the international relations of the Middle East.

GERMANY AFTER UNIFICATION
NORMAL AT LAST?
By A. JAMES MCADAMS

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the concept of "normalcy" has occupied a prominent place in the pronouncements of Germany's most powerful politicians and policymakers. In addition, it has also suffused much of the emerging literature on the domestic and international implications of German unification. Some observers argue that unification embodies the call to normalcy, offering Germany's leaders the opportunity to put their nation's past behind them. Others treat the events of 1989–90 as part of an ongoing challenge to German identity. Finally, a third group of scholars regards the invocation of German unity as an excuse for papering over the crimes of the Nazi past. Although there is no a priori basis for considering any one of these approaches *the most appropriate for assessing contemporary German affairs, this does not mean one's choice* of terms is totally arbitrary. If German normalcy is to mean anything analytically, it must minimally represent an attainable and worthy goal to which the leaders of the Federal Republic can aspire in their efforts to make Germany more like other European states.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MODERNIZATION
Theories and Facts

By ADAM PRZEWORSKI and FERNANDO LIMONGI*

INTRODUCTION

WHAT makes political regimes rise, endure, and fall? Do democracies emerge as a consequence of economic development? Does rapid economic growth destabilize democracies? Is there some level of development beyond which democracies are more likely to fall? Is European history unique or is it repeating itself in contemporary less developed countries?

Our purpose is to distinguish two theories that relate economic development and democracy and to examine some facts in light of these theories. While ultimately the interesting questions concern the mechanisms that mediate between economic development and the dynamics of political regimes, we must nevertheless identify the facts to be explained before plunging into explanations. Hence, we stick as close as possible to elementary descriptive patterns. We pose the question narrowly, examining exclusively the impact of development, rather than seeking broadly to explain the dynamic of political regimes. Hence, we deliberately ignore factors such as religion, colonial legacy, position in the world system, income distribution, or diffusion, which have been found by others to influence the incidence of democracy. We believe that our question is important in its own right, that it lends itself to divergent answers, and that it raises methodological issues that are not well understood.

In Section I, we reconstruct two alternative views of the relation between development and democracy, both put forth by Lipset,[1] and we count the cases that fit them. In Section II we examine the vulnerabil-

* We appreciate comments by Mike Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Cortés, Larry Diamond, John H. Kautsky, Seymour Martin Lipset, Alejandro Lopez, José Maria Maravall, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Susan Stokes. This work was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation no. SES-9022605.

[1] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (March 1959); and idem, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

World Politics 49 (January 1997), 155–83

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ity of democracies to economic crises. In Section III we consider the most important substantive criticisms of Lipset's views, and in Section IV we study methodological criticisms. Methodological and political reflections close the paper. Appendix 1 explains our classification of regimes, while Appendix 2 spells out the analytics of regime dynamics.

I. Economic Development and Democracy

Lipset's observation that democracy is related to economic development, first advanced in 1959, has generated the largest body of research on any topic in comparative politics. It has been supported and contested, revised and extended, buried and resuscitated. And while several articles in the recent Festschrift to Lipset proclaim conclusions, neither the theory nor the facts are clear.[2]

Even a glance at the aggregate patterns, such as Figure 1, shows that the relation between levels of development and the incidence of democratic regimes is strong.[3] Indeed, a probit analysis of regimes conditional only on the per capita income, to which we refer throughout as the level of development, correctly classifies 77 percent of 4,126 annual observations.[4] The probability that this classification is not generated by chance is greater than 0.99.

Yet there are two distinct reasons this relation may hold: either democracies may be more likely to emerge as countries develop economically, or they may be established independently of economic de-

[2] Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, eds., *Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1992).

[3] While different data sets and different estimation methods lead to somewhat divergent results, the most careful statistical study of the aggregate patterns thus far, by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, finds that economic development Granger causes democracy. Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis," *American Political Science Review 88* (December 1994), 903–10.

[4] A fair amount of ink has been spilled over whether the relation between development and democracy is linear. See Robert W. Jackman, "On the Relation of Economic Development to Democratic Performance," *American Journal of Political Science 17* (August 1973), 611–21; and Zehra F. Arat, "Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Revisited," *Comparative Politics* 21 (October 1988), 21–36. We now know better. Democracy, however measured, is a qualitative or a limited variable: it assumes values of 0 or 1 under our measurement; it ranges from 2 to 14 on the Freedom House Scale created by R. D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1987–88* (New York: Freedom House, 1988); from 0 to 100 on the scale of Kenneth A. Bollen, "Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy," *American Sociological Review 45* (June 1980), 370–90, and so on. Hence, no predicted index of democracy can become negative as the level of development tends to zero, and no predicted index of democracy can exceed whatever is the maximum value of a particular scale as the level gets very large. Only a nonlinear function, such as the normal or logistic, as suggested by Robert A. Dahl can satisfy these constraints. See Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). This is why we use probit or logit models throughout.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 1
PROBABILITY THAT A REGIME IS DEMOCRATIC, BY PER CAPITA INCOME

[a]1985 PPP USD-purchasing-power parities in U.S. dollars.

velopment but may be more likely to survive in developed countries. We call the first explanation "endogenous" and the second "exogenous."

Since we are dealing with only two regimes, democracies emerge whenever dictatorships die.[5] Hence, to assert that democracies emerge as a result of economic development is the same as to say that dictatorships die as countries ruled by them become economically developed. Democracy is then secreted out of dictatorships by economic development. A story told about country after country is that as they develop, social structure becomes complex, labor processes begin to require the active cooperation of employees, and new groups emerge and organize. As a result, the system can no longer be effectively run by command: the society is too complex, technological change endows the direct producers with some autonomy and private information, civil society emerges, and dictatorial forms of control lose their effectiveness. Various groups, whether the bourgeoisie, workers, or just the amorphous "civil society," rise against the dictatorial regime, and it falls.

The endogenous explanation is a "modernization" theory. The basic assumption of this theory, in any of its versions, is that there is one gen-

[5] This is not quite true of our data set, since different countries enter and exit the sample at different moments. For now, we consider the population of countries as fixed, but see Section IV.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eral process of which democratization is but the final stage. Modernization consists of a gradual differentiation and specialization of social structures that culminates in a separation of political structures from other structures and makes democracy possible. The specific causal chains consist of sequences of industrialization, urbanization, education, communication, mobilization, and political incorporation, among innumerable others: a progressive accumulation of social changes that ready a society to proceed to its culmination, democratization.

Modernization may be one reason the incidence of democracy is related to economic development, and this is the reading most commentators impute to Lipset.[6] His most influential critic, O'Donnell, paraphrases Lipset's thesis as saying that "if other countries become as rich as the economically advanced nations, it is highly probable that they will become political democracies."[7] Democracy, then, is endogenous, since it results from development under authoritarianism. According to this theory, the sequence of events one would expect is one of poor authoritarian countries developing and becoming democratic once they reach some level of development, a "threshold."

Yet suppose that dictatorships are equally likely to die and democracies to emerge at any level of development. They may die for so many different reasons that development, with all its modernizing consequences, plays no privileged role. After all, as Therborn emphasized, many European countries democratized because of wars, not because of "modernization," a story repeated by the Argentine defeat in the Malvinas and elsewhere.[8] Some dictatorships fell in the aftermath of the death of a founding dictator—a Franco, for instance—who had been uniquely capable of maintaining the dictatorial order. Some collapsed because of economic crises. Some because of foreign pressures.

If dictatorships die and democracies emerge randomly with regard to development, is it still possible that there would be more democracies among wealthy countries than among poor ones? If one is to take Lipset at his own word—"The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy"[9]—then even if the emergence of democracy is independent of the level of development, the chance that

[6] Diamond (fn. 2), 45; as well as Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, "The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7 (Summer 1993), 71–86.

[7] Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973), 3.

[8] Goran Therborn, "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy," *New Left Review*, no. 103 (May–June 1977).

[9] Lipset (fn. 1, 1959), 56.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

such a regime will survive is greater if it has been established in an affluent country. We would thus expect to observe democracies to appear randomly with regard to levels of development, but to die in the poorer countries and survive in the wealthier ones. Thus, history gradually accumulates wealthy democracies, since every time a dictatorship happens to die in an affluent country, democracy is there to stay (see Appendix 2). This is therefore no longer a modernization theory, since the emergence of democracy is not brought about by development. Rather, democracy appears exogenously as a deus ex machina. It survives if a country is "modern," but it is not a product of "modernization."

Are we splitting hairs?

Examine first some descriptive patterns. The facts we report concern 135 countries between roughly 1950 and 1990. "Entry" year refers to 1950, or to the year when a country became independent, or to the first year for which economic data are available, and "exit" year refers to 1990 or to the last year when the data are available. All the regimes that occurred during this period were classified as democracies or dictatorships (we use the latter term interchangeably with "authoritarian regimes").[10] Altogether, we observed 224 regimes, 101 democratic and 123 authoritarian. The references to levels of development and growth rates are expressed in constant U.S. dollars computed at purchasing-power parities and expressed in 1985 prices. (Thus all $ numbers refer to 1985 PPP USD.) The lowest level we observed in the entire sample is $226 (Burma in 1950), the highest is $18,095 (United States in 1989).[11]

If the theory that democracy emerges as a result of economic development is true, transitions to democracy would be more likely when authoritarian regimes reach higher levels of development. In fact, transitions are increasingly likely as per capita income of dictatorships rises but only until it reaches a level of about $6,000. Above that, dictatorships become more stable as countries become more affluent. Dictator-

[10] Our regime classification and the resulting list of regimes are described in Appendix 1 and in Mike Alvarex et al., "Classifying Political Regimes," *Studies in International Comparative Development* (forthcoming). The reason for selecting this period and the sample is the availability of internationally comparable economic data, which we took from the Penn World Tables 5.6. The sample we describe here and use throughout does not include six countries that derive at least half of their income from oil revenues. While political data are available for 4,730 country years, data for economic growth are available for only 4,126 country years, which is the number of observations in most analyses.

[11] Readers used to the UN or the World Bank GNP figures should be aware that counting incomes at purchasing-power parities tends to increase significantly the levels for poor countries and to decrease slightly the numbers for rich countries. It may be useful for future reference to know what different numbers describe: by 1990, Nigeria had a per capita income of $995, Indonesia had $1,973, Czechoslovakia $4,094, Spain $9,576, and the United States $18,073.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ships survive, or at least succeed one another,[12] almost invariably in the very poor countries, those under $1,000. They are somewhat less stable in countries with incomes between $1,001 and $4,000 and even less so above $4,000. But if they reach the level of $6,000, transitions to democracy become less likely. As the lower panel of Table 1 (PAD column 4) shows, the probability of any dictatorship dying during any year is 0.0206; for those dictatorships with incomes over $1,000, this probability is 0.0294, over $5,000 it is 0.0641, over $6,000 it is 0.0484, over $7,000 it is 0.0333. Huntington, it seems, was correct with regard to dictatorships: they exhibit a "bell shaped pattern of instability."[13]

To test whether these patterns can be predicted by per capita income, we estimate the transition probabilities conditional on level and, given the nonlinearity of the observed patterns, its square (see Appendix 2). The results are presented in Table 2. As we see, the probabilities of dictatorships falling, p_{AD}, predicted by the level of development correspond closely to those observed. They increase until the $5,001–$6,000 range and then decline.

Indeed, dictatorships survived for years in countries that were wealthy. Whatever the threshold at which development is supposed to dig the grave for authoritarian regimes, it is clear that many dictatorships passed it in good health. Even disregarding those countries that derive more than one-half of their revenues from oil, dictatorships flourished in Singapore, East Germany, Taiwan, USSR, Spain, Bulgaria, Argentina, and Mexico for many years after these countries enjoyed incomes above $5,000, which Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, and Norway did not have by 1950. Table 3 lists the dictatorships that survived even though the probability that the regime is democratic predicted by the level of development was above 0.50, which corresponds to per capita income of $4,115.

Yet this may not be a fair test of modernization theory. The hypothesis implied by this theory is that *if* a country develops over a longer period under dictatorship, so that all the modernizing consequences have time to accumulate, then it will embrace democracy. But for most dictatorships this premise is vacuous: only 19 dictatorships—to remind, out of 123—did develop over longer periods of time and reached "modernity." Let us thus examine more closely these countries, the ones that developed under authoritarianism and became "modern," which

[12] Note that we do not distinguish successive dictatorships. If President Viola succeeds President Videla or even if ayatollahs succeed a shah, we treat it as one continuous spell of dictatorship.

[13] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 43.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1
REGIME TRANSITIONS BY LAGGED PER CAPITA INCOME (LEVEL)[a]
(ANNUAL DATA)

Low-High	*PJK*	*TTR*	*TOT*	*PAD*	*TRD*	*TA*	*PDA*	*TRA*	*TD*
–1000	0.0152	15	987	0.0066	6	915	0.1250	9	72
1001–2000	0.0329	32	972	0.0248	18	727	0.0571	14	245
2001–3000	0.0316	15	474	0.0276	8	290	0.0380	7	184
3001–4000	0.0238	8	336	0.0161	3	186	0.0333	5	150
4001–5000	0.0349	8	229	0.0492	6	122	0.0187	2	107
5001–6000	0.0314	6	191	0.0641	5	78	0.0088	1	113
6001–7000	0.0196	3	153	0.0625	2	32	0.0083	1	121
7001–	0.0015	1	649	0.0333	1	30	0.0000	0	619
All	0.0221	88	3991	0.0206	49	2380	0.0242	39	1611
Above									
1000	0.0243	73	3004	0.0294	43	1465	0.0195	30	1539
2000	0.0202	41	2032	0.0339	25	738	0.0124	16	1294
3000	0.0167	26	1558	0.0379	17	448	0.0081	9	1110
4000	0.0147	18	1222	0.0534	14	262	0.0042	4	960
5000	0.0101	10	993	0.0571	8	140	0.0023	2	853
6000	0.0050	4	802	0.0484	3	62	0.0014	1	740
7000	0.0015	1	649	0.0333	1	30	0.0000	0	619

[a]Since per capita income is lagged, we lose 135 observations, for the total of 3,991. The following abbreviations are used:

PJK is the probability that either regime dies during a particular year
TTR is the number of transitions
TOT is the total number of regime years at a particular level
PAD is the probability of transition to democracy
TRD is their number
TA is the total number of years under authoritarianism
PDA is the probability of transition to authoritarianism
TRA is their number
TD is the total number of years under democracy

we will take arbitrarily to mean that at some time they had a per capita income of $4,115. (See Table 4.)

Gabon, Syria, and Yugoslavia are the three countries that experienced a sustained increase in income over, respectively, twelve, seventeen, and eighteen years, reached the level at which democracy was the more likely regime, and, having remained under dictatorships, experienced a series of economic crises. Singapore and Malaysia are the two countries that developed over a long period, became wealthy, and remained dictatorships until now. In East Germany, Taiwan, USSR, Spain, Bulgaria, and Hungary dictatorships eventually fell, but only many

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2
REGIME TRANSITION PROBABILITIES PREDICTED BY LAGGED PER CAPITA INCOME AND ITS SQUARE[a]

Level	P_{DA}	P_{AD}	P_{DD}	P_{AA}	P_D^*	*N*
<1000	0.098	0.010	0.902	0.990	0.092	987
	(0.125)	(0.007)	(0.875)	(0.993)	(0.053)	
1001–2000	0.072	0.017	0.928	0.983	0.191	972
	(0.057)	(0.025)	(0.943)	(0.975)	(0.304)	
2001–3000	0.044	0.028	0.956	0.972	0.388	474
	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.962)	(0.972)	(0.424)	
3001–4000	0.026	0.039	0.974	0.961	0.600	336
	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.967)	(0.984)	(0.326)	
4001–5000	0.015	0.047	0.985	0.953	0.758	229
	(0.019)	(0.049)	(0.981)	(0.951)	(0.720)	
5001–6000	0.008	0.050	0.992	0.950	0.862	191
	(0.009)	(0.064)	(0.991)	(0.936)	(0.876)	
6001–7000	0.004	0.047	0.996	0.953	0.921	153
	(0.008)	(0.063)	(0.992)	(0.937)	(0.887)	
7001–	0.0006	0.017	0.999	0.983	0.965	649
	(0.000)	(0.033)	(1.000)	(0.967)	(1.000)	
All	0.051	0.028	0.959	0.977	0.354	3991
	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.976)	(0.979)	(0.466)	

[a] Based on a dynamic probit model. See Appendix 2. The probabilities p_{jk}, j=A,D, k=A,D are of transitions and survival. p^*_D is the equilibrium proportion of democracies. Observed transition rates (from Table 1) are in parentheses.

years after they had reached the critical level of income. Given its 1974 income level, Uruguay should never have been a dictatorship. The economic history of the Chilean dictatorship is convoluted: its income in 1974 was $3,561, it climbed with downs and ups to $4,130 by 1981, collapsed to $3,199 by 1983, recovered to surpass the 1974 level only by 1986, and passed the threshold of $4,155 in 1989, exactly the year of transition. The history of Poland is similar: by our criteria, it reached the threshold of democracy in 1974; it experienced an economic crisis in 1979 and a mass movement for democracy in 1980, passed the threshold again in 1985, and became a democracy in 1989. In turn, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Portugal, and perhaps even South Korea and Greece are the dream cases of a modernization theorist. These are countries that developed under a dictatorship, became wealthy, and threw dictatorships off more or less at the same income levels. But they are few.

This is not to say that democracies did not sometimes emerge be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3
HIGHEST LEVELS OF PER CAPITA INCOME (LEVEL) UNDER WHICH DICTATORSHIPS SURVIVED IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES

Country	*Year*	*Highest Level*	*PROB(REG=DEM)*[a]
Singapore	1990	11698	0.992
East Germany	1988	10433	0.977
Iraq	1979	8598	0.923
Taiwan	1990	8067	0.895
USSR	1989	7744	0.875
Spain	1976	7390	0.851
Gabon	1976	6969	0.818
Venezuela	1957	6939	0.815
Bulgaria	1988	6866	0.809
Argentina	1980	6505	0.776
Mexico	1981	6463	0.772
Iran	1976	6434	0.769
Argentina	1972	5815	0.705
Yugoslavia	1979	5674	0.690
Hungary	1987	5650	0.687
Greece	1973	5218	0.637
Uruguay	1981	5162	0.630
Malaysia	1990	5117	0.625
Poland	1978	5102	0.623
South Korea	1987	5080	0.620
Syria	1981	4668	0.569
Portugal	1974	4657	0.568
Argentina	1962	4541	0.553
Argentina	1957	4355	0.530
Suriname	1981	4220	0.513

[a] The PROB(REG=DEM) is the probability that a regime is democratic given the level. It is calculated as $1-F(\alpha+\beta' LEVEL)$, where the parameters are estimated by the probit model and F(.) is the cdf of the normal distribution.

cause countries became modern; put otherwise, dictatorships do not necessarily fall for the same reasons in all countries. Thus modernization may "explain" why democracy was established in countries that developed over a long period even it these countries had waited for its advent for periods of time that cannot be predicted. But if modernization theory is to have any predictive power, there must be some level of income at which one can be relatively sure that the country will throw off the dictatorship. One is hard put to find this level, however: among the countries that satisfy the premise of the modernization theory, the range of levels at which dictatorships survived is very wide (see the list in Table 4).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 4
COUNTRIES THAT DEVELOPED OVER LONG PERIODS UNDER DICTATORSHIP AND REACHED INCOMES ABOVE $4,115[a]

	Entry		*Passes*	*Peak*		*Transition*	
Country	*Year*	*Level*	*PROB=0.50*	*Year*	*PROB*	*Year*	*at PROB*
Gabon	1961	1969	1973	1976	0.82	never	
Brazil	1965	1864	1980	1980	0.52	1978	0.47
Chile	1974	3561	1981	1981	0.50	no	
			1989	1989	0.53	1989	0.53
Uruguay	1974	4148	1974	1981	0.63	1985	0.48
South Korea	1961	911	1985	1988	0.68	1988	0.68
Malaysia	1957	1282	1982	1990	0.63	never	
Singapore	1965	1845	1972	1990	0.99	never	
Syria	1961	1607	1978	1981	0.57	never	
Taiwan	1952	968	1979	1990	0.90	post 1990	
Bulgaria	1981	4216	?	1989	0.80	1989	0.80
Czechoslovakia	1964	1654	1989	1989	0.51	1989	0.51
East Germany	1971	4995	?	1988	0.98	1990	?
Greece	1967	3308	1970	1974	0.61	1974	0.61
Hungary	1971	3657	1974	1987	0.69	1989	0.68
Poland	1971	3109	1974	1978	0.62	no	
			1985	1988	0.55	1989	0.55
Portugal	1951	1314	1973	1974	0.57	1975	0.52
Spain	1951	2205	1964	1976	0.85	1976	0.85
USSR	1961	2536	1971	1989	0.88	collapsed	
Yugoslavia	1961	2073	1974	1979	0.69	collapsed	

[a]This table lists countries that grew over the period of at least seven years and at some time reached per capita income of $4,115. Entry is 1951 or the year after the country became independent or the year after economic data became available. Passes PROB=0.50 is the year when the country reached per capita income of $4,115. Peak gives the time when the country reached the highest income level under the particular dictatorship and the probability, as predicted by per capita income, that it would be a democracy. Finally, transition gives the year the dictatorship fell, if ever, and the probability of democracy at that time.

Moreover, even if to predict is not the same as to explain, "explaining" can easily entail an ex post fallacy. Consider Taiwan, which in 1961 had a per capita income of $968, which developed rapidly, passing by 1979 our threshold of $4,115, which on the basis of its income level had a probability of 0.10 of being a dictatorship in 1990, and which in 1995 elected its president in contested elections for the first time. Suppose that every year during all this time, the Taiwanese dictatorship faced a probability of 0.02 of dying for reasons not related to development. It thus had about a 50 percent chance of not being around by 1995 even if it had not developed at all. We may therefore attribute to development what may have been just a culmination of random haz-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ards. And, indeed, the Taiwanese dictatorship most likely democratized for geopolitical reasons, not for economic ones.[14]

Thus, the causal power of economic development in bringing dictatorships down appears paltry. Few authoritarian regimes satisfy the premise of modernization theory; that is, few developed over a long period. And even if most of those that did develop eventually became democracies, no level of income predicts when that would occur.

In turn, per capita income, our measure of the level of development, has a strong impact on the survival of democracies. The simple fact is that during the period under our scrutiny or ever before, no democracy ever fell, regardless of everything else, in a country with a per capita income higher than that of Argentina in 1975: $6,055.[15] Thirty-two democracies spent 736 years with incomes above $6,055 and not one collapsed, while thirty-nine out of sixty-nine democracies did fall in countries that were poorer.

As Table 1 shows, the probability that democracy survives increases monotonically with per capita income.[16] In countries with per capita income under $1,000, the probability that a democracy would die during a particular year was 0.125, which implies that their expected life was eight years.[17] Between $1,001 and $2,000, this probability was 0.0571, for an expected duration of about eighteen years. Above $6,055, democracies could expect to last forever. Statistical analysis, the results of which are shown in Table 2 (column 1), confirms that per capita income is a good predictor of the stability of democracies.

These findings cry out for an explanation. Lipset himself thought that the reason democracies survive in affluent countries is that wealth moderates in various ways the intensity of distributional conflicts. This is a plausible explanation but not easy to prove rigorously.[18] The intuitive story is this: Suppose that the political forces competing over the

[14] An analogy may be useful. Suppose that someone runs the risk of 0.01 of dying from accidental causes during each year of her life and that at the age of seventy-eight she gets hit by a falling brick. To attribute this death to development is to conclude that she died of old age.

[15] The claim about the prewar period is based on rather heroic backward extrapolation of 1950 incomes, but the levels at which democracies fell in Europe were an order of magnitude lower: we guess it to have been $1,825 in Austria in 1934, $1,974 in Finland in 1930, $1,474 in Germany in 1933, and $1,814 in Italy in 1922.

[16] John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power," *World Politics* 42 (January 1990). Londregan and Poole found a similar pattern with regard to coups. In their sample of 121 countries between 1950 and 1982 coups were twenty-one times more likely to occur among the poorest than among the wealthiest countries.

[17] Expected life in any state is the inverse of the probability of transition away from this state.

[18] Adam Przeworski, "Why Democracies Survive in Affluent Countries?" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 28–September 1, 1996).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

distribution of income choose between complying with the verdicts of democratic competition, in which case each can expect to get some share of total income, or risking a fight over dictatorship, which is costly but which gives the victor all of the income. Now suppose that the marginal utility of consumption is lower at higher levels of consumption. Thus the gain from winning the struggle for dictatorship is smaller. In turn, if the production function has diminishing marginal returns in capital stock, the "catch-up" from destroying a part of it during the war for dictatorship is faster at lower levels of wealth. Hence, in poor countries the value of becoming a dictator is greater and the accumulated cost of destroying capital stock is lower. In wealthy countries, by contrast, the gain from getting all rather than a part of total income is smaller and the recuperation from destruction is slower. Hence, struggle for dictatorship is more attractive in poorer countries.

Obviously, there are always alternative interpretations. One, for example, is that income is just a proxy for education and more educated people are more likely to embrace democratic values. But while the accumulated years of education of an average member of the labor force—the measure of educational stocks we have—does increase the probability of survival of democracies independently of level, the effect of income survives when education is controlled, and indeed it is much stronger.

These observations strongly confirm the exogenous version of Lipset's theory. Once democracy is established, the more well-to-do a nation, the more likely that it will survive.

The reason we observe the relation between levels of development and the incidence of democracy is that democracies are almost certain to survive once they are established in rich countries. True, dictatorships are less stable when they reach the per capita income of $4,000. But what generates the pattern we observe in Figure 1 is that while democracy is terribly fragile in poor countries, it is impregnable in the rich ones. The probability that a democracy will die during any particular year in a country with an income above $4,000 is practically zero: two in a thousand years. And since at such levels dictatorships die at the rate of 5.7 percent, one would expect that independently of the initial distribution, in the long run democracies would constitute 96.1 percent of regimes in such wealthy countries.[19] Even if wealthy dictatorships died at a double, triple, or whatever times higher rate, that is,

[19] In the long run the proportion of democracies equals $p_{AD} / (p_{AD} + p_{DA})$, where p stands for transition probabilities, A for dictatorship ("authoritarianism"), and D for democracy. See Appendix 2. The numbers in the text are derived from Table 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

even if development made transitions to democracy much more likely, all the difference endogenous theory could make is 3.9 percent.

To conclude, there are no grounds to believe that economic development breeds democracies: Lipset's "optimistic equation," as O'Donnell dubs it,[20] the "benign line" in the language of Huntington and Nelson,[21] has few countries running along it and those that do scatter in random directions. In turn, once established, democracies are likely to die in poor countries and certain to survive in wealthy ones.

II. Ups or Downs?

There is yet another irony to Lipset's theory. While Lipset cited several factors to explain why democracies survive, anticipating Olson[22] and Huntington,[23] he thought that democracies were more likely to be destabilized when countries grew rapidly. In Lipset's view, this threat to democracy originated with "extremist movements"—fascism and communism—because, as he saw it, extremism was a product of rapid development. "Wherever industrialization occurred *rapidly*, introducing sharp *discontinuities* between the pre-industrial and industrial situation, more rather than less extremist working-class movements emerged."[24]

Here Lipset and company could not have been more wrong. Rapid growth is not destabilizing for democracy (and neither is it for dictatorship). When democracies face a decline in incomes, they die at the rate of 0.0523 and can be expected to last nineteen years, but when incomes are growing, they die at the rate of 0.0160, with an expected life of sixty-four years.[25] Moreover, democracies that grow slowly, at the rate of less than 5 percent per annum, die at the rate of 0.0173, while those that grow at a rate faster than 5 percent die at the rate of 0.0132. (See Table 5.)

What is most striking is how fragile poor democracies are in the face of economic crises. In poor countries, those with per capita income under $2,000, of the 107 years during which a decline of incomes occurred, twelve democracies fell the following year: the expected life of democracy under such conditions is about nine years. Even among

[20] O'Donnell (fn. 7), 4.

[21] Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) 19.

[22] Mancur Olson Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History* 23 (December 1963).

[23] Huntington (fn. 13).

[24] Lipset (fn. 1, 1981), 54.

[25] This finding parallels again the results of Londregan and Poole (fn. 16) with regard to coups, which they found to be less likely when the economy grows.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 5
OBSERVED RATES OF TRANSITIONS, BY LAGGED PER CAPITA INCOME AND LAGGED RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH[a]

		All			*Dictatorships*			*Democracies*		
Level	*Growth*	*PJK*	*TTR*	*TOT*	*PAD*	*TRD*	*TA*	*PDA*	*TRA*	*TD*
0–1000	Total	1.52	15	987	0.66	6	915	12.50	9	72
	G<=0	2.14	9	420	1.01	4	397	21.74	5	23
	G> 0	1.06	6	567	0.39	2	518	8.16	4	49
1001–2000	Total	3.29	32	972	2.48	18	727	5.71	14	245
	G<=0	4.68	14	299	3.26	7	215	8.33	7	84
	G> 0	2.67	18	673	2.15	11	512	4.35	7	161
2001–3000	Total	3.16	15	474	2.76	8	290	3.80	7	184
	G<=0	4.96	6	121	3.75	3	80	7.32	3	41
	G> 0	2.55	9	353	2.38	5	210	2.80	4	143
3001–4000	Total	2.38	8	336	1.61	3	186	3.33	5	150
	G<=0	3.23	3	93	1.92	1	52	4.88	2	41
	G> 0	2.06	5	243	1.49	2	134	2.75	3	109
4001–5000	Total	3.49	8	229	4.92	6	122	1.87	2	107
	G<=0	5.56	3	54	6.25	2	32	4.55	1	22
	G> 0	2.86	5	175	4.44	4	90	1.18	1	85
5001–6000	Total	3.14	6	191	6.41	5	78	0.88	1	113
	G<=0	5.71	2	35	10.53	2	19	0.00	0	16
	G> 0	2.56	4	156	5.08	3	59	1.03	1	97
6001–7000	Total	1.96	3	153	6.25	2	32	0.83	1	121
	G<=0	8.82	3	34	40.00	2	5	3.44	1	29
	G> 0	0.00	0	119	0.00	0	27	0.00	0	92
7001–	Total	0.15	1	649	3.33	1	30	0.00	0	619
	G<=0	0.00	0	110	0.00	0	3	0.00	0	107
	G> 0	0.19	1	539	3.70	1	27	0.00	0	512
Total	Total	2.21	88	3991	2.06	49	2380	2.42	39	1611
	G<=0	3.43	40	1166	2.61	21	803	5.23	19	363
	G> 0	1.70	48	2825	1.78	28	1577	1.60	20	1248

[a]Since per capita income is lagged, we lose 135 observations, for the total of 3991. The following abbreviations are used:

PJK is the probability that either regime dies during a particular year
TTR is the number of transitions
TOT is the total number of regime years at a particular level
PAD is the probability of transition to democracy
TRD is their number
TA is the total number of years under authoritarianism
PDA is the probability of transition to authoritarianism
TRA is their number
TD is the total number of years under democracy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries with incomes between $2,001 and $6,000, a decline of incomes resulted in the fall of six democracies in 120 years during which this happened: these democracies could expect to last 20 years. And then, above $6,055 a miracle occurs: in the 252 years during which wealthy democracies experienced economic crises, none ever fell.

Another striking feature of these patterns is that the political effects of economic crises are immediate: they occur one year later. We tried to reproduce Table 5 taking into account growth over a longer period and we did statistical (survival) analyses lagging growth more than one year. Both procedures show that past growth does not matter: one year of economic crisis is enough to produce the political effects.

Thus the hypothesis that rapid growth destabilizes regimes is simply false. In turn, to cite Diamond and Linz, it is true that "economic crisis represents one of the most common threats to democratic stability."[26] What destabilizes regimes are economic crises, and democracies, particularly poor democracies, are extremely vulnerable to bad economic performance.

III. Kinks: Modernization Theory Revisited

While there are important theoretical and even sharper political differences between Huntington and O'Donnell, both argued that there is a level beyond which further development decreases the probability that democracy will survive. Huntington contended that both regimes become unstable when a country undergoes modernization, which occurs at some intermediate levels of development. O'Donnell, in turn, claimed that democracies tend to die when a country exhausts "the easy stage of import substitution," again at some intermediate level.

Huntington was concerned with stability of regimes and did not care whether they were democratic or authoritarian. "The most important political distinction among countries," he told us, "concerns not their form of government but their degree of government."[27] Hence, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union were all systems in which "the government governs." Whether it is the politburo, the cabinet, or the president matters little. "The problem," he insisted, "was not to hold elections but to create organizations." Indeed, we were told, "The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legiti-

[26] Larry Diamond and Juan J. Linz. "Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin America," in L. Diamond, J. J. Linz, and S. M. Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 17.

[27] Huntington (fn. 13), 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mate public order."[28] While never explicitly referring to Lipset, Huntington observed that "in actuality, only some of the tendencies encompassed in the concept of 'political modernization' characterized the 'modernizing' areas. Instead of a trend toward competitiveness and democracy, there was an 'erosion of democracy' and a tendency to autocratic military regimes and one-party regimes. Instead of stability , there were repeated coups and revolts."[29]

Anticipating Huntington, O'Donnell raked Lipset through the coals for various methodological transgressions. Reflecting on his criticisms in retrospect, he observed that "Chapter I is now an archeological remnant—testimony of a debate that in 1971 had recently begun and today is finished: it is no longer necessary to lead the reader through tedious series of data to demonstrate that 'socio-economic development' does not foster 'democracy and/or political stability.'"[30] What the data show, O'Donnell asserted, is that in contemporary South America, the higher and the lower levels of modernization are associated with non-democratic political systems, while political democracies are found at intermediate levels of modernization." Hence, at least within the range observed by O'Donnell, we should observe that democracies fall as economies develop.

Is there some level of development beyond which democracies are more likely to die than before? Note (returning to Table 2, column 5) that the function relating the equilibrium proportion of democracies to per capita income has a kink at levels between $3,001 and $4,000: the observed values are 42.4 percent between $2,001 and $3,000, 32.6 percent between $3,001 and $4,000, and 72.0 percent between $4,001 and $5,000. But this kink is due to the fact that dictatorships are exceptionally stable in this range, rather than that democracies are less stable. The probability of a democracy dying declines monotonically with per capita income. While O'Donnell did find a countercase against Lipset, his account of the rise of bureaucratic authoritarianism is not a competing theory.[31] O'Donnell studied a country that turns out to be a distant outlier: Argentina is the only country where a democracy fell at an income above $6,000; Argentina is also the only country where one collapsed at an income between $5,000 and $6,000. Only two democra-

[28] Ibid., 7.

[29] Ibid., 35–36.

[30] O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, 2d ed. (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979), 204.

[31] O'Donnell was careful about not making general claims: his purpose was to explain the downfall of democracies in the Southern Cone. But his theory of "bureaucratic authoritarianism" captured the imagination of scholars around the world, who treated it as applicable almost everywhere.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cies fell in countries with incomes between $4,000 and $5,000: again one of them in Argentina, and the other in Uruguay. Five democracies fell between $3,000 and $4,000: one of them in Argentina. Indeed, outside Argentina, only five democracies fell in countries with incomes above $3,000: in Uruguay in 1973 at $4,034, Suriname in 1980 at $3,923, Chile in 1973 at $3,957, Fiji in 1987 at $3,398, and Greece in 1967 at $3,176. Thus, Lipset was right in thinking that the richer the country the more likely it is to sustain democracy, except in Argentina.

IV. Does History Repeat Itself?

Since our observations begin in 1950, the regimes we observed came into being as a result of either of two effects: their dynamic or the entrance of new countries into the world, or at least into our sample.

Consider the seventy-three countries in our sample that were independent in 1950, when thirty-five of them had democratic regimes. By 1960 the number of democracies among these countries increased to thirty-nine, only to fall to thirty-one by 1968. It was still thirty-one in 1978, after which it climbed, back to thirty-nine in 1984 and to forty-eight by 1990. Hence, with regard to the "old" countries, our count roughly agrees with Huntington's[32] oceanic analysis, according to which (1) the "second wave" of democratization began in 1943 and ended in 1962, (2) the "second reverse wave" started in 1958 and ended in 1975, and (3) the "third wave" of democratization began in 1974. But the story of the countries that became independent after 1950 is entirely different. Three out of twenty-five (12.0 percent) newly independent countries were democracies in 1960; subsequently, the numbers were seven out of forty-two (14.3 percent) in 1968, eleven out of fifty-five (16.6 percent) in 1978, and twelve out of sixty-eight in 1990 (17.6 percent). Hence, the proportion of democracies among these "new" countries grew slightly with no waves rolling down or up. In turn, the decline of the aggregate proportion of democracies in the world during the 1960s is largely due to the emergence of new countries rather than to transformations of old ones.

Since observations of any limited period of time combine dynamic and entry effects, the question whether history repeats itself is controversial. Studies in the Lipset tradition assume it does: they infer the historical process of "modernization" from cross-sectional observations.

[32] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 16. Huntington considered 74 countries while our sample covers 135 countries; hence, the data are not exactly comparable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Followers of Moore[33] contest the validity of such inferences, however, claiming that the Western European route to democracy was unique, not to be repeated.

Cross-sectional observations can be used to infer historical processes if the probabilities that regimes survive or die conditional on some exogenous variables (in our case per capita income) are the same across different cross sections, so that the probability that a country has a particular regime at any time depends only on the realized values of these variables, rather than the period, the region, or the time when the country became independent. And we know that (1) the probability that a democracy is born is widely scattered with regard to the level of development, rising at low levels and declining at high levels; (2) the probability that a democracy dies declines monotonically with per capita income; and (3) as a result, the probability that a country has a democratic regime increases with level. The question, then, is whether these conditional probabilities were the same in different periods or regions.

The controversy about the validity of inferences based on cross-sectional observations can be formulated in a number of alternative ways: (1) Were these probabilities different before World War II in Western Europe and elsewhere? (2) Were they different during the postwar period among countries that existed before 1950 ("old" countries) and those that became independent later ("new" countries)?

Without a full set of data for the prewar period, we can only make guesses with regard to the first question. Although economic data for the prewar period are not comparable with those at our disposal after 1950, we made heroic assumptions to guess the approximate levels at which democracies were established and fell in some of the present OECD countries. The results of these calculations are presented in Table 6.

Note, however, that these are not the only democracies that existed before World War II. Southern European as well as several Latin American countries experienced relatively long spells of democracy, while in Eastern Europe most of the democratic regimes that emerged in the aftermath of World War I collapsed after the first election.[34] And while Argentina and Uruguay must have been relatively wealthy at the beginning of the century, the average per capita income in Latin America was about one-half of that of the present OECD countries in 1913 and in 1950, while the average income in Eastern Europe was only

[33] Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).

[34] The exception is Czechoslovakia, but note that no alternation in office between parties occurred during this period. Indeed, the first alternation resulting from elections in the history of Eastern Europe occurred in Poland in 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 6
APPROXIMATE PER CAPITA INCOME AT THE TIME OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOME OF THE PRESENT OECD COUNTRIES[a]

	First Democratization		*Reversal*		*Present Democracy*	
	Date	*Level*	*Date*	*Level*	*Date*	*Level*
Australia (1901)	1901	3733	none		1901	3733
Austria	1918[b]	1545	1934	1825	1951	2535
Belgium	1919[b]	2960	none		1919	2960
Canada (1920)	1920	3838	none		1920	3838
Denmark	1901	2213	none		1901	2213
Finland (1917)	1919	1184	1930	1974	1944	2636
France	1875[c]	1748	none (?)		1875	1748
Germany	1919	1072	1933	1474	1949	2567
Italy	1919	1920	1922	1814	1946	1708
Norway (1905)	1884	1228	none		1884	1228
Sweden	1918	1919	none		1918	1919
Switzerland	1870[d]	2226	none		1870	2226
United Kingdom	1911[e]	3016	none		1911	3016
United States	1830[f]	1119	none		1830	1119

[a]Levels are GDP/cap expressed in 1985 USD. They are calculated by extrapolating backward the 1951 numbers for per capita GDP expressed in 1985 PPP USD, using the index numbers for GDP and the population figures provided by Angus Maddison, *The World Economy in the Twentieth Century* (Paris: OECD, 1992), Appendixes I, II. Democratization is dated by (1) the presence of contested elections organized on a partisan basis and (2) legislative sovereignty of the house elected by broadest suffrage (rather than responsibility to the crown or a nonelective upper chamber), whichever came later, but not by the extent of franchise or participation. For countries that became independent after 1871, dates in parentheses are for the year of independence.

[b]1920 figures were used.

[c]Therborn (fn. 8) dates democracy in France to 1884, while John D. Stephens, "Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Europe, 1870–1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1989), refers to the period 1875–84 as one of consolidation. The question mark for France refers to the Vichy regime.

[d]Both Therborn and Stephens date democracy in Switzerland to circa 1880, when the first national electoral register was established.

[e]Robert Dahl uses 1911 to date democracy in the United Kingdom, but scholars who use universal male suffrage as the criterion date it to 1918. See Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

[f]The dating of democracy in the United States ranges widely, from 1828 by Huntington (fn. 32), 16, to 1970 by Therborn. Since we do not take participation as a criterion, we date it early. Maddison does not provide a figure for 1830; we interpolated the numbers using 1820 and 1840.

slightly higher.[35] All this is not much to stand on, but perhaps enough to believe that (1) the levels at which democracies emerged before World War II were highly scattered; (2) they did not differ between Western Europe and other parts of the world; and (3) once established, democracies were more likely to fall in the poorer countries.

[35] World Bank, *World Bank Development Report 1991* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1991), Table 1.1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We are on firmer ground answering the second question.[36] Comparing the "new" and the "old" countries shows that democracies are more brittle in the new countries while dictatorships are more likely to die in the old ones. And, as Table 7 shows, the level of development again has powerful effects. The probabilities of a democracy falling decline dramatically with level in both groups of countries: indeed, this probability is the same once countries reach an income above $2,000. The probability of a transition to democracy increases with level among the old countries. But among the countries that became independent after 1950, dictatorships are as stable when they are wealthy as when they are poor. Among fifteen dictatorships in new countries with incomes above $2,000, only one fell during their 185 years until 1990, in Suriname in 1988 at $2,888, and only one more, in the Seychelles, after 1990.

We may be confusing, however, the effect of levels at which countries were first observed and the effect of development they experienced during the period under scrutiny. And the new countries were much poorer—their average income was $1,103—than the old ones—which had an average income of $2,613—when they were first observed. To distinguish these effects, we show in Table 8 the derivatives of the transition probabilities separately with regard to the entry levels and to the development since then.[37] The effects of the entry level are about the same for the two groups of countries. Democracies are more stable and dictatorships more brittle in countries that were wealthier, either when first observed in 1950 or whenever they became independent. But the effects of development since the time of entry differ greatly between the two groups of countries. The stability of democracy increases much

[36] A third question has also been posed: when D. A. Rustow, pointed out that the levels of development at which different countries permanently established democratic institutions vary widely, Lipset's (fn. 1, 1981) rejoinder was that the thresholds at which democracy was established were lower for the early democracies; see Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," *Comparative Politics* 2 (April 1970). A rough guess at comparing the levels at which democracies emerged before and after the war indicates that levels at which democracy was established before the war must have been on the average lower. But the distribution of incomes during the two periods was not the same: it is doubtful that many countries enjoyed incomes above $4,000 before the war. Hence, we do not know how long the countries that were poor at the time would have waited before becoming democracies. At most, we can compare the distribution of levels at which democratization occurred before the war with the distribution in the postwar period truncated at $4,000. If in addition to the guesses presented in Table 6 we also assume that incomes were lower in Eastern Europe and most of Latin America, the two distributions will be highly similar. But that is too many guesses to take seriously.

[37] Suppose that the function which relates regimes to level is $Pr[REGIME(t)=DEMOCRACY]=REG(t)=F[\alpha+\beta LEVEL(t)]$, where F stands for a normal or logistic distribution. Now subtract and add $\beta LEVEL(0)$ within the square brackets, to get $REG(t)=F[\alpha+\beta LEVEL(0)+\beta[LEVEL(t)-LEVEL(0)]]$. Defining LEVEL(0) as INI and LEVEL(t)–LEVEL(0) as DEV(t), and allowing the (cross-sectional) effect of the initial level to differ from the (dynamic) effect of development yields $REG(t)= F[\alpha+\beta_C INI+\beta_D DEV(t)]$. This is the model we estimated, by dynamic probit.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 7

OBSERVED AND PREDICTED REGIME TRANSITION PROBABILITIES, BY LAGGED PER CAPITA INCOME (LEVEL) AND BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES[a]

Low-High	*PJK*	*TJK*	*TOT*	*PAD*	*TRD*	*TA*	*PDA*	*TRA*	*TD*
All									
New	0.0124	18	1448	0.0058	7	1211	0.0464	11	237
				(0.0058)			(0.1183)		
Old	0.0275	70	2543	0.0359	42	1169	0.0204	28	1374
				(0.0544)			(0.0340)		
–2000									
New	0.0135	15	1111	0.0058	6	1036	0.1200	9	75
				(0.0058)			(0.1480)		
Old	0.0377	32	848	0.0297	18	606	0.0578	14	242
				(0.0279)			(0.0707)		
2000–									
New	0.0086	3	347	0.0054	1	185	0.0123	2	162
				(0.0058)			(0.0203)		
Old	0.0225	38	1695	0.0427	24	563	0.0124	14	1132
				(0.0676)			(0.0156)		

[a]The following abbreviations are used:
PJK is the probability that either regime dies during a particular year
TTR is the number of transitions
TOT is the total number of regime years at a particular level
PAD is the probability of transition to democracy
TRD is their number
TA is the total number of years under authoritarianism
PDA is the probability of transition to authoritarianism
TRA is their number
TD is the total number of years under democracy
New stands for countries that did not exist in 1950
Old stands for countries that existed in 1950
Numbers in parentheses are values predicted by the dynamic probit model.

TABLE 8

DERIVATIVES OF TRANSITION PROBABILITIES WITH REGARD TO THE INITIAL ("ENTRY") LEVEL AND THE ACCUMULATED DEVELOPMENT EVALUATED AT THE MEANS BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES[a]

	with Regard to			
	Initial Level		*Development*	
Derivative of	*Old*	*New*	*Old*	*New*
p_{DA}	−0.0554	−0.0552	−0.0966	−0.0191
p_{AD}	0.0383	0.0277	0.0112	−0.0190

[a]Level is measured in thousands. New stands for countries that did not exist in 1950. Old stands for countries that existed in 1950. Derivatives are based on a dynamic probit model; see Appendix 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more with development in the old than in the new countries. In turn, while development decreases slightly the probability of survival of dictatorships in old countries, the probability of transitions to democracy declines as new countries develop under authoritarian rule.

Hence, the promise that development would breed democracy proved to be particularly futile precisely with regard to those Third World countries to which it was supposed to offer hope. Development during the postwar period just did not have much of an impact on the collapse of dictatorships: an increase of per capita income of one thousand dollars raised the probability of dictatorship falling by only 1.12 percent among the old countries and lowered it by 1.90 percent among the new countries. But at least "modernization" worked in the right direction in the old countries, where most long-standing dictatorships, including those in Eastern Europe, did in the end fall. Most of the new countries, the great majority of them poor when they became independent, just remained poor; and those few that did develop remained authoritarian.

V. Conclusion

Whether couched in the language of the modernization perspective or the historical perspective, theories of the origins of democracy were deterministic. In the modernization theory no one does anything to bring democracy about; it is secreted by economic development and the corollary social transformations. Class actors do move history in Moore's theory, but they operate at a distance of centuries: the agrarian class structure of the seventeenth century determines the regimes countries settle on two or three hundred years later.[38] As Przeworski[39] observed, this deterministic emphasis made both approaches appear irrelevant when the issue of democratization appeared on the political agenda in the mid-1970s. The protagonists in the struggles for democracy could not and did not believe that the fate of their countries would be determined either by current levels of development or by the distant past. They maintained that, albeit within constraints, democratization was an outcome of actions, not just of conditions. Hence, the O'Donnell-Schmitter project was couched in terms of actors and strategies, rather than in terms of deterministic conditions.[40]

[38] Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stevens (fn. 6) go back just a few decades but the question remains: why would conditions found in the 1920s cause events in the 1960s, not earlier or later?

[39] Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[40] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Our findings strongly validate this latter approach. The emergence of democracy is not a by-product of economic development. Democracy is or is not established by political actors pursuing their goals, and it can be initiated at any level of development. Only once it is established do economic constraints play a role: the chances for the survival of democracy are greater when the country is richer. Yet even the current wealth of a country is not decisive: democracy is more likely to survive in a growing economy with less than $1,000 per capita income than in a country with an income between $1,000 and $2,000 that declines economically. If they succeed in generating development, democracies can survive even in the poorest nations.

Viewed from this perspective, the vision of the relation between development and democracy that dominated the intellectual mood and served to orient U.S. foreign policy during the cold war years appears strangely convoluted. While Lipset treated development as exogenous, his contemporaries were persuaded that dictatorship is the inevitable price of development. Galenson claimed that "the more democratic a government is, . . . the greater the diversion of resources from investment to consumption."[41] De Schweinitz argued that if the less developed countries "are to grow economically, they must limit democratic participation in political affairs."[42] And this was also the belief of Huntington and Dominguez:

> The interest of the voters generally leads parties to give the expansion of personal consumption a higher priority vis-à-vis investment than it would receive in a nondemocratic system. In the Soviet Union, for instance, the percentage of GDP devoted to consumption was driven down from 65 percent in 1928 to 52 percent in 1937. It is unlikely that a competitive party system would have sustained a revolution from above like this.[43]

Dictatorships are needed to generate development. As Huntington and Nelson put it, "Political participation must be held down, at least temporarily, in order to promote economic development."[44]

Since in this view dictatorships generate development while development leads to democracy, the best way to democracy was said to be a circuitous one. Yet common sense would indicate that in order to

[41] Walter Galenson, "Introduction" to Galenson, ed., *Labor and Economic Development* (New York: Wiley, 1959), 3.

[42] Karl de Schweinitz Jr., Industrialization, Labor Controls and Democracy," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 7 (July 1959).

[43] Samuel P. Huntington and Jorge I. Dominguez, "Political Development," in F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 60.

[44] Huntington and Nelson (fn. 21), 23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strengthen democracy we should strengthen democracy, not support dictatorships. And, even if G. B. Shaw warned that "common sense is that which tells us that the world is flat," the lesson of our analysis is that this time it is the best guide. With development, democracy can flourish in poor countries.

Appendix 1: Classifying Political Regimes[45]

Democracy is a regime in which some governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections. This definition has two parts: "offices" and "contestation."

In no regime are all governmental offices filled as a consequence of elections. What is essential to considering a regime as democratic is that two kinds of offices are filled by elections, whether directly or indirectly: the chief executive office and the seats in the effective legislative body.

Contestation occurs when there exists an opposition that has some chance of winning office as a consequence of elections. Whenever in doubt, we classify as democracies only those systems in which incumbent parties actually did lose them.

Operationally, a regime was classified as a democracy if none of the four rules listed below applied. Thus, a regime was classified as a dictatorship if at least one of these conditions held.

> Rule 1. Executive selection: the chief executive is not elected.
>
> Rule 2. Legislative selection: the legislature is not elected.
>
> Rule 3. Party: there is no more than one party. Specifically, this rule applies if (1) there were no parties, or (2) there was only one party, or (3) the current tenure in office ended up in the establishment of a nonparty or one-party rule, or (4) the incumbents unconstitutionally closed the legislature and rewrote the rules in their favor.
>
> Rule 4. Type II error: a regime passes the previous three rules, the incumbents held office in the immediate past by virtue of elections for more than two terms or without being elected, and until today or the time when they were overthrown they have not lost an election.

Alternation in office overrides the party rule. Hence, Jamaica—where a single party at one time held 100 percent of the seats in the legislature yet subsequently yielded office having lost an election—was classified as democratic during the entire period.

Our timing rules are the following. We code the regime that prevailed at the end of the year, even if it came to power on December 31,

[45] For a full explanation and historical details, see Alvarez et al. (fn. 10).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as, for example, dictatorship arrived in Nigeria in 1983. Transitions to authoritarianism are signaled by a coup d'état. Transitions to democracy are dated by the time of the inauguration of the newly elected government, not of the election. In the few cases where a democratic regime lasted six months (for example, the Dominican Republic in 1963) or where the situation changed several times (Bolivia in 1979), the information about regimes that began and ended within the same year is lost.

The main difference between our approach and the alternatives is that we use a dichotomous classification, rather than a polychotomous scale. We believe that while some regimes are more democratic than others, unless offices are contested, they should not be considered democratic. Nonetheless, from a practical point of view, alternative measures of democracy generate highly similar results. The dimensions used to assess whether or to what extent a particular regime is democratic seem to make little difference.[46] Our measure is no exception: the Coppedge-Reinicke[47] scale for 1978 predicts 92 percent of our regimes, the Bollen[48] 1965 scale predicts 85 percent, the Gurr[49] scales of Autocracy and Democracy for 1950–86 jointly predict 91 percent. The Gastil[50] scale of political liberties, covering the period from 1972 to 1990, predicts 93.2 percent of our classification; his scale of civil liberties predicts 91.5 percent; and the two scales jointly predict 94.2 percent of our regimes. Hence, there is no reason to think that our results are idiosyncratic to the particular classification of regimes.

Appendix 2: Dynamics of Regimes

Some algebra may help elucidate what is entailed in the distinction between endogenous and exogenous mechanisms.

Let the probability that a country, i= 1,...,N, has an authoritarian regime during a particular year, t= 1,...,T, be $p_A(it)$, where the subscript A stands for "authoritarian," and the probability that it has a demo-

[46] Alex Inkeless, "Introduction," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25 (Spring 1990), 3–6. Note, however, that different measures appear to be biased in somewhat different directions. See Kenneth A. Bollen, "Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures," *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (November 1993).

[47] Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Measuring Polyarchy," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25 (Spring 1990), 51–72.

[48] Kenneth A. Bollen, "Political Democracy and the Timing of Development," *American Sociological Review* 44 (August 1979), 572–87.

[49] Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore, "The Transformation of the Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power since 1800," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25 (Spring 1990).

[50] Gastil (fn. 4).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cratic regime be $p_D(it) = 1 - p_A(it)$. Let the probability that a dictatorship dies from one year to another be $p_{AD}(it)$, so that the probability that it survives is $p_{AA}(it) = 1 - p_{AD}(it)$. Similarly, let the probability that a democracy dies be $p_{DA}(it) = 1 - p_{DD}(it)$. If we assume for the time being that these "transition probabilities," p_{jk}, j = A,D, k = A,D, are constant over time and the same for all countries, then we can describe the evolution of regimes by

$$\begin{vmatrix} p_D(t+1) \\ p_A(t+1) \end{vmatrix} = \begin{vmatrix} p_{DD} & p_{AD} \\ p_{DA} & p_{AA} \end{vmatrix} \begin{vmatrix} p_D(t) \\ p_A(t). \end{vmatrix}$$

The proportion of regimes that are democracies next year depends therefore on the proportion of democracies that survived from the current year, p_{DD}, and the proportion of dictatorships that died, that is, became democracies, p_{AD}. The same holds for dictatorships.

Given the transition rates, there exists a distribution of regimes that, if reached, will remain stable in the absence of exogenous disturbances. These equilibrium probabilities are

$$p_D^* = \frac{p_{AD}}{p_{DA} + p_{AD}}$$

and

$$p_A^* = \frac{p_{DA}}{p_{DA} + p_{AD}}$$

Moreover, whatever the initial distribution of regimes, their proportions will over time tend to these equilibrium values. And since the probabilities that regimes die during any particular year are likely to be low—in fact they are low—this convergence will be monotonic; that is, the proportion of one type of regime will continue to increase and of the other to decline.[51]

As time passes, then, the long-run distribution of regimes depends only on the relative rates at which they die, not on their initial distrib-

[51] Convergence is monotonic if $p_{AD} + p_{DA} < 1$; otherwise, the proportions of regimes will oscillate around the equilibrium.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ution. If $p_{AD} > p_{DA}$, then in the long run there will be more democracies than dictatorships in the world and if at the beginning the proportion of democracies was lower than p_D^*, this proportion will continually increase over time.

Suppose now that while dictatorships die at some constant annual rate, democracies never die, so that $p_{DA} = 0$. You see immediately that in the long run all countries will be democracies. Every time a dictatorship dies, a democracy is established, and, once it is established, it survives forever. The speed of this process depends on the rate at which dictatorships die, but the accumulation of democracies is inexorable.

Now, to return to the issue at stake, imagine that these transition probabilities are not constant but depend on the level of development. To keep matters simple, suppose that there are only two levels: low (L) and high (H). At the low level, both regimes have some probability of dying that is more than zero and less than one. Now consider two possibilities.

One is that while $p_{AD}(L) < 1$, once dictatorships pass the threshold that defines the high level, they are certain to die, so that $p_{AD}(H) = 1$, while democracies die at the same rate at either level. The transition probabilities are thus

Level = Low		Level = High	
p_{DD}	p_{AD}	p_{DD}	1.00
p_{DA}	p_{AA}	p_{DA}	0.00

and while the long-run proportion of democracies at the low level will be $p_D^*(L) = p_{AD}/(p_{AD}+p_{DA})$, at the high level it will be $p_D^*(H) = 1/(1 + p_{DA})$, $p_D^*(L) < p_D^*(H)$. Thus, the proportion of democracies will be higher at the high level of development because democracies are more likely to emerge as a result of development. This is the endogenous—modernization—version of the explanation.

But suppose alternatively that authoritarian regimes die at exactly the same rate whether in poor countries or developed ones, so that $p_{AD}(L) = p_{AD}(H) = p_{AD}$, while in turn democratic regimes never die once they are established in affluent countries, so that p_{DA}=0.00. The transition probabilities are then

Level = Low		Level = High	
p_{DD}	p_{AD}	1.00	p_{AD}
p_{DA}	p_{AA}	0.00	p_{AA}

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and we already know that while the long-run proportion of democracies at the low level will be $p_D^*(L) < 1$, at the high level all countries will have a democratic regime in the long run. Hence, we will observe an aggregate relation between the level of development and the incidence of democracies even though democracies are equally likely to emerge at any level, that is, even if development under authoritarianism does not increase the probability that a country will become democratic. This is then the exogenous version.

Thus, to decide which mechanism generates the relation between development and democracy, we need to determine how the respective transition probabilities change with the level of development. To estimate the impact of level on transition probabilities, we rely on Amemyia.[52] Our data obey a first-order Markov processes; that is, the present regime depends only on the regimes during the previous year, but not beyond. Such processes are defined by:

$$E(R_t=1 \mid R_{t-1}, R_{t-2}, \ldots) = P(t)R_{t-1},$$

where R = D,A stands for regimes, R=D for democracy and R=A for dictatorship, and P(t) is the matrix of transition probabilities, with elements $p_{jk}(t)$. Hence,

$$R_t = P(t)\, R_{t-1} + u_t.$$

Taking expectations of both sides yields

$$\begin{vmatrix} p(R_t=1) \\ p(R_t=0) \end{vmatrix} = \begin{vmatrix} p_{AA} & p_{DA} \\ p_{AD} & p_{DD} \end{vmatrix} \begin{vmatrix} p(R_{t-1}=1) \\ p(R_{t-1}=0) \end{vmatrix}$$

where the sum of columns of the transition matrix, $\Sigma_j p_{jk} = 1$, j=0,1; k=0,1. Hence

$$\begin{aligned} p(R_t=1 \mid R_{t-1}) &= p_{AA}(t)p(R_{t-1}=1) + p_{DA}(t)p(R_{t-1}=0) = \\ &= p_{AA}(t)p(R_{t-1}=1) + p_{DA}(t)[1-p(R_{t-1}=1)] = \\ &= p_{DA}(t) + [p_{AA}(t)-p_{DA}(t)]p(R_{t-1}=1). \end{aligned}$$

Now let X be the vector of the exogenous variables. Assume that

$$p_{DA}(t) = F(X_{t-1}\,\beta),$$
$$p_{AA}(t) = F[X_{t-1}(\alpha+\beta)],$$

[52] Takeshi Amemyia, *Advanced Econometrics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), chap. 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

where F(.) is the CDF of normal distribution. Note that $p_{jk}(t)$ is the probability of transition from being in state j at time (t-1) to being in state k at time t. Given that whenever a transition occurred we code the regime as the one that became installed during this year, the probability of transition between (t-1) and t depends on the conditions at (t-1). Hence, we lag the X's.
Then

$$\begin{aligned} p(R_t=1 \mid R_{t-1}) &= p_{DA}(t) + [p_{AA}(t)-p_{DA}(t)]p(R_{t-1}=1) \\ &= F(X_{t-1}\beta) + \{F[X_{t-1}(\alpha+\beta)]-F(X_{t-1}\beta)\}p(R_{t-1}=1) \\ &= F(X_{t-1}\beta) + F(X_{t-1}\alpha)p(R_{t-1}=1) = F(X_{t-1}\beta + \\ &\quad X_{t-1}R_{t-1}\alpha). \end{aligned}$$

Hence, to estimate α and β, from which one can calculate p_{DA} and p_{AA}, and thus $p_{DD} = 1 - p_{DA}$ and $p_{AD} = 1 - p_{AA}$, all we need to do is probit on $R_t = X_{t-1}\beta + X_{t-1}\alpha R_{t-1} + u$.

This is the model we used to generate results in Tables 2 and 8, with R(0) as observed. The derivatives used in Table 8 are

$$\frac{dp_{DA}}{dX} = f(X_{t-1}\beta)\beta \text{ and } \frac{dp_{AD}}{dX} = -f[X_{t-1}(\alpha+\beta)](\alpha+\beta).$$

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PREFERENCE FOR PRESIDENTIALISM
Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS

By GERALD M. EASTER*

IN postcommunist regime transitions, why did most of the newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union choose presidentialism while most of Eastern Europe opted for parliamentarism? Moreover, as a result of these institutional choices, what are the long-term implications for democratic consolidation? This paper contends that the structure of old regime elites as they emerged from the breakdown phase best explains the preference for presidentialism exhibited in the NIS. Institutional choice is depicted as a strategy by which elite actors seek to gain access to the power resources of the state. A comparison is presented between two presidential cases, Russia and Uzbekistan, and one parliamentary case, Estonia. Based on the findings, the paper suggests a revision to institutionalist arguments that presidentialism leads to failed democracy by redirecting attention from the formal rules of the game to the actors who make the choice.

I. Democratic Transitions and Comparative Presidentialism

In the mid-1980s a small group of comparativists returned to one of the oldest questions in political science: What conditions lead to democracy? Stirred by the breakdown of authoritarianism in Southern Europe and Latin America, these scholars constructed conceptual frameworks

* An earlier version of this paper was presented as a university seminar on democratization at Georgetown University in March 1995. I benefited from the comments of Harley Balzer, Samuel Barnes, Karl Cerny, Eusebio Mujal-Leon, and Marina Ottaway. I also would like to acknowledge the participants in a graduate seminar at Georgetown University from which the idea for this paper was first developed: Pippin Gilman, Eric Huffman, Chip LeGrand, Matt Thomas, Chris Speckhard, and Mara Vorhees.

World Politics 49 (January 1997), 184–211

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for comparing authoritarian regimes in transition.[1] By the early 1990s the democratization wave had reached Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, as well as Asia and Africa. The "transitions" literature provided a convenient point of departure for the elaboration of theory and its application beyond the original cases.[2]

As democratization processes unfolded, scholarly attention shifted from the transition stage to the consolidation stage.[3] Cross-national studies indicated that while many countries had undergone at least some form of democratization, only a few had actually achieved democratic consolidation, that is "a regime that meets all the procedural criteria of democracy and also in which all politically significant groups accept established political institutions and adhere to democratic rules of the game."[4] Scholars now sought to uncover the factors that facilitated or obstructed processes of democratic consolidation. As part of this effort, some comparativists stressed the role played by the formal "rules of the game" in shaping regime outcomes. In particular, they asserted that the institutional choice of presidentialism tends to produce democratic failure.

The "perils of presidentialism" were outlined by Juan Linz, who argued in a seminal article that two institutional features of presidential regimes—fixed terms in office and winner-take-all elections—had contributed historically to rigidity in the political process, inadequate societal representation, dual authority between the executive and the legislature, and the fragmentation of the party system.[5] Under presidentialism, Linz argued, the propensity for political stalemate coupled with the concentration of formal powers increased the probability for

[1] See G. O'Donnell, P. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead, eds., *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986–88); especially, vol. 3, *Comparative Perspectives*, and vol. 4, *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*.

[2] See, e.g., G. DiPalma, *To Craft Democracy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); T. Vanhanen, *The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study of 147 States* (New York: Crane Russak, 1990); A. Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); S. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); N. Bermeo, ed., *Liberalization and Democratization: Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). See also the *Journal of Democracy*, devoted exclusively to the study of worldwide processes of democratization, which was first published in 1990.

[3] See J. Higley and R. Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and, S. Mainwaring, G. O'Donnell, and S. Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).

[4] Higley and Gunther (fn. 3), 3.

[5] "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Winter 1990). An expanded version of this argument is found in "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" in J. Linz and A. Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nondemocratic regime outcomes. Moreover, Linz strongly disputed the argument often raised by proponents of presidentialism that it provided more effective governance and, hence, promoted political stability.

Linz's observations on presidentialism helped to focus attention on and to define the terms of debate for an important question in the study of democratic transitions: To what extent do formal institutional choices determine regime outcomes? By uncovering the hidden pitfalls in the formal institutional rules of the game, a large number of scholars subsequently sought to explain why so many regime transitions had failed to achieve democracy. Following Linz, they contended that presidentialism, in a systematic way, impeded processes of democratic consolidation.[6]

Not all students of democratization and regime change accepted this conclusion. The critics fell into two categories: institutionalist and contextualist. As an example of the former, Donald Horowitz pointed out that in postcolonial Africa and Asia, the Westminster model of parliamentarism was the "institutional villain" behind a string of failed democracies, resurgent authoritarianisms, and unstable polities.[7] Matthew Shugart and John Carey likewise found in a wide-ranging comparative study that democratic failure was as apt to occur in parliamentary as in presidential regimes.[8] A second group of critics, however, embraced contextualist explanations of democratic origins from several decades past.[9] Seymour M. Lipset emphasized that democratic regime outcomes were ultimately determined by socioeconomic factors and cultural heritage.[10] Robert Putnam, meanwhile, in a cross-regional comparison of "civic traditions" in Italian politics, concluded that "social

[6] S. Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," *Comparative Political Studies* 26, no. 2 (July 1993); A. Stepan and C. Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism and Presidentialism," *World Politics* 46 (October 1993); A. Valenzuela, "Latin America: Presidentialism in Crisis," *Journal of Democracy* 4 (October 1993); G. O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (January 1994); and, F. Riggs, "Conceptual Homogenization of a Heterogeneous Field: Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective," in M. Dogan and A. Kazancigil, eds., *Comparing Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).

[7] D. Horowitz, "Comparing Democratic Systems," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Fall 1990).

[8] M. Shugart and J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chap. 3. Shugart and Carey make a case in favor of a modified form of presidentialism, "premier presidentialism," which is similar to Duverger's "semi-presidential" type found in France and Austria. See M. Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government," *European Journal of Political Research* 8, no. 2 (1980). A similar argument is made in G. Sartori, *Comparative Constitutional Engineering* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), chap. 7.

[9] The better-known examples include: S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (1959); G. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and, B. Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[10] S. M. Lipset, "The Centrality of Political Culture," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Fall 1990).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capital"—norms of reciprocity and networks of trust—were necessary to sustain democracy.[11]

This debate over institutional choice and regime outcomes has directed attention to a previously undeveloped area of study, comparative presidentialism. Prompted by the realization that references to the American or French model do not sufficiently penetrate the dynamics of power in newly formed presidential regimes, comparative presidentialism endeavors to develop a body of literature by defining the various types of presidentialism that have emerged in transition processes, identifying the conditions and coalitions that tend to lead to presidentialism, and determining more precisely the ways in which institutional choices affect democratic consolidation.[12] In this regard, regime transitions in postcommunist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union offer an ideal opportunity for the further development of comparative presidentialism.

Preliminary evidence of regime change across this region suggests support for Linz's argument. Those cases whose prospects for democracy seem more promising, such as the Czech Republic or Hungary, have opted for parliamentarism; those cases whose prospects appear less encouraging, such as Romania and Central Asia, have chosen presidentialism. These postcommunist institutional trends raise a question whose answer promises to provide new insights for the study of comparative presidentialism: Why did most of the former Soviet Union choose presidentialism, while most of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states opted for parliamentarism?

II. Postcommunist Regime Change: Old Regime Elites, Power Resources, and Institutional Choice

This paper develops a revised institutionalist explanation by focusing on old regime elites. The argument, in brief, is that the structure of old regime elites, as they emerge from the breakdown phase, determines institutional choice in the transition phase.[13] Variation in structure is de-

[11] R. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[12] See J. Linz and A. Valenzuela (fn. 5), ix–xii.

[13] The observation that elite structures influence regime transitions has been made previously. See S. Huntington, "How Countries Democratize," *Political Science Quarterly* 106 (Winter 1991–92); J. Higley and M. Burton, "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns," *American Sociological Review* 54 (February 1989); and, A. Stepan, "Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," in G. O'Donnell et al., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

termined by the continuity in the internal integrity of the old regime elites and by the extent to which old regime elites retain access to their power resources. Three structural types of old regime elites emerged from the postcommunist transitions: consolidated, dispersed, and reformed.[14]

Consolidated old regime elites came through the breakdown phase structurally intact. They did not experience severe cleavages or internal fragmentation. In these cases, opposition forces were too weak to force old regime elites to alter the means of acquiring power. As a result, old regime elites successfully retained their monopoly of power resources in the transition phase.

Second, dispersed old regime elites experienced internal fragmentation in the breakdown phase. In these cases, opposition forces successfully mobilized mass support in collective actions, such as demonstrations, elections, and boycotts, to dislodge old regime elites from their positions of power. Having undergone internal fragmentation and been denied access to power resources, they were forced to compete for power in the same manner as new political actors in the transition phase.

Third, reformed old regime elites do not come through the breakdown structurally intact, but they do not experience internal fragmentation. Internal cleavages are exposed, and some old regime elites are removed from power. Surviving old regime elites and new political actors enter into power-sharing arrangements. Old regime elites must reform themselves to maintain their access to power resources. They are in a weakened position but still possess significant resource advantages over new actors during the transition phase.

These structural variations of old regime elites, in turn, influenced institutional choice in the transition phase. Three institutional choices existed: presidentialism, parliamentarism, and a mixed system.[15] Invariably, presidentialism was chosen in all six cases of consolidated elites. Parliamentarism, meanwhile, was selected in six of the eight cases of

[14] These three elite structures correspond roughly with Scott Mainwaring's typology of regime transitions: a *dispersed* structure results from "transition through regime defeat," a *reformed* structure results from "transition through extrication," and a *consolidated* structure results from "transition by transaction." The chief difference with Mainwaring's typology arises in the cases of a consolidated elite structure, where the costs of staying in power *decreased* and the transitions fell far short of consolidated democracies. Mainwaring, "Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues," in Mainwaring et al. (fn. 3), 322–25.

[15] Institutional choice is determined by employing Shugart and Carey's two defining criteria: (1) the government's survival is more dependent on the president or parliament; and, (2) the president or the parliament is the principal authority over the government. The two criteria are measured as a continuum ranging from "maximum" to "none." A mixed system exists if neither the president nor parliament is able to dominate both criteria. Shugart and Carey (fn. 8), 26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dispersed elites. The exceptional case of Poland moved from a parliamentary to a mixed system. Finally, presidentialism tended to be the institutional choice in cases of reformed elites. These eleven cases produced seven presidential systems, two mixed systems, and two parliamentary systems. (See Table 1.)

But why should old regime elites prefer presidentialism while new political actors prefer parliamentarism? The answer may be that institutional choice reflects alternative strategies for securing access to the power resources of the state. The state here refers to an institutional complex within which formal powers reside to employ coercion, to resolve societal disputes, to enact and administer laws and regulations, and to extract and reallocate economic revenues. In this regard, Przeworski's observation that "institutions have distributional consequences" is crucial for understanding how institutional preferences are formed.[16]

In postcommunist transitions, presidentialism was preferred by those old regime elites who in the process of regime breakdown maintained their access, completely or partially, to the state's power resources. Their goal during the transition phase was not only to keep what they already had but also to deny it to others. Presidentialism offered an institutional form that served this goal better than parliamentarism. The particular institutional features of presidentialism—powers of decree, separation of executive and legislature, and fixed terms in office—were used by old regime elites to establish a proprietary claim on the state's power resources. For these old regime elites, presidentialism provided a buffer against the encroachments of democracy, liberalization, and the market.

By contrast, parliamentarism was preferred in cases in which old regime elites had been dispersed. New political actors entered the transition with, at best, limited access to the power resources of the state. Their primary concern was to establish access to the power resources of the state. Parliamentarism served this goal better than presidentialism. Particular institutional features of parliamentarism—no confidence votes and legislative control of the executive—guarded against any one political party or group from making a proprietary claim on the state's power resources. Thus, access to the state's power resources was secured through the routinization of a system of electoral competition.

This argument also explains the seemingly anomalous cases in which new political actors emerged as presidentialism advocates. In late 1991, President Václav Havel, the former Civic Forum leader, sought to amend the new Czechoslovak constitution to give to the president the

[16] Przeworski (fn. 2), 81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1
STRUCTURE OF OLD REGIME ELITES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE

Dispersed Elites		*Consolidated Elites*		*Reformed Elites*	
Country	*Institutional Choice*	*Country*	*Institutional Choice*	*Country*	*Institutional Choice*
Czech Rep.	parliamentary	Azerbaijan	presidential	Albania	parliamentary
Estonia	parliamentary	Kazakhstan	presidential	Armenia	presidential
Hungary	parliamentary	Kyrgyzstan	presidential	Belarus	presidential
Latvia	parliamentary	Tajikistan	presidential	Bulgaria	parliamentary
Lithuania	mixed	Turkmenistan	presidential	Croatia	presidential
Poland	mixed	Uzbekistan	presidential	Georgia	presidential
Slovakia	parliamentary			Moldova	mixed
Slovenia	parliamentary			Mongolia	mixed
				Romania	presidential
				Russia	presidential
				Ukraine	presidential

power to dissolve the parliament. Havel's proposed mixed system was rejected, and a parliamentary system prevailed. Poland originally opted for parliamentarism, but under pressure from former Solidarity leader, Lech Walesa, the institutional division of power was revised to form a mixed system. In Albania, Democratic Party leader Sali Berisha also sought to abandon parliamentarism in favor of presidentialism; in 1994 he succeeded in holding a popular referendum for a presidential constitution, which was defeated. In these cases, the new political actors only began to advocate presidentialism after they were elected to serve as presidents in parliamentary systems.

To demonstrate the causal dynamic at work, three cases of institutional choice from the former Soviet Union are developed below. The three cases—Russia, Uzbekistan, and Estonia—represent the three types of old regime elite structures. The cases survey three aspects of the transition process: the politics of regime breakdown, the dynamics of institutional choice, and the patterns of elite access to power resources.

III. RUSSIA: REFORMED ELITES AND PRESIDENTIALISM

The establishment of presidentialism in Russia was a direct consequence of the failure of an elite settlement to a postcommunist "extrication crisis" following the Soviet collapse. This pattern of institutional choice characterized transitions in Ukraine and Belarus as well.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Politics of Regime Breakdown

As with all the republics of the former Soviet Union, the fall of the communist regime in Russia began with Gorbachev's ill-fated attempt to remake the Soviet Union along the lines of "reform socialism." Persuaded of the need to restore the credibility of the regime's authority, Gorbachev pushed the policy agenda in the direction of political reform during the first half of 1987. For the next two years, Gorbachev pursued a program of increasing political liberalization under the rubric of glasnost. In 1989 and 1990 he forced through a package of more radical political institutional reforms, including the transfer of policy-making power away from the communist party bureaucracy to a restructured legislature; the introduction of multicandidate elections for a portion of the seats in the new legislature; the repeal of the constitutional article sanctioning a communist party monopoly; the duplication of these legislative and electoral reforms at the republican level; and, the transformation of the presidency from a symbolic office into a fully empowered chief executive.

Gorbachev's reforms represented an attempt at controlled and limited democratization from above.[17] The new legislature, for example, was structured so that communist party elites would safely maintain a majority. Meanwhile, the new president would not be subject to direct popular elections but rather would be nominated and elected by the communist-dominated legislature. Gorbachev's efforts to enliven political discourse and to rouse new actors into politics succeeded according to plan, but his attempt to define a new set of constraints according to his vision of reform socialism failed spectacularly. The reforms unintentionally sparked centrifugal forces in the republics and undermined administrative capacities in the center. A political crisis unfolded that ultimately led to the territorial and institutional demise of the Soviet state.

In the Russian republic, Gorbachev's reforms gave rise to a loosely organized democratic movement, composed largely of the urban-based intelligentsia. The reforms, in addition, exposed and politicized cleavages among old regime elites along generational, ideological, and regional lines. By the end of 1990 the Russian parliament established

[17] Gorbachev's approach, however, did not quite fit the Spanish or Brazilian versions of "pacta transition" or "transition by transaction." In these cases, regime leaders engaged preexisting and organized sociopolitical groups in a gradual process of negotiation and compromise. See D. Share, "Transitions to Democracy and Transition through Transaction," *Comparative Political Studies* 19 (January 1987). By contrast, Soviet leaders attempted to give form and content to a within-system reform campaign that unintentionally gave rise to radicalized movement politics. See M. S. Fish, *Democracy from Scratch* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

itself as a new political force independent of the Soviet center.[18] The new parliament, elected in March 1990, formally empowered representatives of the democratic opposition. Moreover, it provided a safe haven for defectors from the old regime. A coalition of democrats and renegade communists, known as Democratic Russia, soon emerged as a parliamentary bloc.

These electoral and legislative reforms subverted the patronage networks of a number of local communist political machines. Prominent party bosses, particularly in urban areas, were voted out of power at this time. Many more party officials, however, managed to survive the electoral campaigns by taking advantage of their access to financial, organizational, and media resources. Indeed, 86 percent of the deputies in the new parliament were listed as Communist Party members.[19] From this cast of old regime territorial administrators and economic managers emerged a rival parliamentary bloc, known as Communist Russia.

Gorbachev's reforms effectively transformed the means of acquiring power in Russian politics. But Russia's communist elites did not succumb to a process of self-destruction, such as occurred in the Baltic republics. Instead, they were forced to reform themselves in order to adapt to the new processes and structures of power. Those old regime elites that were able to make this transformation emerged from the breakdown phase sharing power uneasily with a disparate collection of new political actors.

Dynamics of Institutional Choice

From its inception, the Russian presidency was the object of power struggles.[20] The position was formed in the context of the personal rivalry between Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Although forced out of power by Gorbachev in 1987, Yeltsin made a spirited comeback in 1990, emerging as chair of the new Russian parliament. From his Russian republican power base, he challenged the authority of Gorbachev and the Soviet center. In the spring of 1991 an additional question on the creation of a Russian presidency was attached to Gorbachev's referendum on a new union treaty. Popular support for a republican

[18] R. Smyth, "Ideological vs. Regional Cleavages: Do Radicals Control the RSFSR Parliament?" *Journal of Soviet Nationalities* 4, no. 3 (1991).

[19] D. Slider, "Political Elites and Politics in the Republics," in D. Lane, ed., *Russia in Flux* (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1992), 49.

[20] The position of republican presidency was created by Gorbachev in the Soviet center as an enticement to increasingly independent-minded bosses from the republican parties to support his political reforms. Y. Kuznetsov, "The Making of a President," *Demokratizatsya* 2 (Spring 1994), 223.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

presidency was overwhelming.[21] In June 1991, Yeltsin became Russia's first popularly elected president, winning an outright majority of 57 percent on the first ballot.[22]

The presidency that Yeltsin won, however, was weak. Power was formally vested in an overarching collective body, the Congress of Peoples Deputies, a Gorbachevian institutional innovation designed to ensure communist control of the new republican parliament. The congress authorized the parliament to set limits on presidential power. Parliament maintained a veto power over presidential decisions, but the president was denied a similar checking mechanism over parliament. Further, the parliament could initiate impeachment proceedings against the president, but the president could not suspend or disband the parliament.

Parliamentary supremacy, however, proved short-lived as presidential powers were enhanced to meet the challenges of independence. In autumn 1991, Yeltsin's personal popularity soared following the defeat of the August coup. In November the congress ceded to Yeltsin special powers to rule by emergency decree for one year.[23] Yeltsin readily took advantage of this opportunity by launching a program of radical economic reform and naming himself acting prime minister and defense minister. By spring, the congress and the parliament had grown resentful of presidential rule. They acted to revoke the president's special powers, to revise his economic and foreign policies, and to reassert their own constitutional claim to power.

For the next eighteen months, Russia's transition was paralyzed by an extrication crisis.[24] In the process of regime transition, extrication crises arise when representatives of the old order, who are part of a transition coalition, clash with coalition partners over their place in the new order. Extrication crises are generally characterized by uncertainty among the protagonists over the correlation of power resources; a dispute over the institutional division of power; an intensification of ideological differences; and, a breakdown of elite compromises. Russia's extrication crisis unfolded when a coalition of liberal democrats, reform communists, young officers, and regional leaders came undone in the months following independence. Without a common enemy, the coalition split over the spoils of power.

Seven different constitutions (five parliamentary and two presiden-

[21] *Izvestiia*, March 26, 1991, p. 2.
[22] *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, June 14, 1991, p. 1.
[23] *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, November 3, 1991, p. 1.
[24] Przeworski (fn. 2), 67–69.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tial) were drafted, debated, and dismissed during this period.[25] Yeltsin's repeated efforts to seek an elite settlement to this standoff proved unsuccessful. As a result, he organized a popular referendum on presidential rule. The results of the referendum, held in April 1993, indicated popular approval for both the president and his reform policies.[26] Declaring a mandate, Yeltsin presented a new draft constitution for a presidential system. The draft was immediately assailed from parliamentary quarters for returning Russia to the days of the "father tsar."[27] Parliamentary leaders again countered with their own draft outlining a parliamentary system. Yeltsin next sought to circumvent the parliament by convening a special constitutional assembly composed largely of regional leaders.[28] Meeting throughout the summer, the constitutional assembly bickered over the division of powers between the center and the periphery.[29] Several regional leaders, in addition, insisted that a new constitution must be submitted for debate and ratification to each of Russia's eighty-eight regional councils.[30] At the same time, the parliament enacted new legislation reaffirming that the adoption of a new constitution was strictly a parliamentary matter.[31]

Finally, in September 1993, Yeltsin gambled to break this institutional stalemate. He decreed the suspension of the existing "Soviet" constitution and the dissolution of both the congress and the parliament.[32] He further announced new parliamentary and presidential elections and a referendum on a new constitution. Predictably, parliamentary leaders were defiant. The conflict escalated into violence. In the end, Yeltsin's decree was forcibly implemented by a reluctant military.[33] Yeltsin seized the moment to impose an institutional choice on the Russian transition.

A draft of a new constitution proposing a strong presidential system was issued for public discussion in November. This version concentrated even greater formal powers in the center, in general, and in the presidency, in particular, than any of the drafts previously debated and

[25] C. Thorsen, "Russia's Draft Constitution," *RFE/RL*, December 3, 1993.
[26] *Izvestiia*, April 27, 1993, pp. 1, 2.
[27] *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, April 28, 1993, p. 1.
[28] *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, June 6, 1993, p. 1.
[29] *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, May 26, 1993, p. 1; May, 27, 1993, p. 1; June 19, 1993, p. 1.
[30] *Segodnia*, July 13, 1993, p. 2.
[31] *Rossiiskie vesti*, July 20, 1993, p. 1.
[32] *Izvestiia*, September 22, 1993, p. 1.
[33] According to Yeltsin's own account, military leaders at first refused to carry out his orders to take the parliament building by force. Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia* (New York: Times Books, 1994), chap. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rejected.[34] With only minor revisions, the draft was approved by popular vote in the December referendum.[35] The new constitution abolished the congress and restructured the parliament. A bicameral parliament began meeting in January 1994. The presidential election that was promised to be held in conjunction with the parliamentary elections was canceled.

Under the new constitution, the survival of the president and the government is independent of parliamentary approval. The president is directly elected for four years with a two-term limit. The president alone has the power to dissolve the parliament or the government. Parliament technically can remove a sitting president, but it is extremely difficult.[36] Also, the parliament has the power to issue a no-confidence vote in the government, which can be rejected by the president. If parliament records a second no-confidence vote within three months, the president must respond by either sacking the council of ministers or dissolving the parliament.

The president is accorded a preponderance of power over the affairs of government. The president is allowed to chair meetings of the government. The president nominates the prime minister, who in turn forms a cabinet. While the parliament confirms or rejects the president's choice for prime minister, the president can resubmit the same name up to three times. On the third try, however, should parliament again reject the nominee, the president has the power to dissolve the parliament and call for new elections. The president and government initiate legislation, which becomes law with a simple parliamentary majority. The parliament may initiate legislation, but it is subject to presidential veto, which can be overridden only if two-thirds of the upper and lower houses endorse the legislation a second time.

[34] *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, November 10, 1993, p. 1. Sergei Filatov, then head of the president's staff, authored most of the revisions strengthening the presidency. *Moskovskie novosti*, October 31, 1993, pp. A8, A9; *Izvestiia*, October 26, 1993, p. 5.

[35] The referendum required a minimum 50 percent approval from a minimum 50 percent of the electorate for ratification. The official figures listed 54.8 percent of the electorate participating, with 58.4 percent voting in favor of the new constitution. *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, December 25, 1993, p. 1. It was later suggested that the turnout figures were inflated to assure the ratification of the constitution. *Izvestiia*, May 4, 1994, p. 1.

[36] The impeachment process requires: (1) one-third of the lower house voting to charge the president with treason or serious criminal conduct; (2) a Constitutional Court ruling on the procedural correctness of the lower house's action; (3) a Supreme Court ruling on the substance of the lower house's charge; (4) an additional ruling on the substance of the charge by a special commission of lower house members; (5) two-thirds of the lower house voting in favor of impeachment; and (6) two-thirds of the upper house voting in favor of impeachment. If this process is not concluded within three months, the charge against the president is automatically dropped.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The president is further entrusted with special powers and resources, which are employed at his or her personal discretion and permit the circumvention of established procedures of power-sharing and policy-making. Most significant is the power of decree. Presidential decrees are not subject to parliamentary review, although they carry the same legal weight as legislation approved by parliament. Special coercive and organizational resources also are placed at the president's disposal. Several military, police, and intelligence units are in service to the president. These units are detached from their normal chains of command and are directly subordinated to the president. An administrative apparatus of more than two thousand employees serves the president.[37]

Patterns of Elite Access to Power Resources

Russia's postcommunist institutional choice was designed deliberately to insulate the president from the parliament. The president works through the council of ministers, a special security council, and the presidential administration to make policy. Power is concentrated in these elite bodies. Old regime elites from the military, internal security, bureaucracy, industry, regions, and even the orthodox church have looked to the president to protect their access to power resources from the encroachments of democratization, liberalization, and marketization. In this section, three sets of elite actors are briefly examined: regional governors, who seek access to organizational-administrative resources; the police and military, who seek access to coercive resources; and industrial managers, who seek access to economic resources.

As president, Yeltsin decreed for himself the power to appoint and dismiss regional and local heads of government. Following his clash with the parliament, a presidential decree enhanced executive powers in relation to elected legislative councils at the regional and local levels. As a result, regional governors were empowered to preside over meetings of the elected councils.[38] Regional elites organized themselves into the Union of Governors, which engaged in direct consultations with the president. As a result of such consultations, presidential decrees were issued to postpone gubernatorial elections from June 1994 to June 1996, and then again to December 1996.[39] In this way, the territorial

[37] An excellent investigation into the presidential administrative apparatus is found in E. Huskey, "The State-Legal Administration and the Politics of Redundancy," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 11 (April–June 1995).

[38] See Yeltsin's two presidential decrees on local government, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, October 12, 1993, and December 25, 1993.

[39] See the interview with Anatolii Tiazhlov, chair of the Union of Governors, in *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, August 16, 1995, pp. 1, 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

administrative elite have attempted to make a proprietary claim on access to organizational-administrative resources. In August 1995, the governors used the same means to secure for the regions, an additional budget allocation of 500 billion rubles.[40] In addition, through negotiations with the president and the government, several regional heads have signed ad hoc treaties by which they may claim control of a larger share of regional economic resources over the protests of the parliament.[41]

Concerning coercive elites, postcommunist Russia has undergone a near complete turnover in the top leadership of the police and military, but old regime elites still effectively run these bureaucracies. The former Committee for State Security, the KGB, was reorganized into a new Federal Security Service and placed under the leadership of Evgenii Primakov, a former academic and foreign-affairs specialist.[42] But a comprehensive examination of personnel promotions in the new security service found that a corps of middle-level career officers from the old KGB now occupied the top executive posts in the new security agency.[43] In May 1992, a Russian military force was formed from the remnants of the Soviet Red Army. The 1993 constitution gives the president the power to name the defense minister and the chief of staff. Since the collapse of the Soviet regime, many senior Red Army officers have either resigned or been forced out of their posts. Yet the military's leadership remains firmly in the hands of a group of professional soldiers, who were junior officers and veterans of the Afghanistan campaigns in the old regime.[44] Parliament's attempts to establish mechanisms of civilian political control over Russia's coercive elites have not been successful. Instead, civilian political authority interacts with coercive power in a personalistic manner within the domain of the president's security council.

The former industrial elite of the Soviet regime have emerged as the dominant force in the government's council of ministers.[45] The old regime's managerial elite has successfully secured control over economic resources through a process of "*nomenklatura* privatization." Privatization in Russia was conducted through a specially created agency, the State Property Committee, which organized local auctions. Despite the

[40] Ibid.

[41] Tatarstan was the first region to sign a special treaty with the president and the central government in February 1994. As of March 1996, eleven additional regions had negotiated similar ad hoc treaties. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, February 25, 1994, p. 1.

[42] *Izvestiia*, November 28, 1991, p. 1.

[43] A. Rahr, "KGB Survives under Yeltsin's Wing," *RFE-RL*, March 27, 1992, p. 2.

[44] See the interview with then Defense Minister Grachev, *Krasnaia zvezda*, June 9, 1992, pp. 1, 2.

[45] P. Hanson, "The Industrialists and Russian Economic Reform," *RFE-RL*, May 18, 1992.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

efforts of liberal economic reformers to expand the ownership, local political and economic elites effectively manipulated the process to maintain controlling interest in the newly privatized firms. Studies provide evidence of closed auctions, insider trading, and appropriated assets.[46] Russia's privatization process was moved along by a series of presidential decrees.[47] In so doing, Yeltsin used his power of decree to grant numerous exemptions and special treatment for particular firms and sectors.[48]

IV. Uzbekistan: Consolidated Elites and Presidentialism

The politics of regime breakdown in Central Asia played out differently than in the rest of the NIS. In Central Asia, communist elites proved resilient to Gorbachev's democratization and liberalization reforms. Independence came by default only when the Soviet center collapsed in 1991. In contrast to the Slavic states, presidentialism in Central Asia was consolidated without serious political conflict.

Politics of Regime Breakdown

Like other non-Russian republics, Uzbekistan witnessed a national revival in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A resurgence of popular interest in language, history, and religion was experienced across the region. Unlike other republics, however, this cultural revival in Uzbekistan did not develop into a politically strong, mass-based nationalist movement. In the late 1980s an Uzbek nationalist movement, Birlik, staged several rallies that drew upward of a hundred thousand demonstrators, but the movement never developed the capacity to organize more effective challenges to the communist regime.

Three factors help to explain the failure of nationalist or democratic oppositionists to undermine the power bases of native communist elites in Uzbekistan. First, coercion was routinely and effectively employed against potential political rivals. Few enthusiasts for liberalization or democratization were to be found among Uzbekistan's communist elites. Nationalist and democratic leaders endured obstruction and repression on a significantly greater scale than leaders in other republics.[49] Second, the demands of nationalist and democratic leaders tended to

[46] D. Slider, "Privatization in Russia's Regions," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 10, no. 4 (1994); S. Linz, "The Privatization of Russian Industry," *RFE-RL*, March 11, 1994; M. McFaul, "State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization, *World Politics* 47 (January 1995), 210–43.

[47] *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, January 10, 1992, p. 1.

[48] Hanson (fn. 45), 1–7; *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, April 9, 1994, p. 1; *Izvestiia*, February 13, 1996, p. 1.

[49] *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, February 14, 1990, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

focus more on within-system reforms, such as ecological destruction and language issues, than on separatism and antisystem solutions.[50] Third, Uzbekistan was a latecomer to the historical process of nation building. Indeed, the main impetus for nation building in the Central Asian region was Soviet state-building policies in the 1920s and 1930s. National identity was less deeply developed in Central Asia than in the Baltic, Slavic, and Caucasian regions. Subnational regional identities remained strong among the native populations while politicized national identity remained mostly confined to segments of the native intelligentsia and students.[51]

Without the political challenge posed by mass-based nationalist or democratic movements, communist elites in Uzbekistan were not forced to redefine themselves before their native populations as did communists in other republics. Local communist machines blatantly manipulated the elections to the new parliament in February 1990. Candidate nominations, party registration, media coverage, and vote counting were managed by communist-controlled bodies.[52] The politically weak democratic opposition party, Erk, participated in the elections, but the stronger nationalist movement, Birlik, was banned. More than one-third of the seats for the new parliament were not contested.[53] As a result, 95 percent of the deputies to the parliament were Communist Party members.[54] Unlike other Soviet republics, the 1990 elections in Uzbekistan did not serve as a means by which noncommunist political actors were able to gain even partial access to the state's power resources.

Having come through the breakdown phase structurally intact, Uzbekistan's old regime elites managed to reconsolidate their power and status in new institutional forms. Islam Karimov, who had been named republican head of the Communist Party in June 1989, assumed the leadership of the new parliament without serious opposition. The Communist Party was renamed the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). No movement toward independence had been made at the time of the August 1991 coup. Instead Uzbekistan's old regime elites sought greater control over the republic's political and economic resources

[50] See, for example, the charter of the Birlik movement published in C. Furtado and A. Chandler, eds., *Perestroika in the Soviet Republics: Documents on the National Question* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), 517–19.

[51] D. Carlisle, "Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks," *Problems of Communism* 40 (September–October 1991), 30; and, E. Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 293–95, 325–29.

[52] *Pravda*, February 16, 1990, p. 1.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Slider (fn. 19), 49.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

within the union.[55] A formal declaration of independence was not issued until December 1991, four months after the failed August coup.

Dynamics of Institutional Choice

The process of institutional choice in Uzbekistan was controlled from above by old regime elites. In March 1990, Karimov, following Gorbachev's lead in the center, became the first Soviet republican leader to assume the title of president.[56] Karimov was officially appointed president by the communist-dominated parliament. Since the collapse of the Soviet regime, a series of institutional reforms have been enacted that enhance the president's control over government and that insulate the president from parliamentary checks.

When it became clear that the Soviet regime would not survive the failed coup attempt, a popular presidential election was arranged along with an independence referendum in late December 1991. A contested election was organized, in which Karimov was opposed by Muhammad Salih, a leader of Erk, the democratic opposition party. Karimov won 86 percent of the vote in this election, while Salih received 12 percent.[57] Candidates from Birlik and the Islamic Renaissance Party were not allowed to participate in this election. Within a month of the presidential election, Erk would join Birlik as an outlawed political party.

Soon after the election, Karimov proposed a new postcommunist constitution for Uzbekistan, a draft of which was published in late September 1992.[58] The draft outlined a system in which the president would act as head of state and of the government. The president would be popularly elected to a five-year term, and no individual would be allowed to serve more than two consecutive terms. The draft also called for the disbandment of the existing parliament in favor of a smaller legislative body. The new constitution was submitted to the existing parliament for approval in early December 1992. In Soviet-like fashion, the ratification process was completed in all of one afternoon. Karimov appeared before the parliament and read the document, which was virtually unchanged from the earlier published draft. After several hours of discussion, the parliament voted unanimously to approve the new constitution and then declared a national holiday.[59]

[55] See interview with Karimov in *Sel'skaia zhizn'*, December 21, 1991, p. 2.
[56] *FBIS: Soviet Union*, March 28, 1990.
[57] *Pravda vostoka*, December 30, 1991, p. 1.
[58] *FBIS: Central Eurasia*, September 28, 1992.
[59] *Pravda vostoka*, December 9, 1992, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The powers of the president were enhanced again in May 1993 through a reorganization of the cabinet of ministers. At this time, the constitution was revised so that the posts of president and chair of the cabinet of ministers were formally combined. As chair, the president would exercise more direct control over the prime minister and the affairs of government.[60]

In late December 1994, elections were held for the new postcommunist legislature, the Oly Majlis. The electoral process continued to be controlled by old regime elites from the PDP. Oppositionist parties, such as Birlik, Erk, and the Islamic Renaissance, were declared illegal by this time and were shut out of the process. Only one other party, Fatherland Progress, was allowed to participate in the elections. Fatherland Progress was composed of members of the urban-based intelligentsia and business community, who were agreeable to the PDP.[61] Candidate nominations were also accepted from the regional political organizations. Again, old regime elites prevailed. Nearly 95 percent of the deputies in the new Oly Majlis were former Communist Party members.[62] Candidates nominated by regional political organizations won nearly two-thirds of the seats.[63]

The first session of the new Oly Majlis convened in February 1995. On the second day, it voted to conduct a popular referendum to extend the term of office of the president from 1997 to 2000.[64] The referendum was held in late March. The official electoral commission posted the results: over 99 percent of the electorate turned out to vote and favored the proposed extension.[65] At its second session, in May 1995, the Oly Majlis formally extended the president's term to the year 2000.

The process of institutional choice in Uzbekistan indicates a relatively smooth transition. The consolidated old regime elite structure helps to explain the absence of overt conflict over institutional choice.[66] The PDP may not claim de jure to be a monopolistic party, but it remains de facto a hegemonic party in the new regime. PDP members comprise an overwhelming majority in the parliament, rendering inef-

[60] Ibid., May 14, 1993, p. 33.

[61] The Fatherland Progressive Party is headed by one of the president's counselors. *Segodnia*, December 14, 1993, p. 5.

[62] *FBIS: Central Eurasia*, June 17, 1995.

[63] *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, June 18, 1995, p. 6.

[64] *Pravda vostoka*, February 25, 1995, p. 1.

[65] *FBIS: Central Eurasia*, March 31, 1995.

[66] The division of state spoils at the local level has in some places led to clan-based conflicts. *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, April 30, 1993, p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fective any formal institutional checks on the president. In practice, the parliament acts more as an appendage of presidential rule, than as an independent entity. The hegemonic role of the PDP constrains the political arena for alternative actors. The continued resort to repression and coercion has ensured that unsanctioned parties do not become serious rivals.[67] Public debate was not encouraged or tolerated in this process of institutional choice. In response to the move to extend the president's term in office, for example, representatives of two alternative political parties expressed full support for the constitutional revision, characterizing it in the press as another triumph for democracy in Uzbekistan.[68] A formal constraint on debate was enacted with a law that made it a criminal offense to offend publicly the dignity of the president.[69]

Patterns of Elite Access to Power Resources

In Uzbekistan's postcommunist transition, old regime elites succeeded in establishing a proprietary claim on the state's power resources. Following his defeat in the December 1991 presidential election, Salih commented with resignation that "the same people are in power, they hold their old posts that they had before the putsch and before 1988."[70]

In territorial administration, organizational-administrative resources remain in the hands of the former communist elites. In early 1992, the post of governor, or *hakim*, was created to preside over regional administration. The law noted that every governor was personally accountable to the president.[71] Elections for local officials were only held in Tashkent city; governors in all other regions were appointed by Karimov. The governors were all members of the PDP and had all formally worked in the local Communist Party bureaucracy.[72] While Karimov has subsequently removed some regional governors, their replacements continue to be drawn from this existing pool of old regime territorial elites.[73] In July 1993, the powers of the governors were enhanced so that they formally assumed leadership over the regional legislative councils.[74] The office of the president has assured that such resources throughout the regions remain in the hands of old regime elites.

[67] Y. Tokogozoglu, "Uzbek Government Continues to Stifle Dissent," *RFE-RL: Research Report*, no. 39 (October 1, 1993).
[68] *Narodnoe slovo*, March 25, 1995, p. 2.
[69] *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, January 15, 1993, p. 2.
[70] *FBIS: Central Eurasia*, February 4, 1992.
[71] Ibid., January 9, 1992.
[72] Ibid., March 6, 1992.
[73] *Narodnoe slovo*, April 16, 1993, p. 1.
[74] *FBIS: Central Eurasia*, July 26, 1993.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Uzbekistan's old regime police and military elites also have retained their access to coercive resources during the transition. The former communist special-police unit attached to the Ministry of Interior was disbanded by presidential decree in January 1992, following a violent clash with student protesters. The next day, however, a second presidential decree formally created a new national guard in the Ministry of Interior, which was charged with combating domestic challenges to the state.[75] Similarly, the former republican KGB apparatus was reorganized as a new National Security Service with virtually the same leadership.[76] In February 1992, a presidential decree placed all the armed forces in Uzbekistan under the jurisdiction of a new Ministry of Defense. The new defense minister and his first deputy were Uzbek natives, who were also career officers in the Soviet Red Army. To maintain continuity with the old regime, Uzbekistan's new military leadership espoused close ties with Russia's armed forces and retained the services of Russian officers.[77]

Finally, the industrial managerial elite in Uzbekistan have retained their access to economic resources. The privatization process followed a similar pattern as in Russia, but proceeded at a much slower and more hesitant pace.[78] A state property committee was established by presidential decree in September 1992, although privatization of industrial firms did not begin until the second half of 1994.[79] The process was managed by special regional commissions composed of representatives of the state property committee and local government administrators, who routinely turned over control of local enterprises to the existing managerial elite. The president further helped the industrial managers to safeguard their access to economic resources. By presidential decree, for example, the former Ministry of Oil and Gas was reorganized into a quasi-private corporation and granted monopoly rights over all aspects of the domestic oil and gas market.[80] In addition, presidential decrees exempted several firms from corporate income taxes and waived export tariffs for several others.[81] In this manner, the president employed his special powers to favor the economic interests of select newly privatized firms.

[75] Ibid., January 30, 1992; January 31, 1992.
[76] Ibid., February 25, 1992; May 28, 1993.
[77] *Krasnaia zvezda*, May 20, 1993, p. 2.
[78] Officials of Russia's State Property Committee, in fact, helped to organize and train employees in Uzbekistan's State Property Committee. *Narodnoe slovo*, September 27, 1994, p. 1.
[79] See remarks of privatization head, Viktor Chzhen, *Pravda vostoka*, August 8, 1995, p. 2.
[80] *FBIS: Central Eurasia*, May 5, 1992; May 7, 1992; December 30, 1992.
[81] *Narodnoe slovo*, January 6, 1995, p. 2; *FBIS: Central Eurasia*, May 17, 1995.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

V. Estonia: Dispersed Elites and Parliamentarism

Unlike the Slavic or Central Asian states, old regime elites in the Baltics were not able to maintain access to their power resources during the breakdown phase. In contrast to the rest of the former Soviet Union, the Baltic states opted for parliamentarism in their postcommunist transitions.

Politics of Regime Breakdown

In the second half of the 1980s, Estonia developed a national revival movement that quickly evolved into a mass-based national separatist movement.[82] This movement was characterized by four features. First, leadership was provided by former nationalist dissidents and uncoopted members of the native intelligentsia. Second, taking advantage of Gorbachev's liberalization policy, nationalist leaders were successful in articulating and publicizing an ideology for the movement. Their message included a reconstructed image of the nation and its past, a depiction of a common enemy in the Russian-dominated Soviet center, and a separatist solution for the problems of the native population. Third, leaders secured an organizational base for the movement through the Estonian Popular Front, which was at first sanctioned by Moscow as a within-system reform movement. Fourth, the movement cultivated a mass base from the native population, which cut across social cleavages. The ethnic solidarity of this mass base rendered ineffective the communist regime's "divide and rule" strategies for compliance.

The political strength of Estonia's nationalist movement was displayed in a series of collective actions, such as popular demonstrations and economic boycotts, in the late 1980s. Most significantly, the nationalist movement displayed its strength in the 1990 republican legislative elections. Voters overwhelmingly cast ballots for candidates backed by the nationalist movement.[83] Unlike most other republics of the former Soviet Union, Estonia's Communist Party elites proved incapable of reconsolidating their power in the new republican legislature.

A process of structural disintegration now unfolded within Estonia's communist elite. The desertions of rank-and-file members of the Communist Party became rampant at this time. Communist leaders with an instinct for political survival distanced themselves from the party bureaucracy and realigned more closely with the nationalist movement. In

[82] Misiunas and R. Taagepera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940–1990*, rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), chap. 7.

[83] *FBIS: Soviet Union*, March 21, 1990.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

February 1990 the Free Estonia Party was organized by party defectors attempting to reaffirm their nationalist credentials prior to the elections. At the end of March, a large segment of Estonia's Communist Party formally declared itself independent of the Soviet Communist Party.[84] Russian-speaking Communist Party members rejected this new independent party and, instead, organized a political association for themselves, the International Movement of Workers.

The new parliament usurped power from the Communist Party bureaucracy. By the end of 1990, a rump Communist Party, whose leaders were effectively shut out of power in the new legislature, was all that remained of the old regime. While the threat of coercion still remained, the failure of the reactionary military putsch in Lithuania in January 1991 indicated that the Soviet center lacked the necessary consensus and resolve to overturn the new balance of power in the Baltics by force.

Throughout 1990 and the first half of 1991, nationalist leaders used their new positions of power to begin to sever formal ties with the Soviet center. Tax revenues were no longer collected, military obligations were disregarded, and Soviet properties were confiscated. The nationalist movement again demonstrated its capacity for collective action in March 1991. At that time, Gorbachev's referendum on a new union treaty was boycotted in the republic, while an independence referendum was organized in its place.[85] Well before the August 1991 coup, the communist regime was being dismantled incrementally.

Dynamics of Institutional Choice

The dispersed structure of Estonia's old regime elites as they emerged from the breakdown phase provided an opportunity for new political actors to influence the process of institutional choice much more than in the Russian and Uzbek cases.

Immediately following the failed August 1991 coup, the Estonian legislature called for the convocation of a special assembly to draft a new constitution, which would then be submitted to a popular referendum.[86] The assembly began meeting in September 1991. It included sixty members: thirty drawn from the legislature and thirty drawn from the Congress of Estonia, a radical nationalist body that acted as a kind of shadow government. Forty of the assembly's members were new political actors in that they had only recently entered politics through the Estonian na-

[84] *Izvestiia*, March 27, 1990, p. 2.

[85] *FBIS: Soviet Union*, March 12, 1991.

[86] R. Taagepera, "Estonia's Constitutional Assembly, 1991–1992," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 25, no. 3 (Fall 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tionalist movement and were not previously affiliated with the republican communist elite. Of the remaining twenty delegates, thirteen were former Communist Party officials or economic managers who fit the description of old regime elites. The assembly additionally included seven ethnic Russian delegates, who also were economic managers.[87]

At the outset of the Estonian transition, sentiment favored a restoration of the constitutional order that had been in place prior to the Soviet occupation.[88] In 1920 newly independent Estonia had begun the interwar period with a parliamentary democracy. By the early 1930s, however, economic crisis and political polarization undermined support for this form of government and led to presidential authoritarianism. In 1938 a new constitution was enacted, formalizing a strong presidential system.

The first draft introduced at the constitutional assembly outlined a presidential system.[89] This draft depicted a president who was armed with extensive powers of decree and acted as an "arbiter" between parliament and government. Next, radical nationalists, intent on resurrecting pre-Soviet Estonia, submitted a draft based on the 1938 constitution, which included a more extreme "super presidential" system. In reaction to the early support for presidentialism, moderate nationalists in the assembly countered with a campaign in support of parliamentarism. They stressed that the concentration of power entailed in presidentialism risked a recurrence of authoritarian rule. Two additional drafts, defining an extreme and more modified version of parliamentarism, were then submitted to the assembly for consideration. In October 1991, the assembly voted on the different drafts. In the final vote, the more moderate version of parliamentarism narrowly prevailed over the more moderate version of presidentialism.[90] At this point, old regime elites tended to support presidentialism, while new political actors tended to support parliamentarism.[91]

In June 1992, two-thirds of the eligible electorate turned out for a constitutional referendum, in which 90 percent of the voters supported the assembly's parliamentary choice.[92] A new parliament was elected in October 1992. Under the new constitution, the parliament, or Riigikogu, manages the affairs of government, while the president performs mostly

[87] Ibid., 217.

[88] A. Park, "Ethnicity and Independence in Estonia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 1 (1994), 72; and, Toivo Raun, "Post-Soviet Estonia, 1991–1993," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 25, no. 1 (Spring 1994), 74.

[89] Taagepera, (fn. 86), 222, 223. Taagepera was a member of the assembly.

[90] Ibid., 223.

[91] R. Kionka, "Estonia: Drafting a New Constitution," *RFE-RL*, July 3, 1992.

[92] *The Baltic Independent*, July 3–9, 1993, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ceremonial duties. The governmental ministries are led by parliamentary members from the majority parties or ruling coalitions, and the Riigikogu is the supreme rule-making body. The president, on the other hand, can neither initiate legislation, nor veto parliamentary-approved legislation. The president can request that parliament reconsider a law, but parliament is under no legal obligation to do so. The survival of the government is dependent only on parliamentary approval.

The constitution also directs the Riigikogu to elect the president for a term of five years with a two-term limit. For the first post-Soviet president, however, a special onetime, popular election was organized. A multicandidate election was arranged in which the winner of an outright majority would be declared president. If no one received a majority of the votes, then parliament would assume the responsibility of choosing between the two candidates with the most votes. In this case, the rules were designed specifically to prevent Arnold Ruutel from becoming president. Ruutel was a former communist official who successfully repositioned himself as an ally of the nationalist movement. In 1990 he was elected president by parliament and retained that position during the initial transition period between 1991 and 1992. More importantly, opinion polls consistently listed him as one of the most popular political figures in post-Soviet Estonia and the leading candidate for the presidency. His three opponents in the election openly declared that they were running to prevent a Ruutel victory.[93]

Ruutel, in fact, won a plurality of 43 percent of the popular vote in this election. His nearest rival, Lennert Meri, received just 29 percent of the popular vote. As anticipated, the Riigikogu reversed the electoral results and chose Meri to be president. In November 1994, a constitutional amendment was proposed to institutionalize direct popular elections for the president, but it was rejected by the Riigikogu.[94] The parliament continues to reserve for itself the right to appoint the president.

Patterns of Elite Access to Power Resources

The Estonian case demonstrates the importance of elite calculation in the process of institutional choice. Estonia's new political actors designed the new rules of the game to restrict the access of old regime elites to the state's power resources. In comparison to Russia and Uzbekistan, Estonia's old regime elites have been denied access to power resources; meanwhile, institutional mechanisms have been cre-

[93] A. Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution*, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 286.

[94] *FBIS: Central Eurasia*, November 14, 1994. The vote was twenty-five in favor of the amendment and thirty-nine against.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ated to prevent any other party or group from establishing a proprietary claim on power resources.

In territorial administration, local elites have not been allowed to consolidate their control over organizational-administrative resources. Unlike Russia and Uzbekistan, regional political administrative power is allocated to local councils. Council membership is determined by popular elections. Under the new regime, local elections were first held in October 1993; a total of 3427 local deputies were elected from a field of 8788 candidates.[95] Estonia's ruling party at that time, Fatherland, faired poorly in many localities. Moreover, Russian parties performed well in Russian-dominated localities and finished second in Tallinn. Legislative supremacy and regular elections made it more difficult for local political machines to take root in the localities.

Estonia's new political actors moved quickly to sever the access of old regime elites to coercive resources. In December 1991, Estonia's republican KGB administration was dismantled. The new regime confiscated the KGB's property and sacked its entire staff of employees.[96] A new Ministry of Defense was organized in the autumn of 1991.[97] The ministry's leadership has remained in the hands of civilians, who were not affiliated with the Soviet Red Army. The new regime's ministers of defense have included a Swedish history professor and a twenty-seven-year-old member of the Fatherland Party with a degree in philology.[98] In May 1993, a retired American colonel was named chief of staff.[99] At the same time, the defense minister noted that the army's Soviet-trained officers were being systematically dismissed from their duties.[100] Moreover, in contrast to Russia and Uzbekistan, institutional mechanisms have been created to ensure parliamentary control over military affairs.

In Estonia the privatization process has made it more difficult for the old regime's industrial elite to maintain control of its economic resources than in Russia or Uzbekistan. An Estonian Privatization Agency was created in 1992, based on the model of East Germany's Treuhand.[101] By the second half of 1993, the privatization process was under way. The agency organized a series of international auctions at

[95] Ibid., October 18, 1993.
[96] *FBIS: Soviet Union*, December 26, 1991.
[97] *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, September 11, 1991, p. 2.
[98] *FBIS: Central Eurasia*, May 13, 1993; *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 26, 1993, p. 3.
[99] *FBIS: Central Eurasia*, May 4, 1993.
[100] *FBIS* (fn. 98).
[101] *FBIS: Central Eurasia*, June 26, 1992.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which a majority of ownership shares were put up for sale.[102] While Estonia's communist managerial elite has generally fared better than the former political elite during the transition, checks have been built into the privatization process to prevent the easy transfer of ownership to the managers. The economic ministry has intervened to forestall the sale of several enterprises whose managers were funded by the Russian government. In addition, the Privatization Agency includes an executive council upon which sit representatives from the political parties that make up parliament's governing coalition.[103]

VI. Institutional Choice and Regime Outcome: Conclusions

Across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, postcommunist regime change has produced a variety of unconsolidated democracies and reconfigured authoritarianisms. The above cases, for example, have indicated three distinct regime outcomes. The Russian transition has given rise to a hybrid regime, in which a strong authoritarian president coexists with a weak democratic parliament. This institutional arrangement does not reflect a Montesequieuian separation of powers, but instead a separation of statist and particularist interests. The presidency is the institutional embodiment of statist interests, representing society as a whole, or the commonweal; the parliament, meanwhile, is the institutional embodiment of particularist interests, representing component social forces, such as class, ethnicity, occupation, gender, and region.[104] Yeltsin referred to this division as a "practical balance" of power.[105] Indeed, many institutional features of democracy presently exist in Russia. But with the president so often governing, in Stepan and Skach's phrase, "at the edge of constitutionalism," democratic consolidation appears well out of reach.[106]

Uzbekistan's transition has produced a neotraditional form of authoritarianism in which power resides as much in the person of the president as in the office. The Uzbek presidency is not just a formal

[102] Ibid., January 28, 1994; September 2, 1994; November 10, 1994.

[103] Ibid., July 21 1995.

[104] In this regard, the Russian case has been likened to O'Donnell's "delegative democracy." See P. Kubicek, "Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 27, no. 4 (1994).

[105] *Izvestiia*, November 16, 1993, p. 4.

[106] Stepan and Skach (fn. 6). In addition, some parliamentary leaders have continued to question the legitimacy of the 1993 constitution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power position; it is also the center of an extensive informal network of regionally based, patron-client ties.[107] The president is, in effect, the chief patron. The distribution of power resources occurs along informal clan lines within the formal structure of the hegemonic party.[108] While the regime is somewhat more liberal and democratic than its communist predecessor, it nonetheless represents a reconfigured form of authoritarianism.

By contrast, the Estonian transition has produced a regime based on democratic rules of the game, including regularly competitive elections, governmental accountability, and political rights. In practice, the new political institutions have operated according to design, suggesting a viable parliamentary democracy. But Estonia remains a "restricted" democracy as a result of its citizenship laws, which intentionally limit the participation of the Russian ethnic minority.[109]

To what extent can these regime outcomes be attributed to the institutional choices made during the transition phase? The findings seemed to support the institutionalist argument that presidentialism leads to failed democracy. In Russia and Uzbekistan, special presidential powers were routinely employed to circumvent and undermine institutional checks and political rights. But the findings also suggested the need for further refinement of the institutionalist argument.

According to an institutionalist approach, presidentialism leads democratic transitions awry as a consequence of hidden structural pitfalls. These conclusions are often based on empirical studies that may include twenty or more cases across continents and time periods. In dealing with so many cases, scholars have tended to focus on the causal connection between institutional rules of the game and a particular regime's ultimate fate. In this way, the approach often projects an image that institutional choice occurs on a "blank slate."

This paper, instead, contended that institutional choice should be viewed as a strategy by which elite actors attempt either to secure access to the power resources of the state or to deny access to others. Attention is redirected to the dynamics of the choice. In this regard, the political patterns of the past are indeed relevant to contemporary actors, but they do not determine institutional choice or regime outcome.

[107] K. Alimov, "Are Central Asian Clans Still Playing a Political Role?" *Central Asia Monitor*, no. 4 (1994), 16. Six regionally based clans exist in postcommunist Uzbekistan (Western, Eastern, Southern, Tashkent, Bukhara, and Khorezm).

[108] *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, April 30, 1993, p. 6; Alimov (fn. 107), 16, 17; and Carlisle (fn. 51), 37.

[109] For the concept of restricted democracy, see D. Rueschemeyer, E. Huber Stephens, and J. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Estonian case, which offered the most transparent view of institutional choice, aptly demonstrated how patterns of the past provided options to contemporary actors, which were either selected or discarded in consideration of the power struggles of the present.

Thus, it is not presidentialism's rules of the game per se that derail democratic transitions, rather it is the actors who actually make the choice. Presidentialism is the preferred strategy of those actors who calculate that they have the most to gain by limiting the access of others to the state's power resources. If this observation is correct, then the prospects for democratic consolidation in such cases would appear to be bleak from the outset.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RUSSIA'S "ETHNIC REVIVAL"
The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order

By DANIEL S. TREISMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION

SINCE 1990 Russia has experienced an unexpected "ethnic revival." From Sakha in Eastern Siberia to Adygeia on the slopes of the Caucasus Mountains, many of the country's more than one hundred minority nationalities have asserted claims for greater rights, privileges, and constitutional recognition. Leaders of ethnic regions have demanded everything from greater economic autonomy to complete independence. While non-Russian nationalities constitute only about 18 percent of the population, the recent disintegration of other postcommunist multiethnic federations has raised anxieties in both Russia and the West about the country's future stability. The war in Chechnya offers an alarming demonstration of where such nationality politics can lead.

This article seeks to explain the causes of this sudden invigoration of ethnic politics and to explore the implications of Russia's recent experience for general theories of ethnic and nationalist activism. The ethnic revival in Russia and other postcommunist countries follows several decades of ethnic resurgence in various parts of the postcolonial and developed world. This has stimulated a rich theoretical debate over the bases of ethnic identities and nationalist mobilization.[1] Russia's recent

* I would like to thank Henry Hale for his useful comments. This work was supported by a postdoctoral fellowship from Harvard University's Russian Research Center.

[1] The literature is far too voluminous to cite, but a selection of influential sources would include Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: Free Press, 1963); Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966); Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (London: Routledge, 1975); Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, eds., *State versus Ethnic Claims* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983); Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

World Politics 49 (January 1997), 212–49

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

history offers an opportunity to assess the scope of existing theories, specifically, the extent to which generalizations from other parts of the world fit the details of ethnic politics in Russia or the extent to which the evidence suggests a distinctive explanation for the upsurge of ethnonationalist activism in postcommunist states.

An ethnic revival is a complex social phenomenon that can be studied from various angles. Indeed, scholars of ethnicity and nationalism suffer from an *embarras de richesse* in their choice of a dependent variable. Some have sought to explain why individuals adopt particular ethnic definitions of *identity* in certain periods and geographical or social settings.[2] Others have applied insights from the study of social movements to the question of how latent ethnonational groups *mobilize* and have asked why political organizations emerge to represent some groups but not others.[3] Still others have tried to explain the political *behavior* of ethnonational groups and their leaders—their strategies and tactics in dealing with the central state. Finally, others have sought explanations for *outcomes* of ethnonationalist activism, most notably, secession and ethnic conflict.[4]

In this work, I try to explain the strategy of leaders of ethnically defined regions and republics within an ethnically heterogeneous state. While the leaders of some ethnic regions are vigorous in pressing claims for greater autonomy, others are surprisingly docile. I consider which factors may best account for such variation in strategies: underlying ethnic identities of the leader or population, the extent of nationalist organization, the interests or resources of the individual leader, or the region's bargaining power and vulnerability to central countermeasures.

Russia offers a particularly fruitful setting for comparing the evidence for different hypotheses. Of the country's eighty-nine constituent units, thirty-two are today ethnically defined republics, autonomous districts, or autonomous provinces. They vary widely in culture, history, levels of economic development, geographical location, size, and balance of ethnic populations, as well as in many other potentially relevant factors. And under the surface of the general upsurge of minority nationalisms,

[2] For instance, Geertz (fn. 1); Michael Banton, "Modelling Ethnic and National Relations," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17 (January 1994).

[3] Margaret Levi and Michael Hechter, "A Rational Choice Approach to the Rise and Decline of Ethnoregional Political Parties," in Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski, eds., *New Nationalisms of the Developed West* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), esp. 134–36. Much work on this subject draws on Tilly's theory of resource mobilization; see Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Englewood Hills, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1978).

[4] For example, V. P. Gagnon Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994–95); Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leaders of different ethnic regions actually show considerable variation in their eagerness to press demands for greater autonomy. While the limited number of cases and large number of potential explanatory factors restricts the conclusions that can be confidently drawn, Russia's experience of ethnic politics offers a useful opportunity to subject theoretical conjectures to empirical testing.

Leaders of ethnic regions and republics, in Russia as elsewhere, assert a wide range of minor and major claims. In this article, I view these as defining different points along a spectrum of "separatist activism." I include on the same spectrum demands that some might consider qualitatively different. For instance, while two republics—Chechnya and Tatarstan—have at one point demanded full independence from Moscow, most of the others ostensibly seek only greater autonomy in the political, economic, or social spheres.[5] The justification for this research strategy is twofold.

First, while it is certainly true that the goals of ethnic leaders vary in significant ways, unlike their actions these are not directly observable. Both independence seekers and those merely eager for economic concessions may strategically misrepresent their objectives: the independence seekers to forestall repression, the economic concession seekers to add force to their demands. At the same time, goals often expand and contract in the course of bargaining, as movements are radicalized or pacified by central responses. To classify political actions by their professed goals is thus to aim at an often deceptive and moving target. Second, some might nevertheless argue that the *act* of demanding independence—whether or not it is sincere—is fundamentally different from demanding greater autonomy. It is, however, an empirical question whether the factors that predispose some ethnic leaders to demand independence are different from those that predispose others to seek autonomy. I examine evidence for and against this.

In focusing on the behavior of regional leaders, I implicitly assume a state with some territorial subdivision of power. The framing of the question thus fits both federal states and ethnically heterogeneous unitary states with regional governments. (Whether or not post-Soviet Russia can accurately be described as a federation in the definition of Riker or others is a matter of some debate,[6] but it need not be resolved for the purposes of this article.) In many states, federal and unitary, eth-

[5] I use the term "separatist" in this article to refer to leaders who make demands along this spectrum—not necessarily to those who overtly desire complete independence for their ethnic region.

[6] See, for instance, Steven L. Solnick, "Federal Bargaining in Russia," *East European Constitutional Review* 4 (Fall 1995).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nicity enters politics via the interaction of local and central leaders. In such situations regional leaders are poised between two political arenas—the locality and the center—with roles to play and bargains to strike in each of them. Their choices can be explained through analysis of the "nested" or "two-level" games in which they play a part, negotiating with central counterparts under constraints and payoffs determined by characteristics of regional populations.[7]

The following section discusses major theories of nationalist and separatist action and the hypotheses they would imply about the Russian ethnic regions. Section III compares the observed degree of separatist activism of the different regional leaderships in 1990–94 and develops a composite index. Section IV considers the theoretically informed hypotheses of Section II against actual outcomes and weighs the evidence using simple statistical techniques. Finally, Section V summarizes the results and draws some conclusions about what Russia's postcommunist experience implies for the theoretical understanding of ethnonationalist activism in heterogeneous states.

II. Theories of Separatist Activism

Why do some subnational leaders declare sovereignty for their regions, demand greater constitutional rights, assert jurisdiction over local property and natural resources, adopt flags and other symbols, declare independence, deny the authority of central laws, and engage in a host of other actions that call into question existing institutions and bargains? Why do others refrain from such actions? Different theories focus on factors at four levels.

Ethnic Self-Identifications

Some scholars associate the degree of separatist activism of regional leaders with the extent and intensity of minority ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious *self-identifications* among members of the population. Such ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious commonalities provide markers around which social or political movements can crystallize. For some theorists, the path from shared self-conceptions to political action is short. According to Ernest Gellner: "Modern ethnic feeling . . . wells up in otherwise anonymous, atomized populations,

[7] George Tsebelis, *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and it is evidently capable of producing its own organizations, almost effortlessly."[8]

But if the key to separatist activism is such self-identifications, one must then question what determines the strength and breadth of ethnic identities in a given setting. One view, associated with Geertz and Shils, is that such markers are historically determined "givens" of social existence, which are *always* experienced with particular intensity.[9] In Geertz's formulation:

> Congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer, *ipso facto*; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attibuted to the very tie itself.[10]

Such a view of ethnic identities as historically generated, self-preserving, and costlessly self-activating seems to inform many journalistic and scholarly accounts of ethnic politics in Russia and other postcommunist states. In one common image, ethnic identities, preserved for decades in the communist "deep freeze," reemerge with a political thaw.[11] A second image is of the "pressure cooker": not only are ethnic sentiments preserved under communist repression, but they are liable to explode with new force once the lid is removed.[12] More poetically, Isaiah Berlin has argued that "a wounded *Volksgeist* . . . is like a bent twig, forced down so severely that when released, it lashes back with fury."[13] For other scholars, ethnic identifications dominate the landscape of postcommunist politics precisely because of the success of past regimes at demobilizing less resilient civic identities through social engineering, propaganda, and repression.[14]

However, such primordial views of ethnicity offer little insight into why ethnic activism varies so greatly across time and space. If the causes

[8] Gellner, "Nationalism in a Vacuum," in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., *Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

[9] Geertz (fn. 1); Edward Shils, *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

[10] Geertz (fn. 1), 109–10.

[11] See Timothy Garton Ash, *The Magic Lantern* (New York: Random House, 1990), 142; Jacques Rupnik, "Europe's New Frontiers: Remapping Europe," *Daedalus* 123 (Summer 1994), 95.

[12] On "pressure cooker" theories, see Branko Milanovic, "Why Have Communist Federations Collapsed?" *Challenge* 37 (March–April 1994).

[13] Nathan Gardels, "Two Concepts of Nationalism: An Interview with Isaiah Berlin," *New York Review of Books*, November 21, 1991.

[14] George Schöpflin, "Postcommunism: The Problems of Democratic Construction," *Daedalus* 123 (Summer 1994), 137.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of such activism are ties of "blood, speech and custom," why do different ethnic groups emerge from the pressure cooker with different degrees of force? Why, that is, should the Tatars be affected so much more obviously than the Chukchi, who after all also have kinship ties, common language, and shared traditions.

In trying to explain why ethnic definitions of identity are stronger in some times and places than in others, some have argued that such identities are rendered salient by such sociohistorical processes as industrialization and modernization.[15] Modernization brings previously isolated groups into contact with each other, fostering a sense of difference. Rakowska-Harmstone has applied this argument to the subterranean growth of nationalism in developing Soviet republics.[16] However, since a previous theory of modernization predicted that it would accomplish precisely the opposite, creating economic and occupational divisions that would supersede traditional cultural ones, such arguments must explain why modernization activates specifically *ethnic* bases of group identification.[17] Several answers have been suggested.

One possibility is that in early modernization, the existing social capital of kinship networks, rural cultural groupings, and premodern religious affiliations will be used to foster collective action in pursuit of the material benefits of modernization simply because it costs less to use existing organizational capital than to build new, specifically economic organizations from scratch.[18] Another is that the leaders of such traditional groupings may react with ethnic campaigns precisely to the threat that modernization will undermine the bases of their authority.[19]

A third possibility is that economic or occupational cleavages created by modernization will coincide with and reinforce preexisting ethnic divisions. Uneven industrialization may bypass geographically concentrated ethnic categories, stimulating in them a "developmental" nation-

[15] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," *Journal of International Affairs* 27 (January 1973).

[16] Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism* 23 (May–June 1974).

[17] For an example of the first type of argument, see Deutsch (fn. 1).

[18] Douglass North has argued that increasing returns to scale and sunk capital lead to a retention of organizations even after their original purposes are superseded; North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). This seems to lie behind many discussions of "competitive" ethnonationalism in developing African states; see, e.g., Bates (fn. 1), who notes that, "in contemporary Africa, the levels of ethnic competition and modernization covary" (p. 152). See also Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

[19] Charles C. Ragin, "Ethnic Political Mobilization: The Welsh Case," *American Sociological Review* 44 (August 1979). Rogowski terms this "reactive" nationalism; see the helpful discussion in Ronald Rogowski, "Conclusion," in Tiryakian and Rogowski (fn. 3).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alism of the excluded. The correspondence of ethnic and other cleavages is often viewed as heightening ethnic modes of identification and organization, not just in cases of modernization. Hechter predicts greater ethnic mobilization where there is a cultural division of labor, with jobs and life chances segregated according to ethnicity.[20] Melson and Wolpe associate the absence of crosscutting cleavages with the emergence of movements of communal nationalism.[21] Joseph Rothschild considers the existence of "structured interethnic inequalities" to be a "fertile circumstance" for the politicization of ethnicity.[22]

However, even when ethnic and economic cleavages do line up, it is unclear whether economically advantaged or disadvantaged groups are more prone to ethnic activism. The evidence does not point to any simple relationship. Horowitz, based on a study of Asian, African, and Caribbean ethnic movements, observes that among regions that seek to secede, prosperous regions are far outnumbered by those "poor in resources and productivity."[23] But studies of national movements in the developed West and communist world have concluded just the opposite. Tedd Gurr in a survey of politically active communal groups found that the most assertive separatist groups were those least disadvantaged: "Spanish Basques, Québecois, Armenians, Ukrainians, and Slovenes all were separatist in the 1980s despite regional prosperity, limited autonomy, and significant national political influence."[24] In the Soviet Union it was "the nationalities with the highest levels of educational, occupational, and often political attainment, rather than the disadvantaged or marginal ones, that . . . advanced the most ambitious agendas for change and engaged in the most extensive protest."[25]

Horowitz also suggests a more complex categorization, based on both the relative position of the minority ethnic group within the region and the relative position of the region within the country. The greatest propensity for separatism is found among educationally, occupationally, and economically "backward" groups within economically less developed regions, that is, among people who fear losing out to

[20] Hechter (fn. 1).

[21] Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," *American Political Science Review* 64 (December 1970), 1116.

[22] Rothschild (fn. 18), 2.

[23] Horowitz (fn. 1), 233.

[24] Gurr (fn. 4), 82.

[25] Philip G. Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," *World Politics* 43 (January 1991), 197; see also Kisangani N. Emizet and Vicki L. Hesli, "The Disposition to Secede: An Analysis of the Soviet Case," *Comparative Political Studies* 27, no. 4 (1995).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more "advanced" groups in a united state.[26] This coincides with the "developmental" nationalism hypothesis. The lowest propensity, by contrast, should be among "advanced" groups in "backward" regions, who will have greater mobility opportunities within the larger state. Meanwhile, both advanced and backward groups in economically developed regions should exhibit intermediate propensities to secede. On the basis of this categorization, Horowitz expected a high rate of ethnic activism among the relatively less developed Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union.[27]

Besides long historical processes such as modernization and besides the existence of congruent economic cleavages, a certain set of ethnic markers may at times be politicized by some short-term, polarizing event.[28] Conflicts over border issues can awaken previously latent ethnic identifications and overwhelm economic or other divisions.[29] The extreme polarization and reinvigoration of ethnic identities that occurred in the former Yugoslavia as hostilities erupted in 1990–91 is one example. Terrorist acts associated with ethnic demands can also create a sense of insecurity that leads to ethnic "stockading."[30] Some events may traumatize ethnic communities sufficiently to promote ethnic suspicions and consciousness for decades. In Russia the groups deported brutally from their homelands by Stalin in the 1940s may have been left with a heightened sense of shared national identity.

These various theories of the nature and intensity of ethnic identifications suggest a series of hypotheses about the relative separatist activism of regional leaders in Russia and other heterogeneous states. First, primordial theories might imply that those groups most distant culturally from the central nationality would have leaders who are the most separatist. Such cultural remoteness might be observed in rates of language usage and religion.[31] It could also imply that leaders' separatist activism will vary with the concentration of a single, minority national-

[26] Horowitz (fn. 1). The use of the adjectives "advanced" and "backward" here is not intended to imply any favorable or pejorative evaluation; they are chosen simply to address a literature that uses these specific terms.

[27] Donald L. Horowitz, "How to Begin Thinking Comparatively about Soviet Ethnic Problems," in Motyl (fn. 8), 9–22, esp. 16–17.

[28] Banton (fn. 2), 14.

[29] Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35 (Spring 1993).

[30] Richard Jay, "Nationalism, Federalism and Ireland," in Murray Forsyth, ed., *Federalism and Nationalism* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1989).

[31] In Russia, for instance, the Muslim and Buddhist nationalities and those with higher rates of retention of the native language might be expected to mobilize more quickly for autonomy than Orthodox Christian and more linguistically assimilated nationalities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ity in the region's population. The larger and more powerful the coalition that can be mobilized by politicizing ethnic markers, the more likely are political entrepreneurs to organize around the issue of separatist action.[32]

Different versions of the modernization perspective suggest hypotheses that separatist activism would be greater (1) at *early* stages in modernization, (2) in locations of *recent* rapid modernization, (3) among relatively *advanced groups* competing for the benefits of modernization, (4) among *backward groups* in backward regions, threatened by their inability to compete in a modernized state. The convergent-cleavages view implies that the strongest separatist activism would occur where there is a close relationship between ethnicity and occupational or economic characteristics. Finally, the conflictual mobilization view suggests separatist activism might be greatest where there has been recent violent conflict between the minority and majority ethnicities, where in-migration threatens traditional identities, or where particularly traumatic incidents of repression within living memory have catalyzed ethnic suspicions.

Mobilization

A second set of theories contends that ethnic markers are always present, and that what explains why some regional leaders make separatist demands is whether organizations have emerged to mobilize individuals for collective action around these markers.[33] Even intense self-identification by a large proportion of the population will not necessarily mitigate the free-rider problem. Whether groups are mobilized will also depend on the extent to which political entrepreneurs have resources for providing selective incentives and monitoring contributions

[32] Cf. Horowitz (fn. 1), 267: "The strength of a secessionist movement and the heterogeneity of its region are inversely related." Emizet and Hesli find that this was true of Soviet republics in the late 1980s: the concentration of a nationality in its own republic was "a powerful indicator of the disposition to secede"; Emizet and Hesli (fn. 26), 530.

[33] I do not mean to imply too sharp a division between consciousness of cultural identities and organization for collective action. Often the cultural markers around which organizations form are themselves created by those who seek to mobilize groups for collective action; see Paul Brass, *Religion and Politics in North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 27; and E. J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). However, various scholars have drawn a similar distinction between markers and mobilization. Subrata Mitra, for instance, distinguishes between the "social anchors" necessary to define a cultural nationalist movement and the mobilization of such a movement around them; see Mitra, "The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements of South Asia in Comparative Perspective," *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (January 1995), 64. And Rothschild argues that political entrepreneurs mobilize ethnicity from "a psychological or cultural or social datum" into "political leverage for the purpose of altering or reinforcing . . . systems of structured inequality between and among ethnic categories"; see Rothschild (fn. 18), 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of members. This implies the hypothesis that separatist activism will be greatest where ethnic organizations exist and press political demands on local leaders.

Bargaining Power

A third level of factors that might cause variation in regional separatist activism concerns the region's dependence and bargaining power vis-à-vis the center. The central leadership may either accept or reject the region's demand for greater autonomy. If it chooses the latter, it can respond with either concessions or sanctions. Since the center is the same for all regions, variation in its response will reflect variation in the balance of bargaining power in particular cases.

One way in which the bargaining power of different regions may vary follows from their differing status in the system of institutions that governs bargaining. At the start of mobilization in the late 1980s Russia's ethnic regions were either autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, or autonomous okrugs. The republics, which were directly subordinate to the RSFSR, had considerably greater rights and representation at the center than did the autonomous oblasts and okrugs, which were subordinate to the territories in which they were located. Policies to create an indigenous elite, loyal to the party, went further in the republics than elsewhere, endowing present republican leaderships with experience at higher administrative levels and greater institutional resources for bargaining with the center.[34] One might hypothesize, therefore, that the republics would be more likely to press separatist claims than would regions with institutionally lower status, because of the greater bargaining power and skill of the republican leaderships.

The second set of bargaining power factors concerns the payoffs of the game, rather than its structure. There are two possible reasons why an instrumentally calculating regional leader would engage in separatist activity in the first place. First, such a leader might do so as part of a strategy sincerely aimed at acquiring increased independence. For this to be the case, either the region must have a positive expectation of net benefit from greater independence, even given the center's reciprocal sanctions, or the center's threat to sanction must be noncredible. Second, a regional leader may engage in separatist action even though he does *not* desire greater independence, in the hope of extorting other concessions from the center in return for a retreat. For this to be the case, the center's threat to sanction must be noncredible, and the center

[34] Roeder (fn. 25), 228.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

must be more vulnerable than is the region to the costs of extended failure to reach agreement.[35] It must be costlier for the center to call the region's bluff than to pay it off.

The greater the expected benefit from autonomy and the greater the risk-seeking propensities of the regional leadership, the more likely will it be to engage in separatist action. Similarly, the lower the center's ability to cause pain by imposing sanctions on a given ethnic region or the higher the cost to the center of doing so, the more likely that region will be to press demands. While the expected benefit from independence may have many dimensions, the economic ones are perhaps easiest to measure. One might expect regions that subsidize others heavily or that have valuable resource endowments to anticipate a positive benefit from secession. The greater the region's dependence on the center for communications, trade, raw materials, subsidies, and so forth, the more vulnerable it would be as an independent state. And the more dependent the center is on a region's products, the higher will be the cost to the center of imposing sanctions. Regions sufficiently large to lower the risk for imitators if they announced separation would impose costs immediately on the center, in terms of the enhanced risk of state disintegration.[36]

Leadership Characteristics

Finally, even if a certain level of separatist activism was expected to have positive net benefits for the ethnic region as a whole, whether or not it is actually implemented will depend on the particular institutional resources, interests, and self-identifications of the leader herself. Those with political capital invested in good relations with the center (for example, a member of a national party) may be reluctant to risk losing or devaluing it. Those personally more integrated into central institutions (for instance, as an elected deputy to the national parliament) may be less likely to seek rupture. By contrast, those who have lost their institutional supports in the center may seek a new basis of legitimacy in a newly "rediscovered" local ethnic identity. Both in the Soviet Union and in Russia, analysts detected a brand of "*nomenklatura* nationalism" among former local communist leaders eager to hold on to power.[37]

[35] The center's "inside option" must be less attractive than that of the region; see Jon Elster, *The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 76.

[36] There is a temporal assymetry that enables regions which in fact do not wish to secede and who cannot therefore credibly threaten actually to implement such an action to force concessions from the center by merely making the announcement—since it is the announcement that, if unrepealed or unpunished, will lower the perceived risk for imitators.

[37] Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society* (London: Routledge, 1993).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some spoke derisively of new Khant and Mansi nationalists "with Russian or Ukrainian faces." Those with significant political capital invested mostly in region-level organizations (for example, a leader of the indigenous nationalist movement) and may view confrontation with the center as a way to mobilize potential supporters and increase the value of their stake. And the existence of potential rivals in his own organization may limit his room for maneuver.

In Russia the likelihood that regional governors will challenge Yeltsin might be influenced by the extent to which they owe their jobs to the president's support. All ethnic regions inherited Supreme Soviet chairpersons who had been elected by the local legislature—and thus represented the choice of central communist party and local elite. In eleven of the republics elections were held in the period from 1991 to 1993, and presidents or chief executives were chosen by popular vote. The heads of administration of the autonomous oblasts and okrugs were appointed by Yeltsin, sometimes from a short list of candidates supplied by the regional soviet. One might expect those ethnic regions led by Yeltsin's appointees to be less assertively separatist than those led by locally elected presidents.

III. Measuring Separatist Activism in Russia

Among Russia's ethnically defined administrative subunits, some, such as Chechnya and Tatarstan, have become identified with repeated demands for independence, claims to national distinctness, and rejection of rule from Moscow. Others, such as Chukotka or the republic of Mordovia, have almost completely avoided such confrontations. This section seeks a systematic measure of such differences between ethnic regions in terms of degree of separatist activism.

The task is complicated by the wide variety of different types of demands, assertions, and declarations made by regional leaders. Since the early 1990s regional leaders in Russia have shown remarkable ingenuity in constructing a large repertoire of pressure tactics. Among the more extreme measures, they have threatened general strikes and terrorist attacks, local states of emergency and tariffs, and confiscation of federal property; they have even on occasion taken the central government to court to try to extract greater concessions.

Some scholars have emphasized the ostensibly divergent objectives that underlie such varied actions. While some appear aimed at wresting genuine independence from Moscow's rule, others seem calculated gambles to elicit economic or political concessions from the center.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some theorists have advocated drawing a sharp distinction between the pursuit of secession and pursuit of greater advantage within the existing state (even though this may sometimes be accomplished by strategically threatening to secede).[38] History, however, provides many examples of demands that have been presented in a deliberately misleading way, of groups that moderate their demands for tactical reasons,[39] and of demands that slide back and forth between autonomy and independence, depending on the state of negotiations and current prospects. The nonnegotiable often becomes negotiable and vice versa during the process of negotiation.[40] Classifying movements by their stated goals is thus complicated by the tactical nature and elasticity of such goals and by the frequent willingness of leaders in practice to settle for less.[41] Nor can ostensibly economic movements be separated from ostensibly political ones on the basis of the tactics they employ. Strikes that start out as economic often turn political. And as regional leaders recognize, actions aimed at purely economic objectives can have profound political consequences, at times weakening the authority of the central state to the point of revolution or collapse.

The approach of this paper, therefore, is to study actions rather than objectives and to view a range of actions as indicators of an underlying variable—separatist activism.[42] Various indicators of separatist activism suggest themselves, based on the previous work of a number of scholars.[43] Table 1 shows how Russia's ethnic regions line up on a number of these selected for this paper.

I include nine indicators of political-legal separatism in the years 1990–94, as follows:

1. a declaration of sovereignty by the ethnic region's political leadership[44]

[38] See Hudson Meadwell, "Transitions to Independence and Ethnic Nationalist Mobilization," in William J. Booth, Patrick James, and Hudson Meadwell, eds., *Politics and Rationality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 191–92; Michael Hechter, "The Dynamics of Secession," *Acta Sociologica* 35 (Winter 1992), 267.

[39] Horowitz suggests the example of the Iraqi Kurds, who pressed for autonomy rather than full independence in part so as not to antagonize the Iranian regime, from which they had received support in the 1970s; see Horowitz (fn. 1), 231–32.

[40] Donald Rothchild, "Collective Demands for Improved Distributions," in Rothchild and Olorunsola (fn. 1), 174.

[41] Horowitz (fn. 1), 232.

[42] Another study that classifies peripheral movements on a continuum of declared aims is Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin, *Economy, Territory, Identity* (London: Sage Publications, 1983), 140–41.

[43] Emizet and Hesli (fn. 25), 505–8; Mark Whitehouse, "Ethnic Competition and the Development of Autonomy: A Comparative Study of Three Russian Republics" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995).

[44] Either the region's supreme soviet, supreme soviet chairman, or president.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2. a unilateral claim by the leadership of higher administrative status for the region (for example, an autonomous oblast asserting republic status, and an ASSR asserting the status of an SSR)[45]

3. adoption by the ethnic region of its own constitution

4. an assertion either in the constitution or in some other legal document that regional law or the regional constitution took precedence over federal law or constitution

5. holding of a referendum in the region over regional sovereignty

6. a regionally coordinated boycott of the federal election of December 1993, resulting in a a voter turnout of less than 25 percent

7. a declaration not just of sovereignty but of outright independence or an official announcement that the region was no longer part of the Russian Federation

8. a refusal by the leadership to send conscripts to serve elsewhere in the federal army

9. assertion of the right to conduct an independent foreign or foreign economic policy

Next, I included two indicators of economic demands: (1) assertion by the political leadership of a regional right to control natural resources; and (2) a declaration of intent to issue a regional currency. Adding up the number of positive indicators for a given ethnic region yielded an index of regional separatist activism.

Data on these various questions were collected from a wide variety of sources (see the notes to Table 1). These included reports from Russian and Western newspapers, television, and radio, and scholarly works by Western and Russian regional experts. In addition, the Nexis database was searched for additional information about each of the regions. While there is no way to be certain that all information is absolutely complete, an effort was made to investigate all available sources. Available information was too sparse and ambiguous to make a reliable judgment on two points, however—whether Chuvashia's authorities asserted the supremacy of Chuvash law over federal law and whether the Taimir autonomous okrug unilaterally raised its administrative status; they are therefore recorded in the table with a question mark. Raising the index for these two regions by one point does not affect the results signficantly.

[45] Included here are only those ethnic regions for which a report existed of a *unilateral* assertion of higher status by the ethnic region's authorities. In July 1991 the Russian supreme soviet ratified the increase in status of Adygeia, Gorno-Altai, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and Khakassia from autonomous oblasts to republics. But each of these had already demanded such a change unilaterally. In June 1992 the supreme soviet also declared Ingushetia to be a republic; since I could find no record of a prior assertion of republic status by authorities in Ingushetia, it was coded zero.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indicators of Separatist Activism in Russia's Ethnic Regions[a]

	Declared Sovereignty	*Raised Admin. Status*	*Adopted Own Constitution*	*Asserted Legal Supremacy*	*Held Ref. on Sovereignty*	*Turnout <25% in Fed. Elec., 12/93*	*Declared Independence*	*Refused to Send Conscripts*
Karelia	X[b]		X[q]					
Komi	X[b]	X[b]	X[q]	X[l]				
Nenetsky AO	X[c]	X[l]						
Mari El	X[b]	X[b]						
Mordovia	X[d]	X[l]						
Chuvashia	X[b]	X[b]	X[q]	?				
Kalmykia	X[b]	X[b]	X[q]	X[s]				
Tatarstan	X[b]	X[b]	X[q]	X[s]	X[v]	X[s]	X[v]	X[s]
Adygeia	X[b]	X[m]						
Dagestan	X[e]		X[q]					
Kabardino-Balkaria	X[f]		X[q]	X[u]				
Karachaevo-Cherkessia	X[g]	X[n]						
N. Ossetia	X[h]	X[l]	X[r]					
Chechnya	X[i]	X[l]	X[s]	X[s]		X[s]	X[v]	X[s]
Ingushetia	X[i]		X[q]	X[s]	X[w]			
Bashkortostan	X[b]	X[b]	X[q]	X[s]	X[x]			
Udmurtia	X[b]	X[b]	X[t]					
Komi-Permyatsky AO	X[b]	X[b]						
Gorny Altai	X[b]	X[b]						
Khanti-Mansiisky AO		X[o]						
Yamalo-Nenetsky AO	X[j]	X[b]						
Buryatia	X[b]	X[b]	X[q]	X[s]				
Tyva			X[q]	X[s]				
Khakasia		X[p]						
Taimirsky AO	X[k]	?						
EvenkiiskyAO								
Ust-Ordynsky AO								
Aginsky-Buryatsky AO								
Sakha	X[b]	X[b]	X[q]	X[s]				
Yevreiskaya AO								
Koryaksky AO	X[b]	X[b]						
Chukotsky AO	X[b]	X[b]						

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

	Indep. Foreign Policy	*Asserted Right to Nat. Resources*	*Asserted Right to Own Currency*	*Total Political-Legal Indicators*	*Total Economic Indicators*	*Total (= Index of Separatist Activism)*
Karelia	X[y]	X[y]	X[s]	3	2	5
Komi		X[aa]		4	1	5
Nenetsky AO				2	0	2
Mari El		X[z]		2	1	3
Mordovia				2	0	2
Chuvashia		X[q]		3?	1	4?
Kalmykia		X[q]		4	1	5
Tatarstan	X[v]	X[q]	X[s]	9	2	11
Adygeia				2	0	2
Dagestan		X[q]		2	1	3
Kabardino-Balkaria		X[q]		3	1	4
Karachaevo-Cherkessia				2	0	2
N. Ossetia				3	0	3
Chechnya	X[y]	X[q]	X[s]	8	2	10
Ingushetia				4	0	4
Bashkortostan	X[y]	X[x]	X[s]	6	2	8
Udmurtia				3	0	3
Komi-Permyatsky AO				2	0	2
Gorny Altai				2	0	2
Khanti-Mansiisky AO				1	0	1
Yamalo-Nenetsky AO				2	0	2
Buryatia	X[y]	X[q]		5	1	6
Tyva		X[q]		2	1	3
Khakasia				1	0	1
Taimirsky AO				1?	0	1?
EvenkiiskyAO				0	0	0
Ust-Ordynsky AO				0	0	0
Aginsky-Buryatsky AO				0	0	0
Sakha	X[z]	X[q]	X[s]	5	2	7
Yevreiskaya AO				0	0	0
Koryaksky AO				2	0	2
Chukotsky AO				2	0	2

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1 (*cont.*)

[a]X indicates that the criterion was met in the ethnic region in question. ? indicates insufficient information.
[b]Anne Sheehy, "Fact Sheet on Declarations of Sovereignty," Radio Liberty *Report on the USSR,* November 9, 1990, pp.23–25.
[c]RL *Report on the USSR,* November 23, 1990, p. 35
[d]RL *Report on the USSR,* December 21, 1990, p. 28 (watered-down sovereignty declaration without the word "sovereignty" on the state-legal status of the Mord SSR).
[e]RL *Report on the USSR,* May 24, 1991, p. 38.
[f]Ali Kazikhanov, "A Step toward Sovereignty," *Izvestia*, February 1, 1991, p. 2.
[g]RL *Report on the USSR,* November 30, 1990, p. 22.
[h]RL *Report on the USSR,* January 4, 1991, p. 65.
[i]RL *Report on the USSR,* December 7, 1990, pp. 23–24.
[j]Yuri Perepletkin, "Yet Another Republic," *Izvestia*, October 17, p. 2.
[k]Yelena Matveyeva, "The Provinces: Farce of Sovereignties," *Moskovskie Novosti*, May 30, 1993, trans. in CDPSP, June 23, 1993, 45, no. 21, p. 18.
[l]A. Ganelin, A. Kurushin, and A. Mursaliyev, "Abstract of Report of Sovereignty Declarations," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 18, 1991, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 3, 1991.
[m]Jane Ormrod, "North Caucasus: Fragmentation or Federation?" in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, *Nation and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
[n]Yuri Kalmykov, "Opposition: The Rights of the Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Republic Are Being Violated," *Izvestia*, July 4, 1991, p.4, trans. in CDSP August 7, 1991, 43, no. 27, p. 22.
[o]Bogdan Szajkowski, *Encyclopedia of Conflicts, Disputes and Flashpoints in Eastern Europe, Russia and the Successor States* (London: Longman, 1993), 174.
[p]A. Tarasov, "Khakassia: A People under the Sky, but with No Place on Earth," *Izvestia*, December 20, 1991, p. 3, trans. in CDSP 13, no. 51 (1991), 26.
[q]Yelena Tregubova, "Nationalities Ministry Conducts Review of Regional Constitutions," *Segodnya*, October 21, 1994, p. 2, trans. in CDPSP 46, no. 42 (1994).
[r]Valery Shanayev, "North Ossetia Adopts New Constitution, Restores Old Name," TASS, November 12, 1994.
[s]Jessica Eve Stern, "Moscow Meltdown: Can Russia Survive?" *International Security* 18 (Spring 1994).
[t]Interfax, "Udmurtia Adopts New Constitution," December 7, 1994.
[u]TASS, "Kabardino-Balkaria Wants Sovereignty, not Autonomy," January 31, 1991.
[v]Elizabeth Teague, "Russia and Tatarstan Sign Power-Sharing Treaty," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 14, April 8, 1994, pp. 19–27.
[w]Ali Khazanov, "News Hotline: 92.5% Cast Their Votes for a Sovereign Ingushetia," *Izvestia*, December 4, 1991, p. 2, trans. in CDSP 43, no. 49, January 8, 1992, p. 22.
[x]Radik Batyrshin, "Yeltsin and Rakhimov Reach an Agreement," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta,* August 4, 1994, p.1, trans. in CDPSP 46, no. 31 (1994).
[y]Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project (Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University), *Report on Ethnic Conflict in the Russian Federation and Transcaucasia* (Cambridge: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, July 1993).
[z]Mark Whitehouse, "Ethnic Competition and the Development of Autonomy: A Comparative Study of Three Russian Republics" (Paper presented at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1995).
[aa]Georgii Vachnadze, *Goryachie Tochki Rossii* (Moscow: Kniga, 1993).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The results of this tabulation hold few surprises for close observers of Russia's nationality politics. Highest in the measure of separatist assertiveness are the two republics of Tatarstan and Chechnya, with scores of 11 and 10, respectively. These pacesetters are closely followed by two second-rank separatist republics—Bashkortostan and Sakha, with scores of 8 and 7. Next, with scores of 5 or 6, comes a group of moderately assertive republics—Buryatia, Karelia, Komi, and Kalmykia. A second set of republics—Ingushetia, Mari El, Chuvashia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Dagestan, North Ossetia, Tyva, and Udmurtia—was slightly less activist, with scores of 3 or 4. Finally, Mordovia falls among the former and present autonomous oblasts and okrugs, with scores 0 to 2.

Interestingly, there do not seem to be large divergences between the propensity of regions to assert political rights or to demand economic autonomy. Rankings on the politico-legal index correspond fairly consistently to those on the much narrower economic band. This constitutes additional reason to consider a composite index of separatist activism meaningful.

IV. Explaining Separatist Activism

Which of the theories discussed in Section II can explain the divergent rates of separatist activism of Russia's ethnic regions? Since different factors are assumed to operate cumulatively, multivariate statistical techniques are most appropriate. Nevertheless, because the number of cases is small for the number of hypothesized causal variables, it is worth first examining correlation coefficients and cross-tabulations for evidence of strong bivariate relationships.

One factor is so apparent as to demand separate analysis: a region's *administrative status* lines up almost precisely with its level of activism (see Table 1). Almost without exception, autonomous okrugs and oblasts (AOs) were less separatist than republics. Indeed, as Table 2 shows, with only one exception (the Volga republic of Mordovia), those ethnic regions with the status of republics in 1990 had separatism scores at or above the median, while those that were AOs had scores below the median. In general, while the AOs restricted themselves to a declaration of sovereignty and sometimes an assertion of higher administrative status, the republics went further and demanded or asserted greater prerogatives.

This is powerful prima facie evidence that a region's status within Russia's constitutional structure affected its propensity toward sepa-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2
ADMINISTRATIVE STATUS AND SEPARATIST ACTIVISM
(1990)

Separatist Activism Index	*<Median (M=3)*	*≥Median (M=3)*
Republic, 1990	Mordovia	Karelia, Bashkortostan Chuvashia, Tyva, Mari El, Kalmykia, Sakha, Dagestan, Tatarstan, N. Ossetia, Buryatia Udmurtia, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Komi, Kabardino-Balkaria
Autonomous Oblast or Okrug, 1990	Nenetsky AO Adygeia, Altai, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Komi-Permyatsky AO, Khanti-Mansiisky AO, Yamalo-Nenetsky AO, Khakassia, Taimir AO, Evenkiisky AO, Ust-Ordynsky AO, Aginsky-Buryatsky AO, Yevreiskaya AO, Koryakskiy AO, Chukotsky AO	

ratism.[46] I had hypothesized that this would be the case because higher administrative status gave a region greater bargaining power within the institutions of intergovernmental negotiation. Because this strong relationship might distort other relationships, I use the following procedure in testing the other hypotheses against the bivariate evidence: I look for relationships that hold not just among all the ethnic regions but also among just the sixteen republics that existed in 1990. As will be seen, some apparent relationships with other economic or cultural factors are in fact best explained by the difference in administrative status.

[46] This conclusion might be weakened if an ethnic region's administrative status were itself determined by primordial ethnic factors. Available secondary sources reveal few specifics about how such administrative status distinctions emerged. But it is known that most of the distinctions that existed in 1990, at the onset of the "ethnic revival," were essentially fixed in the early postrevolutionary years of the 1920s and the early 1930s. As of 1936 fifteen ethnic regions were ASSRs, five were autonomous oblasts, and others were autonomous okrugs; see Viktor Kozlov, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* (London: Hutchinson, 1988), 33. In 1990 the same fifteen were republics and the same five autonomus oblasts. The only change among these categories was that Tyva, which had been an independent state under Moscow's tutelage until 1944, had been incorporated into Russia as an ASSR (after a period as an autonomous oblast). Thus, whether it was primordial or other factors that accounted for administrative status, it was primordial factors *as of the 1920s or 1930s.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

With one exception, *primordial ethnicity* did not seem decisive in determining which of Russia's ethnic regions staged active separatist campaigns. The exception was religious identity, which probably correlated with broader cultural differences. Republics with traditionally Muslim titular nationalities were considerably more separatist than those that were traditionally Christian, Buddhist, or shamanistic. While the mean separatist activism score for the Muslim regions was 5.5, for the non-Muslim regions it was 2.5.[47] Even looking only at the 1990 republics, the mean for Muslim republics was 6.7, while for their non-Muslim counterparts it was 4.2.[48] All three of the most assertively separatist regions—Tatarstan, Chechnya, and Bashkortostan—were Muslim (see Table 3).

There was no evidence to suggest that separatism was more likely to occur in regions where primordial attachments to language were more intense or where the size of the minority nationalist community was greater. While there appeared at first to be a relationship between concentration of the titular nationality in its homeland and separatist ac-

Many primordial factors had, however, changed in the intervening years. For instance, while the number of Ossetians in the RSFSR more than doubled between 1937 and 1989, the number of Karelians dropped by 46 percent; see Chauncy D. Harris, "A Geographic Analysis of Non-Russian Minorities in Russia and Its Ethnic Homelands," *Post-Soviet Geography* 34, no. 9 (1993). In-migration has drastically changed the concentration of various nationalities in their homelands. While some ethnic populations have in large part retained their national language (98 or 99 percent of Tyvans, Karachai, Kabards, Chechens, Ingush, and many of the nationalities of Dagestan reported the ethnic language to be their mother tongue in 1989), others have assimilated linguistically to Russian (only 49 percent of Karels in 1989 considered Karelian their mother tongue, less than the percentage among many nationalities of the autonomous okrugs).

Decisions on administrative status in the early postrevolution years were highly centralized. Thus, "Autonomy was granted in each case by a unilateral decision of the central authority"; see E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 329. Some of the new ASSRs appeared to have strong primordial claims to such status; but others did not. About Siberia, Carr writes of "primitive native tribes . . . scattered over vast, thinly populated areas" with "no effective nationalist or separatist movements" (p. 350). Still, Buryat-Mongolia became an autonomous republic in 1923, and the vast Yakut territory was recognized as an autonomous republic in 1922.

Second, statistical attempts to isolate the influence of administrative status from the possible influence of other factors correlated with such status suggest that it is administrative status per se that best explains the variation in activism. Republics might in theory be more prone to separatism because they have larger or more dense populations, higher concentrations of the titular—or more broadly of non-Russian—nationalities, more extensive schooling in native languages, more industrialized economies, or more organized separatist movements. One way to test whether the administrative status variable is picking up such spurious correlations is to run regressions of the separatist activism index on administrative status, adding these other potential explanatory factors and observing whether the estimated coefficient on the administrative status variable changes. When I did this, the administrative status variable remained significant in all cases, and the estimated coefficient (3.9 when no control variables are included) changed little in most cases, and in the most extreme case (controlling for regional population) fell only to 2.4. Viewing the evidence in light of these considerations, the most plausible conclusion is that administrative status itself, independent of primordial or other factors, played a significant role in determining the separatist activism of an ethnic region's leadership.

[47] The difference was significant at the .01 level.

[48] This difference was, however, only significant at the .06 level.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3
MUSLIM TRADITION AND SEPARATIST ACTIVISM
(REPUBLICS AND AOS)

Separatist Activism Index	*0–2*	*3–4*	*5–6*	*7–8*	*9–11*
Muslim	2	3		1	2
Non-Muslim	14	5	4	1	0

tivism, this turned out to be explained entirely by the fact that AOs tended to have lower titular nationality concentrations than republics. Among the 1990 republics, there was no relationship between concentration of titular nationality and activism. Nor was there any relationship between activism and the proportion of non-Russians in the regional population, the rate of change in the titular nationality population between 1959 and 1989, the change in the titular nationality's share of the region's population in 1959–89, the proportion of the titular nationality population using its ethnic language, or the proportion of school students studying in the native language. (See Table 4.) This leaves religion as the only primordial factor that appears to have played a decisive role in mobilizing ethnic groups to pressure their regional leaders to demand more autonomy from the center.

Moving on to the next question, were levels of separatist activism in Russia's regions shaped by the tendency of modernization, ethnic conflict, or cultural divisions of labor to politicize ethnic identities? The evidence suggests at most a weak relationship between *modernization* and separatist assertiveness. (See Table 5.) There was no observable relationship between separatist activism scores and urbanization of the region, the rate of secondary or higher education, the proportion of agricultural workers in the labor force, or the 1990 average wage. While there appeared to be a weak positive relationship between the urbanization level of the titular nationality population[49] and separatist activism, again this was explainable by the particularly rural character of national populations of the AOs (no relationship existed among the 1990 republics). Nor was there any evidence for the recent-rapid-modernization hypothesis. Regions in which the capital intensity of industry had increased sharply between 1981 and 1990 were not any more likely to be separatist.

Horowitz argued that less modern groups in less modern regions would have the greatest propensity to secede. Testing this is compli-

[49] Because of data limitations, figures used here were for the 1989 urbanization rate of the particular nationality within the USSR, not just Russia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 4
SEPARATIST ACTIVISM AND PRIMORDIAL ETHNIC VARIABLES
(CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS)[a]

	% of Pop.: Titular Nationality	*% of Pop.: Non-Russian*	*Rate of Growth in Nat. Pop., 1959–89*	*Growth in Nat. Pop. as % of Region's Pop., 1959–89*
Separatist Activism Index (all 32 republics and AOs)	.45 (.01)	.39 (.03)	.30 (.10)	.30 (.10)
Separatist Activism Index (16 republics as of 1990)	−.05 (.86)	.03 (.92)	.19 (.47)	.20 (.44)

	% of Pop. Using Ethnic Language	*% of Students Studying in Ethnic Language*
Separatist Activism Index (all republics and AOs)	.29 (.10)	.14 (.53)
Separatist Activism Index (1990 republics)	.12 (.66)	.02 (.93)

[a]Significance level is given in parentheses, two-tailed test.

TABLE 5
SEPARATIST ACTIVISM AND MODERNIZATION
(CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS)[a]

	% of Region's Pop. Urban	*% of Titular Nat. in USSR Rural*	*% of Pop. with Secondary Education*	*% of Pop. with Higher Education*
Separatist Activism Index (all republics and AOs)	.25 (.18)	−.36 (.05)	−.18 (.33)	−.06 (.74)
Separatist Activism Index (1990 republics)	.11 (.69)	−.01 (.97)	.05 (.86)	−.09 (.73)

	Average Wage 1990	*% of Workforce in Agriculture*	*Change in Cap. Intensity in Industry, 1981–90*
Separatist Activism Index (all republics and AOs)	.25 (.34)	n.a.	−.17 (.36)
Separatist Activism Index (1990 republics)	.19 (.52)	−.18 (.52)	−.02 (.94)

[a]Significance level is given in parentheses, two-tailed test.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cated by the fact that indicators of modernity do not line up neatly in comparing nationalities and regions. Soviet nationalities policy has left some relatively rural, agricultural groups with higher rates of educational attainment than the far more urban and industrialized Russians.[50] However, those tests that can be run suggest Horowitz's conjecture does not fit the pattern of separatist activism in Russia.

Figure 1 shows ethnicities and regions divided up according to their rates of urbanization, industrial output, and agricultural employment. Ethnic regions are classified as "advanced" or "backward," but no connotation, pejorative or otherwise, is intended by the use of these terms, which are chosen simply to correspond to Horowitz's original hypotheses.

The mean separatist activism score for each category is given in the table. Horowitz's theory would predict the highest average propensity to secede in the bottom right quadrant. A hypothesis of ethnic division of labor might be identified with conditions where the national population was either much more or much less modern than the regional average, roughly, the top right and bottom left quadrants. In fact, the highest average separatism score was in the one category predicted by *neither* of these theories—that of advanced national populations in advanced regions. The mean separatism score for the category of advanced nationality in advanced region was significantly higher than that for each other category.[51] Perhaps most important, the large range in separatism scores among regions in the same boxes of Table 1 suggests that in Russia, unlike in Africa, Asia, or the Caribbean, this characterization has weak explanatory power.

Surprisingly, this conclusion is quite robust to differences in the definition of advanced and backward nationalities. When they are classified by rates of secondary education or by urbanization alone, the identity of the ethnic regions in the different cells changes somewhat. But in each case, the mean separatism score for advanced groups in advanced regions remains at least one whole point above the next highest category.

With one possible exception, bivariate analysis did not support the *conflict* hypothesis. Regions that had seen ethnic violence during the period in question or that were involved in a territorial dispute with their neighbors did not have significantly higher average separatist activism scores.[52] While there appeared to be a counterintuitive negative

[50] For instance, despite a population more than twice as rural as the Russians, Buryats had a 50 percent higher rate of completion of higher education, according to the 1989 census.

[51] The mean score for "advanced" populations in "backward" regions was also significantly higher than that for "backward" nationalities in "advanced" regions.

[52] This was the case whether all ethnic regions or just 1990 republics were included. Note, however, the multivariate results presented in Table 10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 1
SEPARATIST ACTIVISM OF ADVANCED AND BACKWARD NATIONALITIES AND REGIONS

[a]Separatism Activism Score is given in square brackets. The terms "advanced" and "backward" correspond to Horowitz's original hypotheses and are not intended to carry any connotation, pejorative or otherwise.

Regions are classified as advanced if both the proportion living in urban areas was greater than the mean for all Russian regions (67 percent) and the region's 1993 per capita industrial output was greater than the mean for all regions (805,000 rubles per capita). National populations were classified as advanced if they were among the 10 highest of the 32 titular nationalities in urbanization and among the 10 lowest in the proportion of the population working in agriculture.

[b]In the case of regions with multiple titular nationalities such as Dagestan or Kabardino-Balkaria, urbanization and agricultural employment rates were averaged using population proportions as weights.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

correlation between the proportion of the population that were in-migrants and separatist activism (in-migration appeared to douse separatist passions rather than to exacerbate them, as might have been expected, given the competition of newcomers for jobs and local resources), this relationship again was explained by the fact that AOs had higher in-migration rates than the republics had. The possible exception concerns the nationalities that had been deported by Stalin during World War II. The mean separatist activism score for (1990) republics or autonomous oblasts containing these five nationalities (Karachai, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars) was 5.0, compared with a mean score of 3.9 for the seventeen republics and autonomous oblasts that did not contain deported groups. However, the difference is not statistically significant. Thus, although religious differences appear to have played a mobilizing role, other factors associated with the distribution or costs of activating ethnic markers do not seem to explain much of the Russian experience of regional separatism.

Did the existence and degree of *mobilization* of ethnic organizations determine which regional leaders would press separatist demands? As this question presents particular data problems, the conclusions here can only be preliminary. Knowing of no reliable source of information from which to gauge the relative membership of ethnic organizations in the regions, I therefore constructed a substitute measure, an index of the date of founding or of the first reference in the Russian national press to an organization in the region with specifically nationalist aims. Additional indicators of the degree of mobilization of nationalist movements were whether the nationalist movement had formed an armed militia and whether it had created a parallel nationality-based parliamentary body.

As expected, those ethnic regions that had established a nationality-based parliament and where nationalist organizations had emerged earlier appeared more likely to be actively separatist. (See Table 6.) But in large part this was due to the fact that republics were more likely to show these signs of greater organization than were AOs. However, the existence of a nationalist militia in a region was positively related to separatist activism among all thirty-two ethnic regions and almost as strongly among the pre-1990 republics.[53] The mean activism score for the six regions with national militias was 6.3, while for twenty-five ethnic regions without militias it was 2.5. This suggests that in ethnic re-

[53] The mean separatism score for ethnic regions with a nationalist militia was significantly higher than for others in both cases.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 6
SEPARATIST ACTIVISM AND ORGANIZATION OF NATIONALIST MOVEMENT (CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS)[a]

	Index of Date of Founding of (or First Traceable Reference to) Nationalist Organization (Early Org = Low)
Separatist Activism Index (all republics and AOs)	−.57 (.00)
Separatist Activism Index (1990 republics)	−.18 (.50)

[a]Significance level is given in parentheses, two-tailed test.

gions where nationalist movements had reached this militant level of organization, they were more effective at imposing their demands on the regional political leaders or they posed a more credible threat of disruption that the leadership could use in bargaining with the center.

Regardless of the interests or demands of regional constituencies, the stance of regional *leaders* might be expected to be influenced by their own particular institutional interests, personal history, and social networks. Surprisingly, however, the Russian data turned up little evidence of this. (See Table 7.) First, regional leaders who in the past had worked as apparatchiks in the party or state bureaucracy were neither more nor less likely to press separatist claims than were those with other past professions.[54] Leaders who were themselves of the titular nationality appeared slightly more likely to engage in separatist acts, but this reflected the fact that more leaders of republics than of AOs were of the titular nationality. Leaders who had been appointed by Yeltsin appeared much less likely to be separatist, whereas those who had been popularly elected in their region were much more likely to be separatist. But these effects can be explained in large part by the fact that all elections were in republics, while almost all the appointments from Moscow were among the AOs.[55] Considering the 1990 republics separately, the greater average activism of leaders who were elected was not significant. In brief, the particular characteristics and institutional interests of the regional leaders did not play a role statistically distinguishable from the

[54] A region's leader is taken to be the president or head of executive in republics and the head of administration in the AOs. This, of course, simplifies the more complicated balance of power in most regions.

[55] The one exception is Ingushetia's General Aushev, who was first appointed by Yeltsin and then elected president.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 7
SEPARATIST ACTIVISM AND REGIONAL LEADERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS

	Reg. Leader Worked in State or Party Apparatus	*Reg. Leader Did Not*	*Reg. Leader of Titular Nationality*	*Reg. Leader Not of Tit. Nat.*
Mean Separatist Activism Index (all republics and AOs)	3.1	3.7	3.9	2.1
Mean Separatist Activism Index (1990 republics)	5.0	5.2	5.2	4.3
	Reg. Leader also Leader of Nationalist Organization	*Reg. Leader Not*	*Reg. Leader Appointed by Yeltsin*	*Reg. Leader Not*
Mean Separatist Activism Index (all republics and AOs)	10.0**	3.1**	1.3**	4.5**
Mean Separatist Activism Index (1990 republics)	10.0*	4.8*	4.0	5.1
		Reg. Leader Elected	*Reg. Leader Not Elected*	
Mean Separatist Activism Index (all republics and AOs)		5.1**	1.6**	
Mean Separatist Activism Index (1990 republics)		5.4	3.7	

*difference of means is significant at p <.05.
**difference of means is significant at p <.01.

broader institutional differences between ethnic regions with different administrative status. The one exception was in the one ethnic region where the republican leader was himself also the leader of a nationalist organization—Chechnya. There the separatist score was significantly higher than the mean for the other regions.

Finally, how did considerations of the *dependence* and relative *bargaining power* of the region influence the choices of regional leaders? Some aspects of dependence are simple consequences of geography.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Regions with access to an international border or with functioning ports might have greater chances of succeeding as independent states or of resisting central economic retaliation. Those with large proportions of the titular nationality population in other parts of Russia might have more to lose from hostility and closed borders. And those near Moscow might be more subject to central pressure than those many time zones away. In fact, however, there was no evidence for any of these hypotheses. Surprisingly, ethnic regions surrounded by Russian territory were not significantly less likely to take separatist actions against the center than were those on an international border or those with a port.[56] Nor did distance from Moscow or the relative number of ethnic hostages in other regions make any difference. (See Table 8.)

A second aspect of bargaining power and dependence concerns the wealth, resources, and size of regions, factors that affect both their perceived viability as separate entities and their ability to withstand central pressure and impose economic costs on Moscow during the negotiations. (See Table 9.) The evidence here is quite powerful.

In contrast to the other factors, which yielded results that were equivocal at best, there appears to be a strong relationship between the economic prospects and bargaining power of an ethnic region and its degree of separatist activism. Those ethnic regions that had large populations and high industrial output, were major raw materials producers, or had high industrial exports were much more separatist. Those that relied heavily on central subventions to fund regional government spending tended to be more cautious.[57] This suggests a strong element of rational calculation in the incidence of separatist action among Russia's regions.

While correlations and comparisons of means are useful for discerning strong relationships between factors, they do not isolate the separate effect of different variables in a multivariate context. For this, regression techniques are appropriate. Table 10 shows the results of OLS regressions of the separatist activism index on various subsets of the hypothesized causal factors.

Model 1 shows the coefficient estimates when a large selection of the hypothesized causal variables are included. Not surprisingly, with so many independent variables for such a small number of cases, the significance of the estimates is very low. Model 2 shows a pared-down regression, from which I have excluded all independent variables that did not significantly improve the fit of the regression as judged by an F-test

[56] This was true whether one considered all thirty-two ethnic regions or only the sixteen 1990 republics.

[57] This was not significant, though, when the 1990 republics were considered separately.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 8
SEPARATIST ACTIVISM AND GEOGRAPHICAL VULNERABILITY
(CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS)[a]

	Distance from Moscow	*% of Titular Nationality Outside Region*
Separatist Activism Index (all republics and AOs)	n.a.	−.28 (.13)
Separatist Activism Index (1990 republics)	.11 (.69)	.11 (.69)

[a]Significance level is given in parentheses, two-tailed test.

TABLE 9
SEPARATIST ACTIVISM AND ECONOMIC BARGAINING POWER
(CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS)[a]

	Reg. Population	*Industrial Output Per Capita 1993*	*Central Subventions as % of Regional Government Spending 1992*	*Industrial Exports Per Capita 1988*	*% of Russian Total Production of Raw Materials*
Separatist Activism Index (all republics and AOs)	.73 (.00)	.06 (.75)	−.38 (.04)	n.a.	.61 (.00)
Separatist Activism Index (1990 republics)	.61 (.01)	.58 (.02)	−.42 (.11)	.56 (.02)	.60 (.02)

[a]Significance level is given in parentheses, two-tailed test.

at the .10 level. Since lack of data meant that including either the export or the raw material production variables in the regression would drastically reduce the number of available cases, they were left out of the first two models. Models 3 and 4 show the estimates if they are, nevertheless, included.

The main results of the bivariate analysis are confirmed. The administrative status of a region remains fundamentally important: republics on average had separatism scores 4 or 5 points above nonrepublics. Muslim regions were on average 3 to 4 points more separatist than non-Muslim ones. (Other primordial or modernization factors remained insignificant.) Ethnic regions dependent on central subventions seem to have been less separatist, although this result is no longer significant once the raw materials production or exports factors are in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 10
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR REGRESSIONS OF SEPARATISM ACTIVISM INDEX ON VARIOUS SUBSETS OF PREDICTORS

Model	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4 (Republics Only)*
Region was republic in 1990	3.84	4.90***	4.21***	—
	(2.22)	(.75)	(.90)	
Percentage of population ot titular nationality	.02			
	(.02)			
Titular nationality predominantly Muslim	2.61	3.96***	3.24**	3.66*
	(2.37)	(.79)	(.93)	(1.15)
Percentage of national population using ethnic language	.00			
	(.03)			
Percentage of regional population urban	−.00			
	(.05)			
Percentage of national population rural	.02			
	(.04)			
Recent ethnic violence	−2.99	−2.94**	−2.29	−2.35
	(2.01)	(.98)	(1.09)	(1.31)
Nationality deported by Stalin	−1.02			
	(1.97)			
Date of nationalist organization appearance	.30	.32*	.25	.24
	(.23)	(.12)	(.15)	(.23)
Nationalist militia existed	1.21			
	(1.80)			
Regional leader elected	.99			
	(1.21)			
Leader of government or parliament was head of a nationalist organization	2.01	4.23**	2.29	4.74*
	(2.19)	(1.23)	(1.83)	(1.91)
Leader was of titular nationality	.41			
	(.93)			
Population	.00			
	(.00)			
Industrial output per capita 1993	−.00			
	(.00)			
Percentage of regional government spending financed by subventions	−.04	−.03*	−.02	−.01
	(.04)	(.01)	(.02)	(.03)
Region's share in Russian Federation raw materials output, 1993			.33	
			(.20)	
Industrial exports per capita 1988				.26
				(.18)
Constant	−2.37	−1.06	−.74	2.70
	(5.20)	(1.17)	(1.27)	(1.61)
R Square	.858	.817	.802	.806
Adjusted R Square	.631	.771	.696	.660
N	26	30	20	14

*p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cluded.[58] Though the results were not significant, which is not surprising given the small number of cases, the positive coefficients suggest that raw materials producers and exporters of industrial goods were on average more separatist. And the two regions where the president or chair of parliament was also the leader of a nationalist organization—Chechnya and Tyva—were significantly more separatist, even controlling for the other factors that improve the fit of the regression.

Two results were more surprising. Given the impact of the other factors, ethnic violence in a region during the previous four years was associated with a *lower* propensity to take separatist action. Perhaps recent experience with ethnic conflict heightens the regional leaders' sense of the danger of inflaming ethnic tensions. And, other things being equal, the earlier a nationalist organization was founded in a region, the *less* separatist it was. One possible explanation for this might be that nationalist movements which organized late were emboldened by the center's accommodation of previous separatist demands, whereas those in the first cohort of autonomy seekers were appeased before their goals could radicalize.

Finally, were the deteminants of demands for independence different from the determinants of demands for greater autonomy? To check whether the results might have been distorted by combining two qualitatively different phenomena in the dependent variable, I ran similar regressions excluding from the data the two republics (Chechnya and Tatarstan) that had actually declared independence. The results were largely similar to those reported above. Republic status remained the most significant factor, and recent political violence remained negatively associated with separatist activism. Dependence on subventions was still a restraining factor, though not significant. The regressions produced results for raw material output and industrial exports similar to those reported in Table 10, though with somewhat lower coefficients. The most notable difference was that, with Tatarstan and Chechnya excluded, the Muslim nationality variable was no longer at all significant. But the existence of a nationalist militia in the ethnic region now significantly increased its predicted separatist score, as did having a leader who was of the titular nationality. One might reasonably conclude that while Muslim tradition may make regional leaders more likely to seek independence, it is less important than the pressure of organized and militant nationalists and even the regional leader's na-

[58] This may, of course, be due to the sharp drop in available cases when these factors are added.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tionality in determining how assertively a leader will demand lesser degrees of autonomy.

V. Conclusion

Russia's experience with minority nationalisms in the early 1990s offers a natural testing ground for existing theories of separatist activism. This article considered why, of Russia's thirty-two ethnically defined subregions, some such as Chechnya and Tatarstan have come to epitomize the demand for greater independence, while others such as Mordovia and Chukotka have been virtually silent. Each separatist group has a distinct history and set of motives to press for greater independence, but some clear patterns do emerge from a comparative analysis.

First, with one exception, little evidence supports pressure-cooker theories of nationalist activism, in which the weakening of central control liberates the repressed primordial sentiments of the most concentrated and self-conscious ethnic minorities. In fact, separatist activism did not vary with concentration of the titular nationality, with ethnic language usage, or with ethnic language schooling. (Strangely enough, the speed with which the sixteen ethnic republics declared sovereignty in the 1990 "parade of sovereignties" was positively related to the number of *Russians* in the region. (See Figure 2.)[59] Regional leaders who were of the titular nationality were not significantly more likely to press separatist demands than were those who were Russian. The one primordial trait that was significant was an Islamic religious tradition, which appeared to predispose regions toward greater separatism. One might tentatively interpret this as suggesting that, to the extent that primordial sentiments explain regional leaders' strategies at all, the key was not so much intensity or concentration of ethnic consciousness as the particular content of the cultural identities. The Muslim/non-Muslim boundary was more influential than other cultural or linguistic divisions.

Not only does this conclusion emerge from statistical analysis, but it is also intriguingly evident in the contrasting histories of some of Russia's ethnic republics. Had primordial ethnic sentiments been the key, one might have expected to find the most adamant separatists in the Buddhist republic of Tyva. Incorporated into the USSR only in 1944, the republic has a population that in 1989 was 64 percent Tyvan. Of these,

[59] One interesting explanation suggested by an anonymous referee was that regional leaders might have felt more secure playing chicken with the center if they had a sizable Russian population that could be held hostage.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 2
TIMING OF SOVEREIGNTY DECLARATION AND PROPORTION OF POPULATION RUSSIAN (16 AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

99 percent spoke Tyvan as their mother tongue, and 60 percent of public school students studied in the Tyvan language. By 1991 the three main political leaders—the president, prime minister, and legislature chair—were of Tyvan nationality. Moreover, ethnic identifications were catalyzed by violent clashes between Tyvans and Russians in 1990, in which seven Russians were killed.[60]

In fact, Tyva was one of the *least* separatist of the 1990 ethnic republics, surpassed in its docility only by Mordovia. Among the many ethnic regions whose leaders took more separatist actions than Tyva were some with comparatively weak primordial ethnicity. In Komi, a Christianized republic, less than a quarter of the inhabitants are Komis and nearly one-third no longer speak Komi as their mother tongue. All schooling in 1993 was in the Russian language. In Karelia, where the titular nationality "is being rapidly assimilated by Russians," only 5 percent of the republic's population reported Karelian to be their mother tongue by 1989.[61] Yet both Komi and Karelia were among the first to declare sovereignty in the 1990 outburst of minority nationalisms, as Tyva remained cautiously on the sidelines.

Factors that accentuated ethnic identifications in other places—modernization, in-migration, conflict—did not have the expected effect on regional separatist activism in Russia. The pattern did not suggest a developmental or reactive nationalism of groups disadvantaged or threatened by the process of modernization. Unlike in the Asian, African, and Caribbean cases studied by Horowitz, the highest rate of separatism was not among economically less developed groups in less developed regions. In fact, just the opposite was true: insofar as there was any relationship between modernization and separatism, it was economically and educationally advanced groups in more developed regions that were at the forefront. Russian separatists had more in common with Catalonians and Basques than with Filipino Muslims or Iraqi Kurds. Nor was greater separatism associated with particularly sharp divergences between the modernization levels of the titular nationality and of the rest of the population, as might be predicted by an "ethnic division of labor" hypothesis. And ethnic conflicts, rather than polarizing communities and catalyzing concentrated minorities' demands for self-government, seem to have served as a cautionary reminder to leaders of the dangers of inflaming ethnic passions.

[60] Toomas Alatalu, "Tuva—a State Reawakens," *Soviet Studies* 44, no. 5 (1992), 890.
[61] Harris (fn. 46), 584.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is hard to be sure what difference the degree of organization of nationalist movements made, given the very limited data available. However, controlling for other factors, it appears that earlier emergence of a nationalist organization was associated with *lower* rates of separatist activism. Possibly, late organizing nationalist groups tended to be more radical than those that appeared before substantial liberalization had reduced the risks. Separatist activism does seem to have increased when the region's president, head of administration, or chair of parliament was also a leader of the nationalist movement, as was the case in Chechnya and Tyva.

Some of the strongest results concern the starting positions and relative bargaining power of regions in the game of nerves with the center. Those ethnic regions with the institutional resources and access of republics played their hand much more provocatively than those with only the status of autonomous oblasts or okrugs. Those ethnic regions heavily dependent on central subventions quite sensibly adopted a meeker posture. Those with export potential and valuable natural resources seem to have been more assertive.

This may explain Tyva's relative quiescence. From the early 1990s, its nationalist movement was quite developed and integrated with the republic's government. A nationalist leader, Kaadir-Ool Bicheldei, served as chairman of parliament. Demands of the more radical Tyvan nationalists "clearly exceeded even those of some of the Baltic states' Fronts," according to one Estonian observer, and included transfer of the republic's capital to a city with a more concentrated Tyvan population.[62] For all this, Tyvan leaders have explicitly rejected a confrontational approach to Moscow, citing the fact that the republic relies on central subsidies for more than 90 percent of its budget. Tyvan officials have actively *discouraged* out-migration by Russians from the urban areas because of the negative economic consequences of a loss of skilled labor.[63]

Rather than fighting off attempts at separatism, Yeltsin found himself during a 1994 visit actually encouraging the Tyvans to be more self-reliant and to expand ties with neighboring China and Mongolia. In a particularly incongruous incident, it was Bicheldei who showed Yeltsin round a sheepskin coat factory under construction in the capital, Kyzyl, and reminded the Russian president of the need for federal subsidies. Yeltsin, immediately promising federal aid to build the factory, wrote in

[62] Alatalu (fn. 60), 892.

[63] Stefan Sullivan, "Interethnic Relations in Post-Soviet Tuva," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 18, no. 1 (1995).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its guest book: "Good job. We'll give you money!"[64] The careful ambivalence of official Tyva's flirtation with nationalism, like the statistical results presented in this article, suggests an essentially rational calculus of potential costs and benefits.

But costs and benefits of what? The reference point of comparison for most ethnic regions seems not to have been a state of actual secession, for in that case, those regions surrounded by Russian territory would surely be much more vulnerable and cautious than those on international borders or with functioning ports. Rather, the reference point appears to have been a greater degree of autonomy—lower central taxes, rights over natural resources, freedom to export with fewer restrictions. Those ethnic regions that could benefit from increased independence *at the margin* were the most likely to press a wider variety of claims. It is unlikely that many of the most adamantly separatist regional leaders desired actual secession.

In fact, the demands and actions of Russia's ethnic regions seem in many ways similar to the bargaining ploys and pressure tactics employed by some of the country's *non*-ethnic regions to extract benefits from the center.[65] Ordinary oblasts and krais have in recent years demanded higher status and greater economic rights, and some have unilaterally declared themselves republics. Conscious of the instrumental benefits of separatist activism, some leaders of nonethnic regions have even expressed envy of the bargaining power that a non-Russian population brings. The deputy governor of Tambov Oblast recently joked that when he saw the advantages ethnic republics were receiving, "I started to think, should I import Tatars into the oblast to make up 50 percent of the population."[66]

Russia's experience offers new perspectives on the comparative politics of separatism. A tradition of scholarship on African and other developing countries has emphasized the role of rational calculation in the rise and behavior of ethnic movements.[67] Seemingly spontaneous ethnic outbursts are often elements of a rational competition over distributional outcomes. Particularly in federal states, regional protests serve

[64] *Segondnya*, June 17, 1994, p. 2, trans. in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 46, no. 24 (1994), 18.

[65] For a more detailed analysis of Russian center-region relations, in which strategies of both ethnic and nonethnic regions are considered in parallel, see Daniel Treisman, "After the Deluge: The Politics of Regional Crisis in Post-Soviet Russia" (Manuscript, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1996).

[66] Author's interview with Yuri N. Blokhin, first deputy head of administration, Tambov Oblast Tambov, June 16, 1996.

[67] See, in particular, Bates (fn. 1); also Rothschild (fn. 18).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to pressure the central government for greater resource allocations, and credible threats of secession are a powerful form of protest.[68] The pattern of separatist activism noted in this article suggests a similar logic in post-Soviet Russia. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that in Russia separatist actions by regional leaders were indeed effective at extracting greater fiscal benefits from the center.[69]

Though cultural identities clearly play a role in separatist activism in Russia, they appear to be more of a resource for regional leaders than a motivating force. Whatever the explanation for the incidence of ethnic identifications and organization, the way such factors are translated into regional political strategies seems highly structured by the rational evaluation of regional interests by local leaders. Such leaders are not the political embodiment of nonrational primordial impulses so much as brokers between region and center in a complicated nested game, in which they consider the potential economic gains of greater autonomy, the risks of central fiscal retaliation and of provoking local ethnic strife, and their own need to sustain local organizational supports. If ethnicity in Russia is explosive, the outbursts are very much the controlled explosions of an internal combustion engine, which, harnessed within a system of constraints, produce movement in a direction chosen by the driver.[70]

The association of advanced economic development, industrial wealth, export capacity, and natural resources with separatism in Russia mirrors similar patterns noted in the Soviet Union and in parts of Eastern Europe.[71] Among postcommunist multiethnic states there appear to have been more Slovenias than Slovakias. Future research is necessary to explain why this should be the case. One hypothesis is that for ethnic regions in postcommunist states separatism implies not isolation but more rapid integration into the world market, as well as a decrease in the interregional redistributive transfers endemic to centrally planned economies. As such, secession from a falteringly reforming

[68] On the role of such protests in India, see Subrata K. Mitra, *Power, Protest and Participation: Local Elites and the Politics of Development in India* (London: Routledge, 1992).

[69] Treisman found that, in 1992, Russian regions which had declared sovereignty early on were on average rewarded with nearly 19,000 rubles per inhabitant in central fiscal transfers and tax breaks. See Daniel Treisman, "The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia," *British Journal of Political Science* (July 1996). Treisman has also modeled why it might often be rational for a central government to appease such separatist regional leaders; see Treisman, "Crises and Stability in Federal States: A Game Theoretic Analysis" (Manuscript, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1995).

[70] The contrasting cases of "highway crashes" in ethnic relations, such as Chechnya, merely highlight the general trend of negotiated compromise between center and ethnic regions.

[71] Emizet and Hesli (fn. 25); Roeder (fn. 25).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

state may have more appeal for potentially profitable regions than for their more depressed, underdeveloped, or resource-poor neighbors.

The ethnic revival in the reforming communist states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union caught many observers by surprise, and suggested various explanations. The sudden invigoration of ethnic claims might reflect a retreat to premodern forms of solidarity, caused ultimately by the communist order's very success in eradicating traces of civil society around which newer definitions of identity could have crystallized. Or it might be explained by an essentially instrumental logic, in which ethnic forms of mobilization hold particular advantages for actors within the distinctive set of institutions evolving out of reforming communist orders. The evidence presented in this article suggests the latter view. The explicitly ethnic administrative architecture of communist federal states left subunits with institutional resources proportional to their previously recognized ethnic status. At the same time, social identifications that support anticenter protest endow ethnic regions with particular advantages in the bargaining for centrally bestowed benefits. In sum, the evidence suggests an instrumental institutionalist view of ethnic politics in Russia. What drives the rise of ethnonational demands is not just the strength of ethnic identifications and movements, but the rational calculation of what they can achieve.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GENDER, FEMINISM, AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Exploring Relationships with Survey Data from the Middle East

By MARK TESSLER and INA WARRINER

GENDER studies, which separate the socially constructed roles and orientations of women and men from biological definitions of sex, are increasingly being combined with international studies at the theoretical level.[1] Scholars working in this area seek to determine whether and how the dynamics of international politics are influenced by gender-specific agendas, and also whether there are gender-specific consequences associated with particular patterns of international political behavior. The field is at present marked by considerable diversity, with clear and in some instances sharp disagreements among analysts who are identified with differing approaches to inquiry, including liberal, standpoint, and postmodernist feminism.

In an effort to contribute to the dialogue between gender studies and international studies, this report presents findings from an investigation based on the integrated secondary analysis of survey data collected in Israel, Egypt, Palestine,[2] and Kuwait. In broad terms, the goal of this research is a contribution to rigor and cumulativeness. It seeks to provide systematic empirical evidence in order to evaluate hypotheses that are

[1] For discussions of the connection between gender and international studies from a variety of perspectives, see V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, *Global Gender Issues* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993); Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, eds., *Gender and International Relations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992); Hilary Charlesworthy, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, "Feminist Approaches to International Law," *American Journal of International Law* 85 (October 1991); Sue Ellen M. Charlton, Jana Everett, and Kathleen Staudt, eds., *Women, the State, and Development* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); Christine Sylvester, "Empathetic Cooperation: A Feminist Method for IR," *Millennium* 23, no. 2 (1994); and Yolande Cohen, ed., *Women and Counter-Power* (New York: Black Rose Books, 1989).

[2] Palestine here refers to the West Bank and Gaza. The public opinion data from Palestine employed in the present study are from a survey of the Palestinian population of these Israeli-occupied territories.

World Politics 49 (January 1997), 250–81

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

most commonly supported with deductive reasoning or interpretative historical analysis, and it also seeks to bring a comparative perspective that incorporates data and insights from non-Western as well as Western societies. More specifically, the analysis assesses the utility of both gender and attitudes pertaining to the circumstances of women in accounting for variance in views about war and peace, and thereafter examines the degree to which attributes of political systems constitute conditionalities associated with important individual-level variable relationships.

Based on data from the Arab world and Israel, with attitudes about a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict treated as the dependent variable, this research also aspires to shed light on more practical considerations pertaining to the international relations of the Middle East. While the major preoccupations of the analysis remain theoretical, with a specific concern for generalizable variable relationships, the report seeks in addition to present findings that have implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Theoretical Context

Two interrelated bodies of theoretical literature shape much of the current interest in gender and international studies. The first, which includes attempts to link feminism and globalism, hypothesizes that women are more pacific than men in their approach to international relations, being more accepting of compromise to resolve interstate disputes and less likely than men to believe that war is necessary or appropriate in particular conflict situations. Competition, violence, intransigence, and territoriality are thus associated with a "male" approach to human relations, including relations among sovereign states, whereas moderation, compromise, tolerance, and pacifism are seen as a "female" perspective on world affairs.

Public opinion research provides some evidence in support of these propositions. Evidence from such research is limited to the United States, however, and even here findings are not entirely consistent. For example, while several systematic studies have found American men to be more supportive of militarism and war involvement than American women by an average of seven to nine percentage points,[3] a recent data-

[3] Lisa Brandes, "The Gender Gap and Attitudes toward War" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1992); Robert Y. Shapiro and Harpreet Mahajan, "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960's to the 1980's," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50 (1986); and Tom W. Smith, "Gender and Attitudes toward Violence," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48 (1984).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

based analysis by Conover and Shapiro reports no sex-linked differences in general militarism.[4]

The Conover and Shapiro investigation, which analyzed data from the 1991 American National Election Study Pilot Study, did note that women were less supportive than men of U.S. involvement in the 1990–91 Gulf War, and it speculated accordingly that sex-linked differences may exist in relation to concrete but not hypothetical war situations. But even in the former instance, the authors added, differences are "by no means large enough to divide men and women into different camps, and they are certainly not large enough to warrant making the kinds of statements differentiating women and men that have long been part of [the popular] stereotype." Overall, the authors thus conclude, "Stereotypes [about male-female differences] turn out to be only partial truths, and the hypotheses [about the explanatory power of gender are] only partially confirmed."[5]

Findings from research on the differences between men and women in several related fields are also sometimes offered in support of efforts to establish a connection between gender and international studies. For example, Gilligan reported a distinctly feminine sensibility based on studies undertaken with small children, college students, and adults.[6] In these studies, women repeatedly demonstrated a predilection to care for others and to prefer harmonious human relations to individual achievement and conquest. Men, by contrast, were more likely to value and pursue behavior involving rivalry and competition, even when this resulted in interpersonal conflict.

Also sometimes cited in support of hypotheses about differences between women and men are findings from earlier anthropological studies of tribal societies. McGuigan has shown, for example, that communal violence and aggressive behavior vary in proportion to male control of the public sphere, and also as a function of the degree to which paramount gods are male.[7] To the extent that these attributes are present, aggression and violence predominate in the resolution of conflicts. Alternatively, the level of violence is significantly lower in tribal societies that draw less of a distinction between the roles of men and women and worship female gods.

More common than studies presenting empirical evidence in support

[4] Pamela Johnston Conover and Virginia Shapiro, "Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War," *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (November 1993).

[5] Ibid., 1095.

[6] Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).

[7] Dorothy G. McGuigan, ed., *The Role of Women in Conflict and Peace* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of "feminist-pacifist" propositions are analyses based on deductive reasoning, most of which emphasize the uniquely female experience of motherhood.[8] Two overlapping visions of the motherhood experience and its salience are found in those feminist and other discourses that seek to establish a link between gender and international affairs. The first celebrates a cultural feminism, or feminism of identity, in which the "female" values of caring and nurturance are given prominence. The second introduces the concept of "moral motherhood," which is said to incline women toward "preservative love" and the elimination of violence in human relations.

The caregiver approach to international relations stresses empathy and compromise, observing that these values are associated with social roles that in most societies are played primarily by women. Women are the principal caregivers in most cultures, attending to the needs of children, ailing friends, elderly parents, and others. Cultural feminism argues that this has relevance for the international arena. Emphasizing the universal applicability of a predisposition toward nurturance, it links women's roles as domestic caregivers to a more tolerant approach to relations among communities and states. Men, by contrast, being less involved in caregiving, are said to be less moderate and pacific and more likely to be concerned with hierarchy, hegemony, and justice in intercommunal and international relations.

While advanced by some feminist scholars, others express reservations about these hypotheses associated with caregiving, not only challenging the evidence on which they are based but also dissenting from their philosophical and political assumptions. In particular, critics charge that attributions of empathy, nurturance, and caring reinforce traditional stereotypes about women and retard the feminist goal of emancipation. On the one hand, some postmodern feminist theorists insist that there are no "essential components" that characterize all women.[9] On the other hand, some assert that the emphasis on caring is itself misplaced, either seeing this as patronizing or disputing the hypothesized link to public and international affairs.[10]

[8] For example, see Sara Ruddick, *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace* (New York: Ballantine, 1989); Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Reflections on War and Political Discourse," *Political Theory* 13, no. 1 (1985); Mary G. Dietz, "Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The Problem with Maternal Thinking," *Political Theory* 13, no. 1 (1985); and Patricia Ward Scaltsas, "Do Feminist Ethics Counter Feminist Aims?" in Eve Browning Cole and Susan Coultrap-McQuin, eds., *Explorations in Feminist Ethics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).

[9] See Marysia Zalewski, "The Women/'Women' Question in International Relations," *Millennium* 23, no. 2 (1994).

[10] See Alison M. Jaggar, "Feminist Ethics: Projects, Problems, Prospects," in Claudia Card, ed., *Feminist Ethics* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991); Elshtain (fn. 8).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A second and closely related feminist discourse emphasizes the concept of "moral motherhood," which asserts that women as mothers have a responsibility to eliminate violence in the resolution of conflicts. Advancing the concepts of "maternal thinking" and "preservative love," which are said to be consequences of the social practice of mothering, this discourse distinguishes between "bureaucratic-administrative abstractionism" and an empathetic and loving approach to human relations.[11] Maternal thinking about world affairs thus rejects a distinction between individual and collective forms of violent conflict, viewing both as equally abhorrent. Elshtain describes the political implications of maternal thinking as "social feminism." An approach to international relations shaped by maternal thinking, she argues, is significantly more pacific and tolerant than one founded on abstract and hierarchical conceptions of justice.[12]

This discourse, too, has critics among some feminist and other scholars. Some argue that men as well as women are capable of maternal thinking, even though the male voice is largely absent in discussions of this concept. Some also raise questions about women who do not have children, noting that they are not considered in the conversation about maternal thinking. Still another reservation, echoing a complaint about the caregiver paradigm, is that an emphasis on motherhood and material thinking reduces women to unidimensional actors and obscures the diversity of the factors that influence their attitudes and behavior.

Whether there is indeed a distinctly female approach to international relations, and, if so, whether it is characterized by an inclination toward compromise, tolerance, and pacifism, thus remain open questions. Hypotheses to this effect are advanced by some scholars but challenged by others, with debates for the most part uninformed by the results of systematic empirical research. Moreover, consistent and unambiguous conclusions do not emerge from the empirical research that has been conducted, and, in addition, this research has been limited almost entirely to the United States. Finally, even should it eventually become clear that significant sex-linked differences do exist, these might be the result of factors other than caregiving and maternal thinking. For example, as one analyst points out, women might be more predisposed than men toward the peaceful resolution of international conflicts because they are the principal users of social programs that compete with the military for governmental funds.[13]

[11] Ruddick (fn. 8); Dietz (fn. 8).
[12] Elshtain (fn.8).
[13] Jaggar (fn. 10).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A second body of theoretical literature has also contributed to current interest in the connections between gender and international studies. The focus in this instance is on the relationship between nationalism and feminism, particularly, although not exclusively, in the dependency situations of external or internal colonialism and in circumstances of ethnic or cultural conflict.

A major concern of scholars interested in the relationship between nationalism and feminism is whether support for gender equality enhances or diminishes the struggle of a political community for its collective or national rights, and whether that struggle in turn advances or retards the achievement of feminist goals. Some scholars argue in this connection that culture and politics reinforce one another; these analysts hypothesize that political struggles aimed at either altering or maintaining existing political relationships will bring a similar attitude toward issues of gender, particularly when male dominance and patriarchy are part of the status quo. Others, by contrast, suggest that individuals tend to compartmentalize and set priorities among political and cultural concerns, with most men, and many women, attaching greater importance to political objectives and avoiding gender-related issues so as not to undermine national or communal solidarity.[14]

The relationship between feminist and nationalist agendas is highly contextual. Since the ideologies and strategies of women's organizations are usually fashioned within the framework of wider social or political movements, this relationship is dependent upon cultural, political, and era-specific conditions. In some circumstances, a push for gender equality complements the political goals of communal emancipation or development. In many newly independent countries, for example, where women's unions were frequently linked to nationalist movements, the leftist ideologies that predominated in the 1950s and 1960s incorporated feminist concerns and advanced the idea, accepted by many men as well as by women, that modernization and progress require a national commitment to improving the circumstances of women.[15] In this

[14] See Kumari Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World* (London: Zed Books, 1986); Cynthia Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives* (London: Pluto Press, 1983); Julie Marie Peteet, *Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Anne Russo, and Lourdes Torres, eds., *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); Deniz Kandiyoti, "Introduction," in Kandiyoti, ed., *Women, Islam, and the State* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); Roberta Hamilton and Michele Barrett, eds., *The Politics of Diversity: Feminism, Marxism, and Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1986); Fred Halliday, "Hidden from International Relations: Women and the International Arena," in Grant and Newland (fn. 1); and Mary E. Hawkesworth, *Beyond Oppression: Feminist Theory and Political Strategy* (New York: Continuum, 1990).

[15] Jayawardena (fn. 14).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

context, feminist and nationalist goals were linked within a broader framework of political mobilization and reform, and hence were mutually reinforcing.

Under other conditions, feminist aims may have no link to nationalist agendas or may even be explicitly denounced as contrary to the collective good. For example, efforts to forge a coherent communal identity may involve an emphasis on conservative traditional values. In this situation, nationalism is not associated with reform but may rather seek the reaffirmation of a patriarchal status quo.[16] Indeed, nationalism's antipathy toward feminist goals may be particularly intense; since women are often considered to be the guardians of culture and tradition—wardens of the community's sacred heritage and authenticity, as it were—reforms relating to women may be judged injurious to nationalist efforts to protect or unify the community.[17] This is also the case in countries where nationalism and national identity are strongly influenced by religious fundamentalism. In addition, as in a number of former communist states, women may sometimes even be called upon to serve the nation by bearing offspring in order to reverse a declining birth rate.[18] In this instance, as in some others, nationalist rhetoric urges women to make their "special and unique contribution" but then restricts this contribution to the domestic sphere.

There are other possibilities as well for tension between feminist and nationalist goals, such as calls for gender solidarity in order to forge a unified nationalist movement. In this case, many men, and perhaps also many women, will favor the subordination or at least the deferment of attention to the needs of women. Believing that to do otherwise would divide the community at a time when unity is necessary if the struggle for national rights is to succeed, this reasoning is particularly likely to be advanced by political leaders, most of whom are men. Among Palestinians, for example, rhetoric about the revolutionary character of the resistance movement notwithstanding, feminists frequently complain that men engaged in the national struggle rarely show any interest in the concerns of women; when pressed, these men reply that attention to women's concerns is divisive and will thus have to wait until political

[16] Valentine M. Moghadam, "Introduction," in Moghadam, ed., *Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994).

[17] Elshtain (fn. 8); Hanna Papanek, "The Ideal Woman and the Ideal Society: Control and Autonomy and the Construction of Identity," in Moghadam (fn. 16).

[18] See Maxine Molyneux, "Women's Rights and the International Context: Some Reflections on the Post-Communist States," *Millennium* 23, no. 2 (1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and national goals have been achieved.[19] Nor is this situation unique to the Third World. Pointing to efforts to create a supranational European Community, feminist scholars assert that women's issues have been similarly marginalized, ghettoized, or dismissed as extraneous by a male-dominated leadership.[20]

Yet another interesting situation concerns the implications of women's participation in the military dimension of a nationalist struggle, as in the war for Algerian independence or some aspects of the Palestinian resistance movement during the 1970s or even later. Sometimes called "integrationist feminism," or "feminism of reality," this holds out the prospect of greater equality between women and men, but it also reinforces the military as an institution and warfare as a strategy of progress, thereby encouraging the view that women are of value and merit consideration to the extent they behave like men.[21] Accordingly, whatever the potential for a partnership between women and men in the pursuit of national objectives, there is not a fusing of feminism and nationalism in this situation but rather, again, the subordination of the former to the latter.

Research Design and Cases

The preceding discussion suggests the absence of any clear consensus about the utility of either gender or attitudes pertaining to the circumstances of women in accounting for variance in views about war and peace. Logical arguments have been advanced for opposing hypotheses: that conceptions of international relations are heavily influenced by considerations of gender and feminism, and also that both differences between men and women and considerations of feminism are largely irrelevant in this domain.

Support for these various arguments is usually the product of either deductive reasoning or inferences from aggregate case-study material; typically, it is not based on rigorous and systematic empirical research in which the individual is the unit of analysis. The present investiga-

[19] See Peteet (fn. 14); Salim Tamari, "The Palestinian Movement in Transition: Historical Reversals and the Uprising," in Rex Brynen, ed., *Echoes of the Intifada: Regional Repercussions of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); and Raymonda Tawil, *My Home, My Prison* (London: Zed Press, 1983).

[20] See Catherine Hoskyns, "Gender Issues in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 20 (October 1994).

[21] Enloe (fn. 14).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion, by contrast, uses survey data from four Middle Eastern societies to explore the connections between gender, feminism, and attitudes toward war and peace. And while there is no a priori reason to assume that findings from the Middle East may be generalizable to other regions, neither is there reason to assume that findings are not applicable more broadly. Rather, until hypothesized variable relationships have been tested rigorously and widely, the primary purpose of individual studies, whatever their data base, should be an incremental contribution to discovering the nature and determinants of particular attitudes and behavior patterns. The present study seeks to make such a contribution. Variable relationships of potentially general applicability will be examined with data from the Middle East, so that evidence from this region becomes part of the empirical foundation being constructed to discern the nature, determinants, and locus of relevant social processes.

In addition, the data in the present study, based on surveys in Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait, permit a comparative analysis in which both the degree of generalizability across political systems may be assessed and system-level conditionalities may be identified. To the extent that there are important similarities in the findings from several or all of the four populations surveyed, there will be evidence that these findings are not idiosyncratic. Indeed, it will be plausible in this instance to suggest that conclusions based on the study of the Middle East are likely to be applicable more broadly. Given the very significant differences among all of the societies from which data have been gathered, a comparison of these societies possesses elements of a "most different systems" research design, which increases confidence in generalizability when similar findings are reported. Taken together, Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait encompass almost all of the political, economic, and cultural diversity of the Middle East.

Several different interpretations will be possible should some or all of the cases produce dissimilar findings. It may be that some or all of the cases are unique, raising the possibility that there are no patterns of general applicability. A finding of differences is by no means an analytical dead end, however. On the contrary, while much additional research will be needed before firm conclusions can be drawn, there will in the meantime be an important opportunity to contribute to theoretical elaboration. More specifically, characteristics that differentiate between the cases may be incorporated into the analysis as system-level variables, thereby producing testable hypotheses about the conditionalities associated with particular normative or behavioral patterns.

Further, each of the societies included in the present study differs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from the others in several critical ways, narrowing the range of relevant system-level variables that might explain why it is not characterized by the same patterns as the others, should this in fact occur. In other words, despite the diversity of the four cases taken together, giving the analysis, as noted, elements of a most-different system research design, a comparison between any single society and the others also involves elements of a most-similar systems research design. This is an important advantage in seeking to specify conditionalities in terms of system-level variables.[22]

Israel, for example, is the only democratic and developed country in the present study and the only one that is not exclusively or predominantly Arab and Muslim. Egypt is the only "typical" Third World country, characterized by overpopulation, mass poverty, and an inefficient, corrupt, and at least somewhat authoritarian government. It is also the only Arab country in the present study with a sophisticated, centuries-old, and cosmopolitan urban culture. Palestinians provide the only instance of statelessness, where the society being studied remains under occupation and where a nationalist movement is still actively engaged in the struggle for self-determination and independence. Finally, Kuwait is the only monarchy and the only rentier state, characterized by the juxtaposition of a small population, the majority of whom are not even Kuwaiti citizens, and massive wealth from the export of natural resources.

There are also important and noteworthy differences among the four societies with respect to issues and institutions associated with women, both in general and as they relate to questions of war and peace. These differences may be briefly summarized, not only to call attention to additional system-level properties that may help to account for country-specific findings, should there be any, but also to provide an introduction to issues of gender and peace in the particular societies from which data for the present analysis have been drawn.

Israel

In Israel, feminism has only recently emerged as an important and activist social movement. Women have long been visible in many professions and in political institutions. Women have also for many years served in the Israeli military. But while these experiences have given legitimacy to female participation in public life since the prestate period, women in Israel have not historically organized in pursuit of objectives in either the arena of legislation or the domain of public opinion.[23]

[22] Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: Wiley, 1970).

[23] Dafna N. Izraeli and Ephraim Taboury, "The Political Context of Feminist Attitudes in Israel," in Yael Azman and Dafna N. Izraeli, eds., *Women in Israel* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transac-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Israeli women's movement has made important gains during the last decade and a half, however, becoming more successful in fostering social activism and, in particular, articulating a connection between feminism and a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israeli feminists explicitly argue that those who support the struggle for equality and self-fulfillment within the Jewish state should be equally sensitive to these struggles in the Palestinian context.[24] An organizational as well as an ideological connection between feminism and peace has also developed. Since the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and particularly since the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada, which began in December 1987, feminists have become noticeably active in the Israeli peace movement. Indeed, several all-women peace groups have recently come into existence.[25]

These developments have placed feminism in opposition to nationalism in Israel, or at least that is the perception of many Israelis. In particular, some Israelis, including most nationalists, assert that any linkage between feminism and international peace poses a threat to national security. One argument is that such a linkage fosters sympathy for the country's enemies, who, according to nationalist analyses, cannot be trusted and in all probability remain committed to the destruction of the Jewish state. Another is that it could, if pursued to its logical conclusion, result in a feminist-inspired pacifism that would reduce support for the military, at least among women and possibly among many men as well. And still a third assertion, common to other countries faced with a foreign enemy, is that feminism may accentuate societal divisions and undermine national solidarity. For all of these reasons, recent gains notwithstanding, the analyses of Israeli feminists have frequently been brushed aside in the name of national security.[26]

---

tion Publishers, 1993); and Natalie Rein, *Daughters of Rachel: Women in Israel* (New York: Penguin Books, 1980).

[24] See Naomi Chazan, "Israeli Women and Peace Activism," in Barbara Swirski and Marilyn Safir, eds., *Calling the Equality Bluff* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991); Simona Sharoni, "Is Feminism a Threat to National Security," *Ms. Magazine*, January–February 1993; Nurit Gillath, "Women against War: Parents against Silence," in Barbara Swirski and Marilyn Safir, eds., *Calling the Equality Bluff* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991); Roberta Micallef, "Israeli and Palestinian Women's Peace Movements," in Elizabeth Warnock Fernea and Mary Evelyn Hocking, eds., *The Struggle for Peace* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992).

[25] See Barbara Swirski, "Israeli Feminism: New and Old," in Swirski and Safir (fn. 24); Nahla Abdo, "Women of the Intifada: Gender, Class, and National Liberation," *Race and Class* 32, no. 4 (1991); and Simona Sharoni, *Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Syraucse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 24.

[26] Madeleine Tress, "Halacha, Zionism, and Gender: The Case of Gush Emunim," in Moghadam (fn. 16).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Egypt

In Egypt, calls for expanded opportunities for women were heard at the end of the nineteenth century, and women organized within the nationalist movement shortly after World War I.[27] Moreover, although dominated by upper-class women, this long-standing and well-established tradition of feminism, or protofeminism, included many Egyptian women who were not of bourgeois origin.[28] But while women worked alongside men in the struggle for independence, organizing strikes and protest demonstrations, for example, feminist goals were of limited importance to the nationalist movement and later to the state. Even Gamal Abdel Nasser's program of Arab socialism, although it extended women's rights, prohibited women from organizing politically. In the ensuing decades, women made gains in education and professional life but registered far less progress in the political arena, the only notable exception being the partial reform of personal status laws carried out by Anwar Sadat, Nasser's successor, at the urging of his wife. The women's movement in postcolonial Egypt has thus been characterized by sustained independence from the state, there being no progressive alliance with a political leadership committed to eradicating practices that subordinate or demean women.

Even as they complain about indifference or lethargy on the part of political leaders, many Egyptian feminists are at pains to point out that their movement is indigenous, that their core values are to be found in Islam, and that normative influences from the West, including Western feminism, are only one of the sources from which they draw inspiration, and by no means the most important.[29] Egyptian feminists frequently argue in this connection that the patriarchal structure of society, rather than Islam, bears primary responsibility for the oppression of women. In view of these considerations, as well as the historic association of the women's movement with Egyptian nationalism, it is not surprising that many Egyptian women are attracted to Islamist organizations. Muslim political organizations not only receive rank-and-file support from women as frequently as from men,[30] they have in recent

[27] See Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, "The Revolutionary Gentlewoman in Egypt," in Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie, eds., *Women in the Muslim World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); and Thomas Philipp, "Feminism in Nationalist Politics in Egypt," in Beck and Keddie.

[28] See Margot Badran, "Independent Women: More than a Century of Feminism in Egypt," in Judith Tucker, ed., *Arab Women* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).

[29] Valentine M. Moghadam, *Modernizing Women* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 157.

[30] Mark Tessler and Jolene Jesse, "Gender and Support for Islamist Movements: Evidence from Egypt, Kuwait and Palestine," *Muslim World* 84 (April 1996).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

years also encouraged the growth of voluntary groups that compete with secular feminist associations for recruits among politically conscious women.[31]

As the preceding summary suggests, issues of war and peace have been noticeably absent from the agenda and discourse of Egyptian feminism. In contrast to the situation in Israel, where there are both ideological and organizational links between feminism and peace, the women's movement in Egypt has been concerned almost exclusively with domestic considerations, including increased opportunities for women in public life and a reduction in those aspects of poverty that fall heaviest on women. Further, feminist efforts in these domains are for the most part nonideological, marked by practical and low-key outreach activities that are either unaccompanied by any philosophical grounding or explained and justified with reference to Islam.[32]

Palestine

Two discourses have traditionally characterized Palestinian women and each continues to be important. The first, which is widely embraced, affirms the primacy of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and independence. The view that nothing is more important than this existential struggle, and that, in any event, women cannot be liberated unless all Palestinians are liberated, is almost universally held by both women and men. For some, this view also brings a rejection of Western notions of women's emancipation, including an assertion that in the Third World, or at least in Palestine, women's liberation *is* national liberation.[33] This analysis has been particularly common among women's organizations affiliated with the PLO.[34] In recent years, some women, although a minority, have also chosen to work for their simultaneous liberation as Palestinians and women within the framework of Islamic political organizations. For example, women are as likely as men to support Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the two most important Islamist movements in Palestine.[35]

In addition, however, there is a small but growing core of politically conscious women who see the nationalist struggle through a more explicitly feminist lens. Although they accept the primacy of this struggle,

[31] Elizabeth W. Fernea, "The Veiled Revolution," in Donna Lee Bowen and Evelyn A. Early, eds., *Everyday Life in the Muslim Middle East* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Moghadam (fn. 16); Kandiyoti (fn. 14).

[32] Moghadam (fn. 16); Badran (fn. 28).

[33] Souad Dajani, "Palestinian Women under Israeli Occupation," in Tucker (fn. 28).

[34] Mervat Hatem, "Post-Islamist and Post-Nationalist Feminist Discourses," in Tucker (fn. 28).

[35] Tessler and Jesse (fn. 30).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they also argue that those aspects of Palestinian society which oppress women should be attacked during, as well as after, the battle for national liberation.[36] Further, they frequently complain that this is not occurring largely because of the social conservatism that characterizes the nationalist movement and many of the men who lead it. They often charge that these men possess a "revolutionary political consciousness" coupled with a "reactionary social-gender consciousness."[37] Such complaints, which have been articulated for nearly two decades, assert that women (and men) are oppressed not only by the Israeli occupation, but also by a conservative class structure and patriarchal social institutions that national liberation alone will not modify. Moreover, while criticism has been directed primarily at men, those who articulate this view have sometimes charged that the female leaders of traditional charitable societies and established women's organizations also tend to be social conservatives who favor the existing class structure.[38] More recently, there have also been complaints about the glorification of women's homebound roles as the mothers or wives of resistance fighters and martyrs.[39]

While neither of these discourses has traditionally articulated a link between issues of gender and issues of peace, both an ideological and an organizational connection has recently begun to emerge among women unwilling to subordinate the interests of their gender to those of national emancipation. On the one hand, while no less committed than other Palestinians to the goal of self-determination, these women have concluded that the nationalist struggle has not brought progress on women's issues and may indeed have retarded the struggle for women's rights, and that the achievement of peace is therefore essential for the fulfillment of their aspirations as women as well as Palestinians. On the other hand, particularly since the outbreak of the intifada and in response to parallel developments within the Israeli women's movement, an incipient but nonetheless important cooperation between Palestinian feminists and the peace movement in Israel has begun to take shape, overcoming at least some of the historic divide between oppressor and oppressed. There are a number of women's peace groups in which Palestinians and Israelis cooperate, for instance, as well as activ-

[36] Philippa Strum, *The Women Are Marching: The Second Sex and the Palestinian Revolution* (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1992).

[37] Abdo (fn. 25). See also Dajani (fn. 33); and Tawil (fn. 19).

[38] Nuha Abu Daleb, "Palestinian Women and Their Role in the Revolution," *Peuples Méditerranéens* 5 (October–December 1978); Soraya Antonius, "Fighting on Two Fronts: Conversations with Palestinian Women," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 8 (Spring 1979).

[39] Abdo (fn. 25).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ities in which both Palestinian women and men join their Israeli counterparts in the pursuit of a just and peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.[40]

KUWAIT

Kuwait is a deeply conservative society. Unlike Egypt and many other Arab and Muslim countries, Kuwait has no tradition of women organizing either to improve their own circumstances or to advance a nationalist struggle. Among the reasons for this is Kuwait's historic isolation from the currents of modernization and development experienced elsewhere in the Middle East, an isolation that ended only when oil exports assumed significant proportions in the 1950s and 1960s. An important related consideration is the absence of progressive political leadership; the country has been ruled by a conservative monarchy since its independence in 1961. As a result, not only is there no tradition of an organized struggle for women's rights, but participation in public life even by individual women has long been limited.[41] According to a 1984 UNESCO study, for example, work outside the home is neither sought nor valued by native Kuwaiti women.[42] Women are also legally prohibited from joining the armed forces, voting, or becoming members of the National Assembly.[43]

This conservative legacy notwithstanding, the last decade or so has witnessed the beginning of a change in the circumstances of women, including the formation of an embryonic women's movement. On the one hand, women's participation in the labor force has slowly begun to rise, and this has in fact increased somewhat more sharply since the Gulf crisis of 1990–91. On the other hand, several nongovernmental women's organizations were formed in the 1980s and have been lobbying, although without success thus far, for various legal reforms, including voting rights for women.[44] Women have also strengthened their position and increased their political consciousness through participa-

[40] Abdo (fn. 25); Micallef (fn. 24); Sharoni (fn. 25).

[41] See Suad M. Al-Sabah, *Development Planning in an Oil Economy and the Role of Women: The Case of Kuwait* (London: East Lords Publishing, 1983); Shamlan Y. Al-Essa, *The Manpower Problem in Kuwait* (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul International, 1981); and Kamla Nath, "Education and Employment among Kuwaiti Women," in Beck and Keddie (fn. 27).

[42] Farida Allaghi and Aisha Almana, "Survey of Research on Women in the Arab Gulf Region," in *Social Science Research and Women in the Arab World* (Paris: UNESCO, 1984).

[43] Jamal Sanad and Mark Tessler, "Women and Religion in a Modern Islamic Society: The Case of Kuwait," in Emile Sahliyeh, ed., *The Politics of Religious Resurgence in the Contemporary World* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990).

[44] Hatem (fn. 34), 35; David Ottoway, "Feminists Seek Voice in Kuwaiti Politics," *Washington Post*, April 14, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion in the resistance against Iraq's occupation during the Gulf crisis. While there is no discernible concern for issues of war and peace associated with these developments, beyond that involving condemnation of the Iraqi invasion, there is an emerging feminist sensibility. For example, publications of the new organizations break with the older view that confined women to activities within the family; rather, they cover political events of relevance to women and examine the ways that "life in patriarchal societies distorts a women's definition of herself and her relationship to society."[45]

Data and Measurement

Against this background, and with the previously discussed possibilities for comparative analysis in mind, data from survey research carried out in Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait have been collected for the present study. The data from each country are from a heterogeneous and generally representative sample of the active, urban, adult population. The data set from each country also includes items dealing with both the Middle East conflict and the circumstances of women.

Israel

The Israeli data to be analyzed in this study were collected in 1989 and are from a national sample of persons over the age of eighteen residing in four hundred randomly selected urban Jewish households. Polling was done by the Dahaf Agency, which conducted the survey as part of a broad program of research on women and war designed by Galia Golan and Naomi Chazan of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Arab citizens of Israel were not included in the sample. Nor were Israeli Jews living in kibbutzim or other agricultural communities. The sample yielded usable responses from 985 individuals, including 534 women and 451 men.

The interview schedule administered in Israel included a large number of questions about the Arab-Israeli conflict, among them items designed to assess attitudes toward the Palestinians and toward the possibility of territorial compromise in the West Bank and Gaza. It also included many items dealing with gender equality and other issues relating to the circumstances of women. Factor analysis was employed to select from among these larger batteries of questions two subsets of items to be utilized in the present study. More specifically, five items

[45] Hatem (fn. 34), 37.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dealing with the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians loaded highly on a common factor and were accordingly combined to form a single attitudinal scale; and four additional items pertaining to the role and status of women loaded highly on another common factor and were thus combined to form a second attitudinal scale.

In fact, factor analysis has been useful on two counts: it provides a mechanism for item selection and it contributes to measurement reliability and validity. Reliability is assured since only reliable items will load highly on a common factor; and since this will occur only if all items pertain to the same underlying normative or behavioral dimension, it is also highly likely that the items are valid. The two sets of items identified through factor analysis and combined to form scales measuring attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and attitudes toward gender equality are shown in Table 1, along with their respective factor loadings following rotation. Most questions require that an answer be selected from a list of four or five possible responses, and the wording of several questions has accordingly been modified slightly in order to incorporate information about the available responses.

EGYPT

The Egyptian data to be analyzed in this study were collected in 1988 and are from a stratified and broadly representative sample of Muslim adults residing in Cairo. The survey was carried out under the supervision of Jamal Sanad Al-Suwaidi of the Center for Strategic Studies and Research in Abu Dhabi, who designed the project in collaboration with Mark Tessler,[46] and it is part of a larger, continuing study of Arab attitudes toward domestic and foreign policy issues. The actual interviews were conducted by a team of research assistants, or intermediaries, who were selected on the basis of previous experience in survey research administration. Some were university students and others were government employees. Intermediaries were also given a four-day orientation, after which they participated in the pretest of the survey instrument.

The sample constructed in Cairo contains 292 respondents, including an almost equal number of men and women. All respondents are over the age of eighteen. More generally, the sample was stratified and designed to be representative with respect to gender, age, education, socioeconomic status, and neighborhood, although individuals who are

[46] For additional methodological information and discussion of this project, see Mark Tessler and Jamal Sanad, "Will the Arab Public Accept Peace with Israel: Evidence from Surveys in Three Arab Societies," in Gregory Mahler and Efraim Karsh, eds., *Israel at the Crossroads* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF ITEMS FROM ISRAELI SURVEY

	Factor Loadings[a]	
Item	*Attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict*	*Attitudes toward Gender Equality*
Would you be willing to return either all or some of the occupied territories in return for a peace agreement with the Arabs?	**.74931**	.05366
Do you prefer to address the problem of the West Bank and Gaza by exchanging them for peace, by giving the Palestinians partial autonomy, or by removing the Arab population from these territories?	**.73406**	.02799
Do you agree or disagree that Israel should consider permitting the establishment of a Palestinian state?	**.66018**	.12193
Do you think the real aim of the Palestinians is to establish a state alongside Israel or to destroy the Jewish state and drive out its population?	**.64889**	.00002
Do you define the Palestinians as a nation?	**.59568**	.07926
Do you agree or disagree that a woman should be laid off of a job before a man?	−.08094	**.70713**
Do you believe that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work or that men should have higher salaries because they are the major breadwinners?	.01352	**.69310**
Do you support or oppose a women's right to choose to have an abortion?	.18322	**.62655**
Do you agree or disagree that men and women should share everything in an ideal marriage?	.10166	**.54804**

[a]Directional differences in items and/or response codes have been removed through recoding, so that positive values for factor loadings always indicate more positive attitudes toward Arab-Israeli peace and more positive attitudes toward gender equality. The figures in boldface type in each column identify those items with high factor loadings. These items, which define the factor's conceptual content, have been combined to form a unidimensional attitudinal scale.

poorly educated and unemployed or economically disadvantaged are slightly underrepresented. Non-Muslim Egyptians were not surveyed, which makes the sample somewhat less representative of the total population but appropriate in view of the study's strong interest in Islamic issues and in comparisons with Muslim Arabs in other countries. Overall, although not a strict random sample, the Egyptian data are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

generally representative of the country's adult, urban, and Muslim population.

The survey instrument administered in Egypt includes many items dealing with the status and circumstances of women, as well as other social issues, particularly those bearing on the practice and interpretation of Islam. The survey also dealt with issues of domestic politics and foreign policy, and among the latter are several questions about the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the present investigation, the factor-analytic procedures described with respect to the Israeli data were also employed in the Egyptian case, where they again permitted the formation of scales measuring attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and toward gender equality. The factor analysis also permitted the formation of a four-item scale measuring the strength of Islamic attachments, including personal piety and attitudes toward the social salience of Islam. The three sets of items and their respective factor loadings are shown in Table 2.

It will be noted that the first Egyptian scale focuses on the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, rather than on the Palestinian question in particular. This is also part of a more inclusive scale measuring foreign policy orientation that was generated by a factor analysis of the Egyptian data. Even though items used in the Egyptian and Israeli surveys are not identical, the similarity and conceptual equivalence of the scales developed in the two countries are readily apparent. Both measure respondent views about the most salient dimensions of the conflict and, specifically, about a peaceful resolution of the Middle East dispute through diplomacy, compromise, and mutual recognition. Additional information pertaining to sampling, survey administration, and measurement has been reported in greater detail in previous publications.[47]

KUWAIT

The Kuwaiti data used in the present study were collected as part of the comparative research project that also produced the Egyptian data described above. The same procedures related to sampling and survey administration were employed, and again the result was a heterogeneous and broadly representative sample of the country's active, adult, and urban population of Kuwaiti citizens. For reasons related to the analytical goals of the research, only Sunni Muslims were sampled, which again reduces representativeness but provides comparability with the

[47] Ibid. See also Mark Tessler, "The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements: A Political Economy Analysis," in John Entelis, ed., *Islam, Democracy and the State of North Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, forthcoming).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF ITEMS FROM EGYPTIAN SURVEY

Item	*Factor 1*[a] *Attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict*	*Factor 2*[a] *Attitudes toward Gender Equality*	*Factor 3*[a] *Strength of Islamic Attachments*
Do you agree or disagree that peace with Israel is both desirable and possible?	**.86411**	−.08016	−.11416
Do you believe that the Arab-Israeli conflict can be solved by diplomacy or is a military solution required?	**.84614**	.09527	−.03108
Do you agree or disagree that full-time housework is the best area of work for a woman?	−.08830	**.75641**	.16867
Should women be required to cease work after marriage in order to devote full time to their homes and families?	.19187	**.73300**	−.00053
Do you think it is more important for a boy to go to school than a girl?	.21893	**.69596**	.15314
Do you agree or disagree that there should be equality between men and women in jobs, wages, and promotion?	.15092	**.69064**	−.16196
Do you support the application of Islamic law in social life?	−.11644	.24017	**.81899**
Do you support the application of Islamic law to deal with civil and criminal matters?	.03852	.12045	**.80240**
How often do you refer to religious teachings when making important decisions about your life?	−.15011	−.06406	**.71752**
Would you support anyone in your family who wants to study in a religious institution?	.13882	.25564	**.66492**

[a]Directional differences in items and/or response codes have been removed through recoding, so that positive values for factor loadings always indicate more positive attitudes toward Arab-Israeli peace, more positive attitudes toward gender equality, and stronger Islamic attachments. The figures in boldface type in each column identify those items with high factor loadings. These items, which define the factor's conceptual content, have been combined to form a unidimensional attitudinal scale.

other Arab populations included in the study. The total number of Kuwaiti respondents is three hundred, and, as in the Egyptian case, this includes an approximately equal number of women and men.

The Kuwaiti survey employed the same interview schedule that was administered in Egypt, the only difference being in the available re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sponse codes of a small number of items. Moreover, the same factor-analytic procedures employed to select and validate items in the cases of Egypt and Israel were employed in Kuwait as well, with nearly identical results. As shown in Table 3, the items again yielded three distinct factors with consistently high loadings, making it possible to construct multi-item scales measuring attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, attitudes toward gender equality, and strength of Islamic attachments.

PALESTINE

The Palestinian data used in the present study were collected early in the fall of 1994 by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) in Nablus. Under the supervision of its director, Khalil Shikaki, and the head of its polling unit, Nader Said, trained field-workers administered an interview schedule to an area probability sample of 1,251 West Bank and Gaza residents. CPRS has conducted polls every month or two since the signing of the September 1993 agreement between the PLO and Israel. Limited in substantive scope but increasingly accurate with respect to sampling and measurement procedures, CPRS polls have a slight urban bias but are otherwise very highly representative. Christians as well as Muslims are included among respondents, but the former constitute less than 4 percent of the sample. Moreover, subsequent analysis confirmed that findings pertinent to the present study are the same even when Christian respondents are removed from the database. Data from the CPRS poll of fall 1994, the eleventh it had conducted, have been selected for the present investigation because this poll includes an item pertaining to the use of armed operations against Israel.[48]

The survey instrument employed in Palestine has a more restricted scope than those used to collect data in Israel, Egypt, and Kuwait. Accordingly, there are not enough items dealing with either the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or attitudes toward the circumstances of women to use factor analysis. Respondent views about the conflict have thus been measured with an index composed of two highly intercorrelated items. One asks about partisan preferences, with respondents divided into those who do and those who do not favor factions that support territorial compromise and mutual recognition. The other asks about support or opposition with respect to the conduct of armed operations against Israeli targets in Gaza and Jericho. Attitudes toward women's circumstances have been measured using an item that asks about the partici-

[48] Khalil Shikaki, *Results of a Public Opinion Poll: The West Bank and Gaza Strip, September 29–30 and October 1, 1994* (Nablus: Center for Palestine Research and Studies, 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF ITEMS FROM KUWAITI SURVEY

Item	*Factor 1*[a] *Attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict*	*Factor 2*[a] *Attitudes toward Gender Equality*	*Factor 3*[a] *Strength of Islamic Attachments*
Do you agree or disagree that peace with Israel is both desirable and possible?	**.76336**	.25572	.10206
Do you believe that the Arab-Israeli conflict can be solved by diplomacy or is a military solution required?	**.83185**	−.08331	−.09435
Do you agree or disagree that full-time housework is the best area of work for a woman?	.22365	**.80811**	.06399
Should women be required to cease work after marriage in order to devote full time to their homes and families?	.00843	**.80533**	.00802
Do you think it is more important for a boy to go to school than a girl?	−.07892	**.67290**	.02340
Do you agree or disagree that there should be equality between men and women in jobs, wages, and promotion?	−.10435	**.67833**	.19076
Do you support the application of Islamic law in social life?	.10306	.04578	**.82762**
Do you support the application of Islamic law to deal with civil and criminal matters?	−.09989	.12534	**.71202**
How often do you refer to religious teachings when making important decisions about your life?	.19142	−.02954	**.60269**
Would you support anyone in your family who wants to study in a religious institution?	−.00070	.12675	**.72326**

[a]Directional differences in items and/or response codes have been removed through recoding, so that positive values for factor loadings always indicate more positive attitudes toward Arab-Israeli peace, more positive attitudes toward gender equality, and stronger Islamic attachments. The figures in boldface type in each column identify those items with high factor loadings. These items, which define the factor's conceptual content, have been combined to form a unidimensional attitudinal scale.

pation of women in Palestinian elections, including voting, running for office, and having seats on the Palestinian Council reserved for women. This is the only item on the survey instrument that asks specifically about women. The Palestinian interview schedule does not contain any items measuring the strength of religious attachments, and this variable accordingly is not included in analyses of the data from Palestine.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The data from these four samples provide a strong foundation for examining the relationships among gender, feminism, and attitudes toward war and peace in the Middle East. As noted, all four samples are highly representative, at least of the urban populations from which they are drawn, and all accordingly possess male and female respondents in almost equal proportions. Thus, even though only one of the four data sets is based on a strict random sample, they nevertheless constitute an unusually solid empirical foundation, indeed one that is extremely rare in the study of the Middle East or other developing areas at the individual level of analysis.

A second very important strength, discussed earlier, is the cross-national character of the data, and in particular, the advantages for comparative analysis derived from the dissimilar nature of the four societies from which data have been drawn. To the extent that observed variable relationships are similar in all four societies, confidence in the generalizability of these findings will increase significantly since they will have been produced with data from widely differing environments. Alternatively, should there be important differences in the variable relationships observed in some or all of the societies under study, knowledge will be gained about the system-level attributes upon which particular findings are conditional.

Finally, the limitations as well as the strengths of the available data should be noted. For one thing, there are not enough questions in several of the data sets, particularly those from Egypt and Kuwait, to provide a complete picture of respondent attitudes toward issues of war and peace. While it is possible to situate respondents along a militarism-pacifism continuum, and hence test hypotheses, a fuller attitudinal profile is beyond the capabilities of the Egyptian and Kuwaiti data. For another, it is important to emphasize that the data provide attitudinal but not behavioral measures and to point out in this connection that there are constraints on the ability of respondents to act in accordance with their views, particularly in the relatively undemocratic political systems of Egypt and Kuwait.

Analysis and Findings

In analyzing the data from Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait, the first relationship to be examined is that between gender and attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Specifically, do men and women have similar or different views about whether the long-standing dispute can and should be resolved peacefully, that is, through diplomacy and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

compromise leading to mutual recognition between Israelis and Arabs, including, of course, the Palestinians? The scales measuring these attitudes in each of the four societies have been trichotomized, with respondents accordingly divided into those who are more supportive of compromise and reconciliation, those who are somewhat supportive, or unsure, and those who are less supportive of a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Findings are presented in Table 4, which compares the attitudes of men and women in each of the four societies. In reading the table, it should be recalled that the relationship between gender and attitudes is being assessed within each country and that comparisons across the four societies involve only this relationship, not the attitudes being measured by the dependent variable. Because the specific items used to measure the dependent variable vary from country to country, respondent categories should be considered relative, rather than absolute, and distributions across these categories are thus not comparable from one sample to another. The only exception involves Egypt and Kuwait, where the same survey instrument was employed.

Table 4 shows that women and men do not have differing views about the Arab-Israeli conflict in any of the four societies examined. On the contrary, not only are gender-linked differences statistically insignificant, but there is for the most part a remarkable similarity in the attitudinal distributions of the two sexes. The only exception is the case of Egypt, where men are actually more pacific than women, although the difference is not statistically significant at the generally accepted .05 level. Thus, notwithstanding the contrary hypotheses advanced by some scholars, there is no evidence that women are less militaristic than men or more oriented toward diplomacy and compromise in their judgments about the most important international conflict in the region in which they reside.

Furthermore, as noted in the discussion of research design, these parallel observations from Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait increase confidence in the generalizability of the finding that gender is not related to attitudes about international conflict, perhaps in general and at least about the disputes affecting one's own country and region. This proposition naturally needs to be tested further, with survey data drawn from other societies and pertaining to other international conflicts. Nevertheless, with comparable findings from surveys carried out in countries that differ significantly in their political, economic, and cultural attributes, as well as their histories, the present study provides strong evidence that men and women have similar attitudes toward is-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 4
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENDER AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

		Supports Nonviolent Means of Resolving Arab-Israeli Conflict	*Female (%)*	*Male (%)*	*Total (%)*
Israel:	$X^2 = .44$, df = 2, p > .05				
		highly supportive	35	33	34
		somewhat supportive	31	33	32
		not supportive	34	34	34
		Total	475	382	857
Egypt:	$X^2 = 3.86$, df = 2, p > .05				
		highly supportive	64	74	70
		somewhat supportive	19	16	17
		not supportive	17	10	13
		Total	135	148	283
Palestine:	$X^2 = 1.14$, df = 2, p > .05				
		highly supportive	51	53	52
		somewhat supportive	35	35	35
		not supportive	14	12	13
		Total	619	609	1228
Kuwait:	$X^2 = .69$, df = 2, p > .05	highly supportive	24	25	25
		somewhat supportive	33	29	31
		not supportive	43	46	44
		Total	148	136	284

sues of war and peace regardless of the political and social environment within which they reside.

A second relationship to be explored concerns a possible association between attitudes toward the status of women and attitudes toward issues of war and peace. Such a relationship is suggested by pertinent social science literature; and it is indeed possible that attitudes toward gender equality, if not gender itself, will be useful in accounting for variance in attitudes toward the Middle East conflict. Table 5 presents relevant findings from Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait. The measures of attitudes toward gender equality are dichotomized, with respondents who are more supportive of equality between women and men compared to those who are less supportive.

Table 5 reveals the existence of a strong and positive relationship between attitudes toward gender equality and attitudes toward the Arab-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD GENDER EQUALITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

		Supports Nonviolent Means of Resolving Arab-Israeli Conflict	*More Supportive of Gender Equality (%)*	*Less Supportive of Gender Equality (%)*	*Total (%)*
Israel:	$X^2 = 20.02$, df = 2, $p < .001$				
		highly supportive	44	29	34
		somewhat supportive	29	34	32
		not supportive	27	37	34
		Total	290	567	857
Egypt:	$X^2 = 14.53$, df = 2, $p < .001$				
		highly supportive	78	58	70
		somewhat supportive	14	21	17
		not supportive	8	21	13
		Total	170	113	283
Palestine:	$X^2 = 25.19$, df = 2, $p < .001$				
		highly supportive	57	41	52
		somewhat supportive	32	42	35
		not supportive	11	17	13
		Total	880	341	1221
Kuwait:	$X^2 = 11.26$, df = 2, $p < .001$				
		highly supportive	29	20	25
		somewhat supportive	36	25	30
		not supportive	35	55	45
		Total	141	141	282

Israeli conflict in all four of the societies for which data are available. Specifically, Israelis, Egyptians, Palestinians, and Kuwaitis who are more supportive of equality between women and men are also more favorably disposed toward diplomacy and compromise in the Arab-Israeli dispute, whereas those who are less supportive of gender equality are in each case less likely to favor resolving the conflict on this basis. The relationship is highly statistically significant in all four instances, indicating that, in this sense at least, there is a clear connection between feminism and issues of gender on the one hand, and concerns related to international conflict on the other. Moreover, again, the dissimilar characteristics of the four societies in which the same relationship has been observed strongly suggests that this relationship is of broad applicability.

There are some respondents in each of the four countries examined who are highly supportive both of resolving the Middle East conflict

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through compromise and diplomacy and of striving for greater equality between women and men, and the final set of relationships to be investigated concerns the degree to which this normative orientation is associated with various personal status attributes. The proportion of respondents in this category is not of particular interest in the present study, since the scales derived through factor analysis provide relative rather than absolute ratings and since the cutting points selected are inevitably somewhat arbitrary. What is of interest are the reasons that some individuals but not others embrace this combination of attitudes. Specifically, to what degree is the possession of this orientation a function of particular respondent characteristics?

There would appear to be a common theme underlying support for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute and support for gender equality. Individuals who embrace this combination of attitudes would seem to have a generalized predisposition in favor of reconciliation, extending their concern for justice and equality to individuals and political communities alike. They also appear willing to challenge traditional and established ideas about right and wrong, or perhaps, more accurately, about the "natural" order of human interaction, and thus to reject the notion that existing conflicts and differences are inescapable. This orientation is sometimes characterized as "feminist-pacifist." As discussed earlier, it is an important focus of the theoretical literature seeking to link gender, feminism, and international studies. Some scholars also describe this perspective as one of "global feminism," arguing, as does one analyst, that there is a connection between feminism and international relations because "a world committed to domination at its intimate core in the home more readily accepts ever-escalating levels of domination and imperialism between peoples."[49]

The personal attribute variables whose relationship to this normative orientation will be assessed are gender, age, education, religiosity, and interest in current affairs, the latter based on the frequency of newspaper readership. Religiosity has been measured in the Israeli survey by items indicating whether a respondent is ultraorthodox (Haredi), orthodox, traditional, or nonreligious. Religiosity has been measured in the Egyptian and Kuwaiti surveys by a scale composed of five items dealing with Islamic attachments. These items, which are shown in Tables 2 and 3, were selected using the factor-analytic procedures discussed earlier. There is no measure of religiosity in the Palestinian case, since no salient items were included on the interview schedule.

[49] Charlotte Bunch, *Passionate Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 303.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Logistical regression, which assesses the explanatory power of each independent variable with all others held constant, has been used to determine whether these personal attributes help to explain why some respondents possess a feminist-pacifist orientation and others do not. Accordingly, the dependent variable is a dichotomous "dummy" variable based on whether or not a respondent is high in support for both peace through compromise and gender equality. Among the independent variables, age, education and newspaper readership involve ordinal categories, as does religiosity in the Israeli case. The direction of each independent variable is indicated in parentheses, with the sign of the coefficients showing whether associations with that value are positive or negative.

Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 present the logistical regressions for Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait. As seen in Table 6, Israelis who favor both peace through compromise and gender equality are more likely than other Israelis to be older, better educated, less religious, and more interested in current affairs. All of these relationships are statistically significant. Among Egyptians, as shown in Table 7, a feminist-pacifist orientation is more common among those who are female, better educated, and less religious. Table 8 shows that in the Palestinian case there is a statistically significant relationship between this orientation and older age and interest in current affairs, with an association with female gender falling just short of statistical significance. Finally, as shown in Table 9, Kuwaitis who favor both peace through compromise and gender equality are more likely than other Kuwaitis to be female and less religious.

The logistical regressions reveal both similarities and differences among the cases examined, with the former suggesting conclusions that are to at least some extent generalizable. Indeed, as noted with respect to findings about gender, the observation of comparable relationships

TABLE 6
LOGISTICAL REGRESSION OF ISRAELI DATA SHOWING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELECTED PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES AND SUPPORT FOR BOTH PEACE THROUGH COMPROMISE AND GENDER EQUALITY

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Wald*	*Sig*	*R*
Gender (female)	−.4285	.2586	2.7463	.0975	−.0363
Age (older)	.2075	.0840	6.1003	.0135	.0850
Education (higher)	.7219	.1505	22.9977	.0000	.1923
Religiosity (lower)	1.7423	.2970	34.4069	.0000	.2389
Reads newspapers (more)	.3218	.1591	4.0926	.0431	.0607

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 7
LOGISTICAL REGRESSION OF EGYPTIAN DATA SHOWING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELECTED PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES AND SUPPORT FOR BOTH PEACE THROUGH COMPROMISE AND GENDER EQUALITY

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Wald*	*Sig*	*R*
Gender (female)	.8551	.2564	11.1250	.0009	.1524
Age (older)	.0788	.0903	.7611	.3830	.0000
Education (higher)	.3164	.1464	4.6702	.0307	.0824
Religiosity (lower)	.8145	.0632	8.5145	.0035	.1288
Reads newspapers (more)	−.0991	.1129	.7704	.3801	.0000

TABLE 8
LOGISTICAL REGRESSION OF PALESTINIAN DATA SHOWING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELECTED PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES AND SUPPORT FOR BOTH PEACE THROUGH COMPROMISE AND GENDER EQUALITY

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Wald*	*Sig*	*R*
Gender (female)	.2311	.1221	3.5837	.0584	−.0312
Age (older)	.0978	.0290	11.1003	.0008	−.0758
Education (higher)	.0150	.0626	.0574	.8107	.0000
Reads newspapers (more)	−.1463	.0657	4.9659	.0259	.0427

in countries that differ significantly in their political, economic, cultural, and historical circumstances strongly suggests that these relationships are unaffected by, and thus apply regardless of, the system-level attributes which characterize a country's political and social environment.

In the present analysis, the most important instance of similar findings concerns the inverse relationship between religiosity and a feminist-pacifist normative orientation. The relationship is the same whether the pertinent religion is Judaism or Islam, and in the latter case whether it is the Islam of Cairo, a large, ancient, and cosmopolitan city with the world's most important Islamic university, or the Islam of a conservative sheikhdom with an essentially tribal tradition. The importance of low religiosity is also independent of conflict involvement, being the same for the heavily engaged Israelis as for the more distant Kuwaitis and the Egyptians, whose country had already been at peace with Israel for a decade when data for the present study were collected. In view of these findings, future research should seek to explicate the pathways that link low religiosity to a feminist-pacifist orientation, undertaking to identify, for example, the substantive content of those dimensions of religiosity that are most important in accounting for variance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 9
LOGISTICAL REGRESSION OF KUWAITI DATA SHOWING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELECTED PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES AND SUPPORT FOR BOTH PEACE THROUGH COMPROMISE AND GENDER EQUALITY

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Wald*	*Sig*	*R*
Gender (female)	1.0708	.4071	6.9181	.0085	.1465
Age (older)	−.1293	.1708	.5737	.4488	.0000
Education (higher)	.3008	.3056	.9689	.3249	.0000
Religiosity (lower)	.2047	.0741	7.6427	.0057	.1570
Reads newspapers (more)	−.1270	.2289	.3078	.5971	.0000

Also suggestive are findings pertaining to gender, which involve both similarities and differences among the four cases. Female gender is related to a feminist-pacifist orientation among Egyptians and Kuwaitis, and the relationship falls just short of statistical significance in the case of the Palestinians. This suggests that the relationship may be broadly applicable among Arabs and Muslims, and perhaps among the inhabitants of other non-European societies. Another possibility is that the relationship is dependent upon the degree of gender equality that characterizes a society. This is suggested by comparisons with Israel, where a significant relationship involving gender was not observed. On the one hand, despite their continuing problems and the limits of feminism in the Jewish state, Israeli women are not disadvantaged relative to men to the same extent as their Egyptian, Palestinian, and Kuwaiti counterparts. On the other hand, more specifically, differences between the Israeli and Arab cases may be explained by the fact that only in the former do women serve in the military.

Finally, findings pertaining to education, which again involve both similarities and differences, offer possibilities for theoretical elaboration. Education is positively related to a feminist-pacifist orientation in Israel and Egypt, which are the two most cosmopolitan, politically developed, and culturally heterogeneous of the four societies examined. While other explanations are possible and additional study is needed, this suggests that the socialization experiences associated with education tend to produce a feminist-pacifist perspective only among the citizens of those countries marked by a meaningful measure of social diversity and political development.

CONCLUSION

The comparative analysis of data from four highly dissimilar Middle Eastern societies suggests interesting conclusions about the connections

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between gender, feminism, and international relations. Evidence from all four societies suggests that women are not more pacific than men in their attitudes toward international conflict. And while this finding contradicts the argument advanced in some feminist and other literature, the likelihood of its validity is strengthened by the fact that a connection between gender and attitudes toward war and peace was found to be absent in diverse political, economic, and social environments.

On the other hand, findings from the present study do suggest a connection between *attitudes* related to gender and attitudes about war and peace, between feminism and pacifism, as it were. Specifically, regardless of the sex of the individual, persons who express greater concern for the status and role of women, and particularly for equality between women and men, are more likely than other individuals to believe that the international disputes in which their country is involved should be resolved through diplomacy and compromise. This pattern, too, was observed in all four of the societies examined, suggesting that it may also be broadly applicable.

In addition, the data shed light on the personal circumstances that lead individuals to support both peace through compromise and equality between women and men, an orientation that some scholars describe as "pacifist-feminist," and the data also make it possible to offer testable propositions about the locus of applicability of significant variable relationships. Specifically, this orientation appears to be a function of low religiosity under highly diverse conditions, of gender in societies with higher levels of inequality between women and men, and of education in countries that are relatively politically developed and cosmopolitan.

All of these relationships must of course be additionally tested and refined through research in other countries. In the meantime, however, findings reported in the present study offer an unusually strong empirical foundation for insights about the interconnections among gender, feminism, and international conflict. Whereas scholarly inquiries seeking to connect gender studies and international studies rely most frequently on deductive reasoning and historical interpretation, and focus only on Western societies when they do involve more rigorous analyses, the present study offers evidence based on the comparative analysis of cross-national survey data in support of its conclusions about the nature, generalizability, and locus of important variable relationships.

Finally, it may be worthwhile in concluding to comment briefly on the practical as well as the theoretical implications of the findings reported above. The latter remain the primary concern of this report, but findings about attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict will be of in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terest to students of the Middle East as well as to students of gender and international relations.

Three summary observations may be offered in this connection, put forward without elaboration as a stimulus to reflection and further research. First, the absence of sex-linked differences in attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict suggests that neither advocates nor opponents of territorial compromise are likely to find one sex more receptive to their message than the other. Particularly in Israel and Palestine, where this issue is of central concern, the partisan and ideological struggles surrounding questions of war and peace are thus unlikely to find women more frequently than men in any particular political camp.[50] Second, the strong association between attitudes toward war and peace and attitudes toward gender equality suggests that the former are part of a more comprehensive worldview. If this is correct, the promotion of progressive values in other areas is likely to increase support in the Middle East for peace through diplomacy and compromise. Third, the emergence of a progressive and globalist worldview is tied to secularism, or more accurately to the privatization of religion, and also to education under conditions of greater political development and social diversity. This in turn suggests that gains in the Middle East with respect to development, political tolerance, and citizen equality, to the extent they are realized, will also increase support for Arab-Israeli peace.

Some of these propositions may be disputed, and none is accompanied by a fully developed rationale. But while their further consideration is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, they are offered in conclusion in order to invite and inform speculation not only about theoretical considerations but also about the practical implications of findings pertaining to gender and international conflict. They are also offered as a stimulus to further research at the individual level of analysis, in the hope that more and better-quality survey research will be undertaken in the Middle East, and particularly in the Arab world, in order to understand better the nature, determinants, and consequences of citizen attitudes about issues of war and peace.

[50] For an interesting study that advances a similar conclusion, see Eileen F. Babbitt and Tamra Pearson D'estrée, "An Israeli-Palestinian Women's Workshop: Application of an Interactive Problem-Solving Approach," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Olser Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., *Managing Global Chaos: Sources and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1995). The authors conducted a workshop involving Israeli and Palestinian women in December 1992. They report that participants did see themselves has having an important role to play in the pursuit of peace, but not one that is more important than, or even qualitatively different from, that to be played by men.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Article

GERMANY AFTER UNIFICATION
Normal at Last?

By A. JAMES MCADAMS*

Daedalus 123 (Winter 1994). Special issue entitled "Germany in Transition," 284 pp.

Marc Fisher. *After the Wall: Germany, the Germans, and the Burdens of History*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995, 366 pp.

Timothy Garton Ash. *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent*. New York: Vintage Books, 1994, 680 pp.

Jürgen Habermas. *The Past as Future*. Interviewed by Michael Haller, edited by Max Pensky. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994, 185 pp.

David Marsh. *Germany and Europe: The Crisis of Unity*. London: Heinemann, 1994, 236 pp.

> We [Germans] must accept the normalization of our situation as a reunified sovereign nation and deduce from this our international role.
>
> —*German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel*

> There is no German dream. There is only a German nightmare. People talk about returning to normalcy now that the Wall is down. What does "normalcy" mean in German history? And what does "return" mean?
>
> —*Norbert Gansel*

IT is hard to think of a group of contemporary politicians more obsessed with debating their state's normalcy than the Germans.[1] With

* For their helpful comments on this essay, I am grateful to Thomas Banchoff, Alan Dowty, Andrew Gould, Gregg Kvistad, and Dirk Moses.

[1] There are some notable cases of states that might aspire to compete with the Federal Republic for this status. For example, on the hopes of many of Israel's founders to establish a "normal nation," see Boas Evron, *Jewish State or Israeli Nation?* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 62–63, 184–85. On the pursuit of normalcy in postcommunist Russia, see Boris Yeltsin's autobiography, *The Struggle for Russia* (New York: Times Books, 1994), esp. the introductory chapter, entitled "A Normal Country." On the Italian desire for a more normal democracy in which government and opposition

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the unification of the two German states one year later in October 1990, the theme of normalcy has been an undercurrent to just about every significant policy debate in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).[2] Germany's leaders have argued about whether the restoration of their prewar capital in Berlin will help to overcome the long-standing provisionality of the old Bonn republic. The major political parties have battled over whether the FRG's recovery of full national sovereignty should entitle, or perhaps even oblige, the government to play a more active role in world affairs. During the 1995 ceremonies commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, some politicians even sought to rewrite history by portraying their country not only as a perpetrator of the conflict but also as a victim of both Hitler's crimes and the Nazi defeat.[3]

In a world in which many states would prefer to justify their entitlement to special treatment by underscoring their exceptionality, the Germans' obsession with wanting to be perceived as "just like everybody else" may look anomalous. Those who follow German politics, however, will recognize this pursuit of normalcy as a central theme for many of the FRG's leading politicians that dates back many years, to before the Wall's fall. Thus, for example, shortly before assuming office in 1982, Chancellor Helmut Kohl proclaimed that his generation was entitled to focus its attention upon the future, because it enjoyed the benefit of having come after Hitler's tyranny, "the grace," as he called it, "of

routinely exchange power, see Alexander Stille, "Italy: The Convulsions of Normalcy," *New York Review of Books* (June 6, 1996). The citations from the two epigraphs are, respectively, Kinkel, "Germany's Post-reunification Foreign Policy," in *Statements and Speeches*, vol. 15 (New York: German Information Center, October 21, 1992), no. 16; and Gansel, *International Herald Tribune*, June 19, 1993. Gansel is a social democrat in the German Parliament.

[2] German normalcy has also been a subject of intense international speculation. See the useful study by Helmut Hubel and Bernhard May, "Ein 'normales' Deutschland? Die souveräne Bundesrepublik in der ausländischen Wahrnehmung," *Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik*, no. 92 (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, June 1995).

[3] An example of this tendency to rewrite history was the paid announcement, "May 8, 1945—Against Forgetting," which appeared on April 7, 1995, in the moderate-conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. The statement, signed by prominent representatives of the FRG's mainstream parties, characterized the day of the Nazi surrender "as not only the end of the National Socialist rule of terror, but also as the beginning of the expulsion terror and new oppression in the East and the division of our nation." Cited in *The Week in Germany* (New York: German Information Center, April 14, 1995). On the subject of German victimization, see Roger Boyes and William Horsley, "The Germans as Victims: A British View," *World Today* (June 1995); and Jane Kramer, "The Politics of Memory," *New Yorker*, August 14, 1995. In the *Daedalus* volume under review in this essay, Jochen Thies, the foreign editor of the influential German daily *Die Welt*, comes surprisingly close to embracing the view of the Germans as victims. "Germany has paid a high price for *Hitler's war* and its consequences," he writes in the first sentence of his article, "—so high, in fact, that Germans tend to repress it" (p. 263; emphasis added).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

being born late" ("die Gnade der späten Geburt").[4] Unlike their predecessors, younger Germans were supposedly no longer as burdened with the sins of the Nazi past.[5] In like fashion, the chairman of the chancellor's parliamentary party, Alfred Dregger, declared that it was time for all Germans "to come out of Hitler's shadow—we must become normal."[6] In the mid-1980s, in a widely publicized debate known as the *Historikerstreit* (historians' conflict), some of Germany's most prominent historians went so far as to challenge the notion that their nation had ever been any less normal than its neighbors. Downplaying the uniqueness of the Holocaust, they sought instead to highlight the positive aspects of German history and thereby link their nation's prewar identity to the present.[7]

Of course, normalcy is an elusive concept, and it is not hard to see why comparativists might be reluctant to use such a standard to characterize the politics of contemporary Germany. Is the Federal Republic behaving more normally when it attempts to take advantage of its newly acquired strengths as a unified nation to acquire greater power and influence over its European neighbors? If so, Bonn's controversial decision in December 1991 to force its allies' hands by establishing diplomatic ties with the breakaway republics of Croatia and Slovenia would appear entirely normal. Or, by another definition, is the FRG exhibiting normalcy when it restrains its competitive instincts in the interest of greater international cooperation? In that case the Federal Republic's current inclination to renounce its sovereignty over its own currency to promote European monetary integration could be viewed as equally normal.

For all these ambiguities, one should resist the temptation simply to dismiss the concept. For one thing, the theme of normalcy has occupied a prominent place in the pronouncements of the Federal Republic's most powerful politicians and policymakers in the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall. As a barometer of official opinion alone, the use of the concept by figures like Helmut Kohl highlights the desire of

[4] See Dennis Bark and David Gress, *A History of West Germany: Democracy and Its Discontents: 1963–1988*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 424–25.

[5] Whether Kohl himself, who was born in 1930, belongs to such a post-Hitler generation is doubtful. See the lively observations on this issue by the Berlin essayist Peter Schneider, "Hitler's Shadow: On Being a Self-Conscious German," *Harper's*, September 1987.

[6] Cited in Ian Buruma's remarkable study, *The Wages of Guilt* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994), 244.

[7] An excellent treatment of this subject is Charles Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). For the key documents, see *"Historikerstreit": Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1987).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some members of the German elite to get on with life at last and to be treated like other Europeans—after four decades of exceptional conditions, national division, and semisovereignty.

The concept of normalcy also suffuses much of the emerging literature on the domestic and international implications of German unification. This includes, to greater and lesser degrees, the first book-length studies on this subject in English, which we shall consider in this essay.[8] For some observers, the realization of unification itself embodies the call to normalcy, the historical opportunity for the FRG's leaders to put the past behind them and restore the reputation of the German nation. In contrast, others treat the events of 1989–90 as part of an ongoing challenge to German identity. In this view, normalcy can be achieved only after the Federal government has also surmounted the many problems of bringing the two German populations back together again. A final group takes a more jaundiced view of recent events. These scholars regard the invocation of postunification German normalcy as an excuse for papering over the crimes of the Nazi past and, as writer Günter Grass has accused, seeking to erase the memory of Auschwitz.[9]

By definition, there is no a priori basis for considering one or another of these approaches the most—or the least—appropriate for assessing contemporary German affairs. What may be normal to one person may be inadequate or flawed to another. Nevertheless, the matter is not totally arbitrary. As I shall argue in this essay, if normalcy is to mean anything analytically, it must minimally represent an attainable goal to which the leaders of the Federal Republic can aspire in their desire to make Germany more like other European states. Reasonable observers will, of course, differ about how they choose to characterize this condition. Thus, for some, the optimal Germany may be more assertive of its national interests than the old FRG (a Gaullist "Allemagne dans tous les Azimuts?"), whereas for others, it might be expected to stress more cooperative, transnational values. At a minimum, however, to achieve a normalized Germany politicians and policymakers should be able to identify their energies with concrete and feasible objectives.

[8] For related articles on this theme in English, see Gary Geipel, "Germany: Urgent Pressures, Quiet Change," *Current History* (November 1994), 358–63; Philip H. Gordon, "The Normalization of German Foreign Policy," *Orbis* 38 (Spring 1994); Michael Huelshoff and Andrei Markovits, "Introduction," in M. Huelshoff, A. Markovits, and Simon Reich, eds., *From Bundesrepublik to Deutschland: German Politics after Unification* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993); Peter Pulzer, "Unified Germany: A Normal State?" *German Politics* 3 (April 1994); and David Morris, "Bitburg Revisited: Germany's Search for Normalcy," *German Politics and Society* 13 (Winter 1995).

[9] See Grass's chapter "Writing after Auschwitz," in *Two States—One Nation?* trans. K. Winston and A. S. Wensinger (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As we shall see, some authors clearly live up to this requirement, offering specific—although differing—assessments of the appropriate road to German normalcy. In contrast, others appear less successful in meeting this challenge. Either they hold the German government up to a standard that it cannot possibly achieve or they define the German predicament in such a restrictive manner that there is no point in the country's leaders even seeking to better their condition. In both instances, these arguments speak to the strong feelings that experts in German affairs still have about their subject matter. But as I shall contend, by failing to appreciate sufficiently the importance of positing a possible Germany and not merely an ideal and unattainable one, they have the unintended effect of stultifying precisely the debate about the German condition that they, and many of the FRG's best-known politicians, would otherwise hope to promote.

German Unification as an Opportunity

Timothy Garton Ash has very definite opinions about where Germany should be going, though he begins and ends his book with numerous caveats about the concept of German normalcy. In the first chapters of his massive study of the German *Ostpolitik*, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent*, the well-known British historian and chronicler of East European dissent under communism warns his readers about the ambiguous uses to which the term has been put, even before the Wall fell.[10] Quite frequently, Garton Ash tells us, the standards employed by Germany in pursuing "normal" relations with its East European neighbors were measured on a different and much more forgiving scale than those applied to its allies in the West.[11] Thus, the kind of normalcy that Bonn would have welcomed in its relations with the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and other communist regimes in the 1970s or 1980s (for example, stable trade ties, regular diplomatic contacts) would seem laughable from the better-informed standpoint of the 1990s. Far from guaranteeing national unity, this minimalist definition of normalcy might have sealed the division of Germany forever. For these reasons, Garton Ash suggests toward the end of his book that future German leaders would be well advised to "watch out for those abstract nouns ('stability,' 'normalization')" that led

[10] Among Garton Ash's many other works, see particularly *The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe* (New York: Random House, 1989); and idem, *The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of 1989 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague* (New York: Random House, 1990).

[11] Cf. Gebhard Schweigler, "Normalität in Deutschland," *Europa Archiv*, no. 6 (1989).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them to such mistaken judgments about their long-term interests in the past (p. 409).

Nevertheless, one does not have to read very closely between the lines of this study to see that Garton Ash has very strong views about the direction that a "normal" Germany should be taking in the 1990s. In particular, he sees Germany's unification in 1990 as an opportunity for the FRG's leaders to atone for the sins of their fathers. They can enter the twenty-first century prepared to make up for their nation's past failure to play a more responsible role in European affairs. "At the end of the nineteenth century," Garton Ash informs us,

> Germany was the emergent major power in the centre of Europe, a powerhouse of economic and scientific modernity. It had a chance to use this power peacefully and constructively. It spectacularly failed so to do. Now, at the end of the twentieth century, it was again a major power in the centre of Europe. . . . Could Germany do it? Could it not only preserve but also help to spread the achievements that had made it a magnet and a model? (p. 408)

In answer to his question, Garton Ash suggests that an optimal Germany seeking finally to live up to its potential would have to come to terms with two things—first, how its priorities were defined over more than forty years of national division and, second, how these priorities must now be *re*defined in light of Europe's newfound circumstances. The bulk of his account focuses on the first issue, beginning with the Yalta system, which shaped Germany's options in Europe after 1945.

"Once, Europe was cut in two," Garton Ash opens his account, "the two parts were called West and East. The division itself was often labelled 'Yalta.' It was set in concrete in the Berlin Wall" (p. 1). For decades the challenge faced by German decision makers was how best to live with this division. Their response to the dilemma was essentially twofold. Under Konrad Adenauer, the newly created Federal Republic defined its national agenda by affirming the priority of Western integration, joining NATO, and championing European unification. Adenauer believed that the magnetic effect of a free and democratic West German state, firmly allied with a strong West would prove so overwhelming to Moscow that the Soviet Union would eventually be compelled to yield to pressures for Germany's reunification and, in the process, loosen the shackles over Eastern Europe. It is well known, however, that the confidence of many German politicians in Adenauer's prophecy was shaken on August 13, 1961, when the Soviet government made a show of strength by sponsoring the construction of the Wall. As a result, subsequent German leaders, epitomized by Willy Brandt

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who became chancellor in 1969, called for a different approach to the Yalta system. They contended that the twin problems of German and European division could be overcome only if Bonn actively sought to reduce tensions between the blocs and promoted détente with the East. Through such measures, they hoped to convince their adversaries that it was in their interest to promote internal liberalization and an opening to the West.

As Garton Ash shows in rich detail, scholars may never reach a consensus about which of these two approaches contributed the most to the collapse of the Yalta system, as signaled by the opening of the Wall in 1989 and by Germany's subsequent reunification. Some historians will insist that Adenauer's "policy of strength" was the key to Moscow's decision to relinquish control over East Germany. In contrast, others will emphasize the impact of Brandt's détente-minded *Ostpolitik*, which by the 1970s and 1980s had led to the restoration of countless, subtly destabilizing ties between long-separated families and friends across the inter-German divide. Garton Ash himself suggests that factors unrelated to German policy (for example, internal developments in the USSR) also played a role in the collapse of the Soviet empire (pp. 119–21).

Whatever one's interpretation, nearly everyone will agree that the end to the Yalta system restored Germany to a condition more like that enjoyed by its continental neighbors since the end of World War II. But, Garton Ash leads us to wonder, did this new condition also help Germany's leaders in their quest to make the FRG a more normal state? In one respect, he seems to suggest that it did. "To say that Germany had become more normal since unification," Garton Ash observes, "was common sense. Anyone who thought that it was normal to live with a wall through Berlin was not quite normal. It was more normal to take a bus from the Alexanderplatz to Bahnhof Zoo" (p. 385). Nonetheless, Garton Ash is not one to restrict himself to formulaic propositions. Rather than simply equate German unity with German normalcy and stopping there, he takes his argument one step further by contending that the leaders of a Germany that finally lives up to its promise to be a European magnet and model must also be prepared "to define anew their own national interest" (p. 409).

In this, the second part of his argument, Garton Ash shows that history alone may not be enough to guide German priorities in the 1990s. While he would not deny that unification was a great achievement, he would argue that it did not lead to any decisive rethinking of German priorities. Quite the contrary, the FRG's leaders remained torn by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

same ambivalent orientations that characterized the Yalta era. Thus, Garton Ash argues, postunification German foreign policy has often been a mishmash of contradictory agendas and principles. At times, German policymakers chose to emphasize their country's complex NATO commitments and European priorities, themselves frequently conflicting goals. At other points, they concentrated on building bridges to the East. More often than not, however, they followed a policy of *sowohl als auch* (roughly, "both . . . and"), as they sought to satisfy diverse constituencies by pursuing all of these goals simultaneously. Adhering to this approach was challenging enough, Garton Ash notes, during the years when both Germany and Europe were divided. But for him, the fact that this ingrained uncertainty continues to be the guiding referent for policy-making in the FRG has ensured that the country's leaders have been unable to provide a coherent accounting of their country's goals during the 1990s. Instead of showing that they could make hard choices, the fundamental challenge of leadership, they have sought to offer something to everybody. Thus, "France was [their] most important partner, but so was America. Deepening the EC was the top priority, but so was widening it. Russia was item number one in the East, but so was Poland" (p. 392).

For his part, Garton Ash leaves little doubt about where he believes Germany's postunification priorities should be. Above all, his best of all possible Germanys would concentrate its considerable economic and political resources on developing a new *Ostpolitik* to further the democratic consolidation of the formerly communist states of East-Central Europe—Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary.[12] "If Germany wanted to be a normal, European and Western country," he advises, "like France or Britain, then it had, like France or Britain, to have normal, European and Western neighbors to its east. To say this is, of course, already to suggest a certain priority" (p. 394).

I will leave it to the readers of *In Europe's Name* to decide for themselves whether this particular focus upon the East represents a worthy goal or, for that matter, whether such a concentration of resources upon one region can be as easily separated from the FRG's other international commitments as the book's author seems to suggest. Still, it is important to ask whether, in positing this optimal German condition, Garton Ash has also brought us closer to answering the central question of his book: will German policymakers in fact be better prepared than in the

[12] For an elaboration of this argument, see Timothy Garton Ash, "Germany's Choice," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (July–August 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

past century to play a healthy role in Europe and spread their country's achievements beyond its borders? Indeed, for all that Garton Ash repeatedly cautions the reader about the risks of sweeping predictions, this is *his* question. Moreover, he asserts quite openly that he has no intention of limiting his account to the normative agenda of prescribing policy. He cites Adenauer to this effect: historians may not be prophets, but they "should at least attempt to recognize in which direction history might be heading. They should point to probable developments, 'and perhaps warn'" (p. 378). Certainly, in his concluding chapters, Garton Ash does a fair amount of warning about the German future, for example, about the many dangers facing the new democracies in the East. More to the point, he warns about the danger of stalemate in the German capital. As long as the FRG's leaders insist on trying to please everybody, he argues, they are sure to go nowhere: "[T]he one thing Germany could not do was everything. If it tried to do everything it would achieve nothing" (p. 393). But if the German government is to avoid what Garton Ash views as the misguided temptation to continue to draw upon the foreign policy practices of the Yalta era, where should we look to respond to Adenauer's query about where the FRG is heading?

On this question, one wishes Garton Ash had been a bit more specific. For example, he has little to say about the institutional aspects of foreign policy making in the Federal Republic and how such factors might shape Germany's ability to do the right thing and make the right choices. Nor does he discuss the shifting alignments of the country's political parties or the balance of public opinion on national priorities. Only by reading between the lines do we discern a ray of hope in the area of leadership, in the ascendancy of political figures with the wisdom and strength of conviction, as Garton Ash puts it, "to define their [country's] national interest consciously and clearly" (p. 409). In fact, in assessing the FRG's past successes, it is clear that Garton Ash places a great deal of faith in the power of individual will to shape history. He leaves little doubt about his admiration for Adenauer's leadership skills in the early years of the Federal Republic, especially for Adenauer's good sense in setting national priorities. He also shows a high regard for Helmut Kohl, whom he credits—I think overly generously—for having been prescient about national reunification.[13]

[13] For example, Garton Ash favorably cites one of Kohl's recollections of an early conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev in Bonn (unfortunately, he does not tell us when), in which the chancellor supposedly pressed his counterpart on the subject of German unity: "The river of history, he said, was flowing towards German unity, as the Rhine before them flowed down to the sea. You could try to dam

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nonetheless, although Garton Ash clearly admires such personalities, the reader is still left wondering whether visionary leadership or, for that matter, any other factor will be sufficient to transform Germany into the responsible European model that he favors. Notably, he ends his long account of Germany's delivery from national division on a note that seems curiously indecisive, particularly coming from an individual whom most observers would be likely to include among the most optimistic contemporary analysts of German affairs.[14] "Taking all in all," Garton Ash writes, "the favourable variant that we have imagined for Germany and Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century did not seem probable. But it was still possible. There are worse combinations than that of scepticism and hope" (p. 410).

German Unification as a Challenge

While Garton Ash at best offers tempered optimism about Germany's prospects, David Marsh, a widely published observer for London's *Financial Times*, is decidedly pessimistic. "By overcoming division," he argues in his study of the impact of German unification on Europe, "Germany threw off the longest-lasting legacy of the Second World War. But its hopes of *rapidly* becoming a 'normal' European nation are unlikely to be fulfilled. It is beset less by the burdens of the past than by the burdens of the present" (p. 20; emphasis added). Admittedly, Marsh's concept of normalcy (the closest thing we find to an analytical

the Rhine, but the mighty river would flood its banks and find a way around the dam. So also with German unity" (p. 118). Despite numerous cautions to the reader about the problems of interpreting such recollections, Garton Ash is clearly disposed to give Kohl and his party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the benefit of the doubt. In contrast, he reserves almost all of his criticism about the handling of the FRG's *Deutschlandpolitik* (national policy) for the CDU's opponents in the Social Democratic Party. Another approach to the subject, which Garton Ash does not follow, would be to identify the shortcomings of the CDU's national policy as well as the evidence that Kohl was not nearly so foresightful about the prospects for unification. See, for example, the records of Kohl's and others' private conversations in the 1980s with the former GDR leader Erich Honecker, in Heinrich Potthoff, ed., *"Die Koalition der Vernunft": Deutschlandpolitik in den 80er Jahren* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995).

[14] In other publications I have found Garton Ash more upbeat about Germany's prospects. See Garton Ash, "Germany Unbound," *New York Review of Books* (November 22, 1990); and idem, "Kohl's Germany: The Beginning of the End?" *New York Review of Books* (December 1, 1994). The latter article seems particularly indicative of Garton Ash's fondness for the role of great leaders in history. About the German chancellor, he writes: "Helmut Kohl is still the most formidable politician—and statesman—in Europe. He will not lightly be deflected from pursuing the last great task that he has set himself: to bind united Germany into a united Europe" (p. 26). On the same page, his optimism about Germany's prospects shows through as well: "The Federal Republic has proved the Cassandras wrong so many times before. Let's hope it can do so again. In any case, it's worth remembering that when looking at Germany most people from most of the world, even from quite prosperous countries in the West, will exclaim: 'If only we had your problems.'"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

edge in this book) seems to depend heavily on what he means by employing such ambiguous terminology as the word "rapidly." Nevertheless, despite the imprecision in his choice of terms, his account provides an instructive contrast to Garton Ash's reading of the German condition. Whereas Garton Ash stresses the opportunities presented by the restoration of national unity, Marsh is representative of that second group of Germanists who underscore the unanticipated social and economic trials of unification. In Marsh's view, these trials are certain to delay the appearance of the Germany he would like to see—a state that is finally able to convince its European neighbors of its readiness to become a "reliable, predictable, and safe" force on the Continent (p.130).[15]

At the outset, it is important to emphasize that Marsh is too good a historian to attribute all of the FRG's problems in the 1990s to the demands of unification. To his credit, he repeatedly emphasizes that German policymakers were already facing serious challenges well before the Wall came down. "Already in the late 1980s," he explains, "critical voices had been raised in West Germany over the need to overhaul an economic system that, for all its post-war success, was starting to grow inflexible, costly and uncompetitive" (p. 12). The consensus-based organization of German industry, an integral part of the "economic miracle" of the 1950s and 1960s, was impeding efforts to keep the FRG competitive with its European neighbors, Asia, and the U.S. High production costs and a rigid labor market had led to a marked decline in foreign investment. Furthermore, Marsh stresses, the extraordinary affluence enjoyed by the FRG's citizens in the postwar era had produced a social and economic culture inimical to innovation and risk taking; Chancellor Kohl would later sarcastically liken this culture to a "collective recreational park."[16] Not only were average West Germans increasingly disinclined to take their leaders' calls for sacrifice and self-restraint seriously, but they were also wary of any attempts to tamper with the economic model that had brought them these riches. Notwithstanding Bonn's upbeat rhetoric, these concerns were beginning to make them-

[15] In this sense, Marsh joins a long and distinguished list of scholars and journalists who have put the trials and defects of German unification at the center of their assessments of the FRG's future. Among notable examples, see Gordon Craig, "United We Fall," *New York Review of Books* (January 14, 1994); Gert-Joachim Glaessner, *The Unification Process in Germany: From Dictatorship to Democracy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Jane Kramer, "New Nazis: A Chaos in the Head," *New Yorker* (June 14, 1993); and Fritz Stern, "Freedom and Its Discontents," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (September–October 1993).

[16] "*[K]ollektive Freizeitpark*," from a Bundestag speech on October 21, 1993, cited in *Deutschland Nachrichten* (New York: German Information Center, October 22, 1993).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

selves felt in popular discontent over the question of expanded German participation in a united Europe (pp. 19–20, 110–12, 137–39).[17]

By themselves, these developments were worrisome enough, but it is Marsh's central contention that these problems were further exacerbated by the rapid drive to German unity. Well before the East German revolution, he shows, policymakers in Bonn had ceased even to consider the possibility that the Berlin Wall might ever be opened. As a result, the sudden rush to national unity took them completely by surprise. They were especially unprepared to handle the economic crisis that was at the root of the GDR's fall—the country's rotting industrial base, its poorly trained workforce, and its population's unrealistic expectations of quickly sharing in the benefits of West German capitalism. But for a number of other reasons, ranging from nearly panicked judgment to selfish political calculations, they also bungled their chance to integrate the former GDR into the FRG in a manner that would have been responsive to the East's long-term needs and duly attentive to the strengths and weaknesses of the West German economy.

Marsh is arguably strongest in his treatment of the issue of German monetary unification.[18] Taking advantage of extensive contacts with the Kohl government and with key personalities in the German central bank, the Bundesbank, Marsh tells the story of the decision to bring the deutsche mark (DM) into East Germany; his account provides an illuminating contrast to Garton Ash's generally more upbeat portrayal of the period. Far from being heroes, in Marsh's telling, German leaders like Kohl and Minister of Finance Theo Waigel ignored the Bundesbank's appeals for caution and established rates for the conversion of East Marks into deutsche marks (1:1 for wages and smaller savings deposits, and 1:2 for larger accounts) that amounted to an "act of colossal economic disablement" in the East (p. 63). "Seldom in the field of economic history," he writes, "had a step of such consequence been prepared with so little forethought" (p. 74).

The short-term consequences of this path to monetary union are well known. As savings and incomes were converted overnight into deutsche marks, eastern German consumers rushed to purchase higher-quality products from the West that had long been denied to them. Simultaneously, the GDR's export markets in eastern Europe evaporated,

[17] For an informative assessment of these problems, see Wolfgang Streek, *German Capitalism: Does It Exist? Can It Survive?* Kellogg Institute Working Paper Series, no. 218 (March 1996).

[18] Marsh has already written authoritatively on the role of the German Bundesbank; see Marsh, *The Most Powerful Bank: Inside Germany's Bundesbank* (New York: Times Books, 1992).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as the country's former trading partners chose to save their hard currency reserves for Western goods. As wages were driven up to match those in the FRG, thousands of East German firms went bankrupt, which pushed real unemployment to over 30 percent of the eastern labor force. For a limited time, Marsh explains, "East Germany's losses were West Germany's gains," since popular demand for Western products generated a mini-economic boom in the FRG (p. 83). However, West Germany was soon forced to pay the price for taking this path to national unity. To head off growing discontent in the East and to finance the enormous transfer payments required for eastern Germany's reconstruction (upwards of DM 150 billion annually), Kohl had to abandon his early plan to insulate the West German citizenry from the burdens of unification. He reluctantly agreed to raise taxes, and his government began to engage in what were by German standards uncharacteristically high levels of domestic and international borrowing.

In recounting these developments, Marsh gradually makes his point about the chances of a unified Germany becoming the predictable force in Europe that both he and the leaders of the FRG favor. Up to 1989, he argues, there had been hints of uneasiness in the back rooms of the Finance Ministry and the Bundesbank about the risks of greater German involvement in the European Community, especially in the sensitive area of monetary policy. However, the costs of unification forced these concerns into the open. At precisely the moment Community members were beginning serious discussions on the creation of a single European currency, the German central bank chose to counter the inflationary pressures induced by Kohl's massive aid program to the East by raising its prime interest rates. The move was disastrous for Europe. Because the primary European currencies were linked through the mechanism of the European Monetary System (EMS), the higher German interest rates were effectively exported to the other members of the Community. As a consequence, Great Britain and Italy were forced to devalue their currencies and to withdraw from the EMS, the continentwide recession of 1992–93 was worsened, and a pall was thrown over the cause of monetary union.

Marsh has no quarrel with the fact that the Bundesbank's action ultimately served the FRG's narrow purposes; that is, by raising interest rates, the bank's governors contained inflation and promoted a wave of international investment in German securities. Nevertheless, he argues, Bonn could have defended its interests in other ways had it *really* wanted to make the case for a common European currency. The Kohl administration, for instance, could have chosen a more prudent path to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

national unity, or later the Bundesbank could at least have pursued other means to combat inflation (for example, a revaluation of the deutsche mark) (p. 131). In Marsh's view, the fact that Germany's leaders did not take into account the implications of their actions for the Continent is evidence enough that they were not ready for Europe: "In their hearts," he concludes, "although they could not admit it, the Germans did not want European monetary union" (p. 130).

No one will dispute the complex challenges that still lie in the path of European monetary unification. The task of maintaining popular support for the agenda, let alone successfully integrating the Continent's currencies, can hardly be considered easy or straightforward.[19] For our purposes, however, the most relevant aspect of Marsh's argument is his verdict on the implications of Germany's actions in 1992 for the FRG's ability to find its place in Europe. Far from concluding that the road to European unity will continue to be difficult (a point on which no one disagrees) or that the Federal Republic's decisions will be increasingly consequential for the Continent (again, a subject of common agreement), Marsh contends that the Bundesbank's steps to protect the deutsche mark are the proof that Germany is still not a normal country. "Through unification," he insists, "Germany regained its integrity as a nation, but not yet the right to be regarded as a normal one" (p. 169).

How is one to interpret this argument? In defense of his position, Marsh might insist that normalcy is a subjective category that can only be judged in the eye of the beholder. But if the concept is to be useful at all for comparative purposes, we are entitled to ask whether it provides any guidance about what the FRG's leaders could have done differently over the same period to help them be more like their neighbors. Did other, purportedly more normal European states adhere to higher standards of behavior in responding to Maastricht? Did they show that "in their hearts" (Marsh's words) they were more committed than the Germans to the cause of European monetary union?

In fact, Marsh serves up ample evidence to the contrary, all of it suggesting that there was widespread concern across the Continent about the negative implications of European unification. Without appearing to make the connection, Marsh tells us that Great Britain negotiated a

[19] On this subject, see Barry Eichengreen and Fabio Ghironi, "European Monetary Unification: The Challenges Ahead" (Paper presented at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Washington, D.C., May 18, 1995); and for an excellent historical perspective, see Lily Gardner Feldman, "Germany and the EC: Realism and Responsibility," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 531 (January 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clause to the Maastricht agreement, exempting itself from automatic participation in fixed currency rates in 1999. Additionally, he relates the familiar story of the Danish electorate's June 1992 vote against Maastricht in the first referendum on the treaty. And he notes further that only a few months later the accord barely survived a related vote in France, in part because many French voters feared linking their currency to a standard that might eventually be dominated by the deutsche mark (pp. 147–53). Yet notably, in none of these cases does Marsh suggest that these countries were acting in anything less than a normal fashion; the French, it seems, were merely showing "Gallic ambivalence" (p. 149).

In this light, even if the FRG's leaders could have acted differently, technically speaking, the question to ask about Marsh's argument is whether the Germans' supposed normalcy deficit is really a useful way of capturing their uncertainty about Maastricht and promoting constructive comparisons among European states. To be sure, the case for European unity would clearly benefit were the FRG's leaders to abide by more self-sacrificing standards than their continental counterparts. But while this might be an ideal Germany, it may not be a possible one. If we stick with Marsh's evidence and conclude that German policymakers were driven by many of the same mixed motivations as drove their neighbors, it could be the case that the Federal Republic is *already* as normal as it is ever going to be, at least by Marsh's restrictive definition of the term.

German Unification as an Excuse

By contrast, the third and final group of contemporary observers of German affairs would undoubtedly have serious reservations about going even this far. In their view, the invocation of the image of a normal Germany by Kohl and others in recent years has too frequently served as a bad excuse for the FRG's leaders to paper over those factors, historical and otherwise, that continue to set their country apart from other European states. To a great extent, this is the position of journalist Marc Fisher in his examination of the Germans' efforts to make sense of their past while seeking to bring the two parts of the nation together again. Fisher's account, which is based largely on his experiences as the *Washington Post*'s bureau chief in Bonn and Berlin between 1989 and 1993, in many ways dovetails nicely with Marsh's focus on the new challenges of unification. The book includes insightful anecdotes and observations about the difficulties Germans on both sides of the Elbe have encountered in living with each other after forty years of separa-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion. In particular, he shows great sensitivity for the plight of those eastern Germans who had the guts and personal fortitude to take their grievances into the streets in fall 1989 but subsequently found themselves excluded from the political mainstream.

Nevertheless, Fisher's story is less about Germany in its entirety than about the old FRG—West Germany—and about how prominent politicians such as Kohl have unjustifiably attempted to use the events of 1989–90 as a way of finally putting their country's troubled past behind them. In Fisher's depiction, preunification West Germany was always a much more complex and unsettled state than the majority of outsiders thought it to be. Far from being what it appeared on the surface, "a seemingly satisfied place, a trusted ally, [and] an efficient technocracy" (p. 11), the Federal Republic was "a bundle of contradictions, a nation suspicious of itself" (p. 18). For the postwar generation of Germans, Fisher argues, normalcy was defined less in terms of a positive identity in which citizens could take comfort than in terms of "whatever Nazi life was not." As he explains:

> A country anxious to prove to itself and outsiders that it had discarded the old ways simply banned them. If the Nazis corralled children into spying on their own parents, postwar Germans made it illegal to have phone extensions in your own home. If the Nazis persecuted Jews, the postwar Germans made it illegal to utter anti-Semitic words. Parents tried to dress and raise their children differently. Language changed. Life became more American. TV, democracy and economic boom times made the nightmare seem distant and dim. (p. 28)

However, Fisher contends, just beneath the surface of tranquillity, all was not well. Many Germans remained highly ambivalent about democracy, preferring certain aspects of the putatively benevolent authoritarianism that had defined their national culture a century earlier. Additionally, while their leaders delivered "Sunday speeches" about the virtues of greater international involvement, many Germans were happy to take advantage of their country's unique status as a defeated power to opt politely out of any responsibilities beyond the FRG's borders; "[t]hey preferred to live in a country that minded its own business, a big Switzerland or Sweden" (p. 79). Most damning from Fisher's perspective, the majority of Germans paid only lip service to the need to keep wrestling with the crimes of the Nazi dictatorship. Deep down, as new generations emerged and memories faded, they were eager to ascribe those offenses to another people and another time.

It should therefore come as no great surprise that Fisher reserves his harshest criticism for the person most closely identified with the FRG's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bid for normalcy in the 1990s. In a chapter entitled "Helmut Kohl and the Lust for Normalcy," he portrays the German chancellor as almost obsessed with the task of unburdening his country of the shame of Auschwitz. Well before unification, in Fisher's portrayal, Kohl was seeking to link his personal predilections for the simple, unexamined life—Birkenstock slippers, fish collections, and occasional visits to the neighborhood *Kneipe* (pub) (p. 92)—to the desire of many Germans of his social class and generation to draw a line between themselves and their past. In this sense, unification afforded the chancellor his pivotal opportunity "to show the world and the German people that the Nazi legacy was truly dead and buried" (p. 97). This done, Kohl could announce—as he did, beginning with his party's triumphal election campaign in 1990—that Germans could now turn their energies to the future, taking pride in the FRG's accomplishments and playing a greater, more confident role in world affairs.

Like Garton Ash and Marsh, Fisher has observed Kohl for years; hence he does not make the mistake of underestimating the chancellor's uncanny ability to turn such positive themes to his political advantage. Ever the survivor, Kohl speaks a language that voters understand. However, unlike Garton Ash in particular, Fisher takes Kohl sharply to task for obscuring the fact that the majority of Germans are, in his view, no closer today to being comfortable with their national identity than they were when the Wall was still standing. If anything, Fisher argues, the uncertainty that both Germany's leaders and the German people have shown in responding to the social and political problems attending the rush to national unity is evidence that the chancellor's dream of a nation at peace with itself is still a long way off. Thus, even if most Germans were appalled by the rise in incidents of right-wing violence against foreigners in the early 1990s, they still pressed their government to take tough measures to restrict the number of asylum seekers allowed into Germany; and few supported modifying their country's restrictive, essentially racially defined citizenship laws. Similarly, despite speeches by Kohl and others about the need to play a more responsible international role, Germany's neighbors soon discovered in such actions as Bonn's heavy-handed campaign for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia[20] that there were still no clear operating principles behind the FRG's foreign policy. For Fisher, the conclusion is obvious:

[20] For a rigorous analysis of the German decision to recognize the two states, see Beverly Crawford, "Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia," *World Politics* 48 (July 1996).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Germans remain "a people who know what they do not want to be, but haven't yet figured out what they are" (p. 288).

Clearly, Fisher's Federal Republic is far from what it should be. By his own account, such a Germany would know how it wanted to define its national identity (that is, as something more than a big Switzerland or Sweden) even as it was appropriately mindful of its historical responsibility; that is, it would be a state simultaneously more self-confident *and* more self-critical. But does Fisher actually put the FRG's leaders into the position where they could conceivably live up to these dual criteria? Interestingly, Fisher's evidence suggests that he is not particularly eager to allow the Germans to realize their goal of becoming more like other Europeans.

For example, in a chapter entitled "The Bloody Flag," Fisher repeatedly finds fault with the fact that average German citizens are still reluctant to take pride in their flag and national anthem, yet he appears equally critical of those politicians in the Federal Republic who would like to promote a "healthy patriotism" among their countrymen (p. 69–72). Likewise, although Fisher criticizes Germany's leaders for pursuing a supposedly empty foreign policy ("a moralistic irrelevance") during the final decade of national division, he admits that a more assertive posture in the 1990s would not help their reputation very much either. "[T]he slightest ripple of German muscle" in the postunification period will be sure to produce "gasps of horror—feigned and real—among other Europeans" (p. 79). To his credit, Fisher concedes that this damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't logic puts the Germans in something of a no-win situation: "They cannot express national self-interest without being accused of nationalism. They cannot respond to foreign calls to join allies in military operations without risking accusations of a new German militarism" (p. 321). Still, rather than provide the FRG's leaders with a way out of this dilemma or even a reason for trying, Fisher concludes his book on a note that readers are likely to find disappointingly noncommittal: the German people, he informs us, remain "imprisoned by their past" (p. 321).

Naturally, Fisher could protest that it is not his task to help the Germans out of their own dilemmas. Nonetheless, it *is* his task to define the FRG's options in such a way that an optimal Germany is at least conceivable, particularly if he wishes to promote constructive debate on the issue. Otherwise, the country's leaders (and the reader along with them) are likely to end up being just as imprisoned by the restrictive terms of his argument as by the burdens of history. But there is also an additional problem with Fisher's argument. If it is not clear how Ger-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many's citizens can realistically hope to find their national identity while remaining duly attentive to the Holocaust, it is quite conceivable that Fisher will inadvertently help make the case for those individuals who would prefer to write off the Nazi period as an unpleasant and distracting memory. After all, if all Germans are fated to be judged as less than normal because of their nation's history, regardless of their individual responsibility, why should they not demand that their leaders immediately do everything possible to sever postunification Germany from all that came before it?

In contrast to Fisher, Jürgen Habermas offers a provocative response to this problem by identifying a solution to the German dilemma precisely in the country's unique past. As Habermas makes clear in *The Past as Future,* a collection of essays and interviews in English translation, he is no less concerned than Fisher that contemporary German leaders will be tempted to try to write off the Nazi period as a temporary aberration or "unfortunate sidetrack" in German culture (p. 162). But unlike Fisher, he explores the intriguing possibility that the best Germany of the future may be one that celebrates elements of its past, rather than denying it wholesale, and then strives continually to live up to its democratic potential.[21]

Habermas's argument can be framed in terms of the following paradox, which he calls "the dialectic of normalization": if the Germans ever want to consider themselves normal, the best thing they can do is never to forget how *different* their history has made them from their neighbors. According to this interpretation, the FRG's distinctive achievement in the postwar era has been to embrace the universalistic principles of the French Revolution, that is, "[a sensitivity] for the indivisibility of internationally recognized human rights and for a civilized mode of human interaction" (p. 28). Yet, Habermas stresses, this move did not result from whim or accident. Rather, it was precisely the experience of Hitler and the Holocaust that made the shift possible. The Third Reich totally discredited the idea that the German nation should ever be legitimated on the basis of any "particularistic" or "special consciousness," such as German ethnicity or nationalism (p. 134). Therefore, even to suggest that national unification has brought the FRG back to a condition of normalcy (a condition Habermas calls "the second big lie of the

[21] In reading Habermas, I have benefited greatly from A. Dirk Moses, "The *Historikerstreit* Continues: Germans and Their History since Reunification" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the German Studies Association, Dallas, Texas, October 6, 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Federal Republic")[22] is to risk undermining the moral basis of modern German democracy.

It is thus not surprising to find Habermas in the company of Marsh and Fisher in denouncing the Kohl administration for attempting just such a return to a halcyon past that never in fact existed (a "purely self-deceptive consciousness of 'normalcy,'" he concludes [p. 28]). For example, Habermas criticizes Kohl and his advisers for treating the unification of the two German states as little more than an administrative undertaking, rather than opening up the process to public discussion and debate.[23] As a result of this approach, he contends, the union of eastern and western Germany in 1990 was brought about solely on the basis of a common ethnicity and not, as universalistic principles would require, as "a normatively willed act of the citizens of both states, who in political self-awareness decided on a common civil union" (p. 44). For quite similar reasons, Habermas joins all of the authors under review in this essay in finding fault with the citizenship and immigration policies that the Kohl administration has followed in the wake of unification. In continuing to insist that the right to German citizenship be defined primarily in terms of descent and ethnicity, he argues, the Bonn government has "raise[d] the question of whether the expanded Federal Republic is going to continue on the path toward political civilization, or whether it will introduce the old special consciousness in a new form" (p. 134).

Some of the central elements of Habermas's critique of the normalcy debate may nonetheless surprise his readers, and perhaps even some of his critics.[24] Certainly, Habermas stands apart from many German left-

[22] "Big lie" is an awkward translation of the difficult German term, *Lebenslüge*. The concept refers to an illusion that both states and individuals maintain as a way of rationalizing their actions. Habermas's "first big lie" is the notion that "we are all democrats," which he attributes to the period of Adenauer's chancellorship. For the original article from which this section of *The Past as Future* is drawn, see Habermas, "Die zweite Lebenslüge der Bundesrepublik: Wir sind wieder 'normal' geworden," *Die Zeit* (December 18, 1992).

[23] To promote rapid unification, the Kohl government chose to follow Article 23 of Germany's Basic Law, which provided for the nearly automatic admission of the constituent parts of the former GDR to the Federal Republic. The other available approach to unification, favored by Habermas and numerous other German intellectuals, was to follow Article 146, which would have instituted a constitutional convention to decide the manner for uniting the two states. For his more detailed views on the subject, see Habermas, "Yet Again: German Identity—A Unified Nation of Angry DM-Burghers," in Harold James and Marla Stone, eds., *When the Wall Came Down* (New York: Routledge, 1992). For another critique of Kohl's approach, albeit from an angle different from Habermas's, see Wolfgang Seibel, "Necessary Illusions: The Transformation of Governance Structures in the New Germany," *La Revue Tocqueville/The Tocqueville Review* 13 (1992).

[24] For a bitter critique of Habermas's position, which accuses him of rejecting "liberalism and liberal thought," see Mark Lilla, "The Other Velvet Revolution: Continental Liberalism and Its Discontents,"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wing intellectuals in what he has to say about, among other things, the former East German state.[25] His account betrays no romantic notions of the achievements of East German socialism; the fall of the German Democratic Republic, Habermas assures us, was "the overthrow of an unjust regime" (p. 33). Furthermore, he underscores the point that he has nothing against national unification per se: "It's not the political union itself but the mode of this union that's being criticized" (p. 49).

But most notable about *The Past as Future*, Habermas evinces a grudging but still unmistakable respect for the accomplishments of the Federal Republic since 1949, at times even for its founder, Konrad Adenauer. In a revealing mea culpa, he admits that as a young man he may have underestimated "the historical consequences of Adenauer's great achievement—binding the Federal Republic strongly with the Western alliance and the Western social system" (p. 48). In his view, West Germany's unequivocally pro-Western orientation after World War II was an essential guarantee of the FRG's adherence to the universalistic beliefs that he perceives to be at risk today. Additionally, Habermas is also willing to concede that forty years of West German democracy have gone a long way toward transforming the civic and public consciousness of the German population. Thus, he speaks approvingly of the peaceful demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of average Germans that took place in 1992 in opposition to right-wing violence against foreigners. "The [German] population is better than their politicians and spokespersons," he asserts. "Unless I'm fooling myself, this popular protest is continuous with those better traditions of the old Federal Republic—traditions that can only grow from the well-considered rejection of the kind of 'normalcy' that is now being invoked as an exemplar once again" (p. 141).

For those who are used to Habermas portraying himself, and being portrayed, as the archetypical critic of postwar German democracy, these sympathetic chords may seem somewhat out of character. Habermas admits as much himself, noting that the German left too will increasingly have to rethink its positions on the FRG if it is to remain

Daedalus 123 (Spring 1994), 145. Lilla does not appear to have used any of the interviews or essays reprinted in *The Past as Future*. My own view, however, based upon materials that were available to Lilla, is that Habermas's arguments are consistent with basic liberal principles, indeed, that they are in some respects quintessentially liberal. Consider, for example, the notion of "constitutional patriotism," which Habermas has popularized since the mid-1980s. This view holds that the constitution, and not the nation, should be the ultimate point of reference for individual identity; see Habermas, "Eine Art Schadensabwicklung," in *Historikerstreit* (fn. 7).

[25] For an incisive commentary on the predicament of the German left, see Andrei Markovits, "The German Left: Dilemmas and Uncertainties of Power," *German Politics* 1 (April 1992).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

true to its principles.[26] "We are not accustomed," he reflects candidly, "to the literally *conservative* role that we assume as we throw our support behind the continuation of a process of civilization, of culturally turning to the West, that was introduced with the old Federal Republic" (p. 159; emphasis added).[27] But of course, in taking this position, Habermas is hardly a conservative in any conventional sense; indeed, he explicitly rejects the idea that unified Germany can be considered a finished product. He is merely defending the principle that the ideal Germany may already exist *in potentia* in the founding ideas of the FRG.

In this sense, if one considers the possible implications of national unification for Germany's future priorities, it should not be surprising to find Habermas and other like-minded critics[28] assuming the role of thoughtful conservators of their country's founding traditions. Whatever the practical shortcomings of West German democracy in the period before 1989-90, these observers would suggest that the greatest danger that comes with the restoration of national unity may not be—as Fisher and perhaps Marsh would argue—that German politicians will continue to make the same old mistakes. Rather, given all of the pressures to recast their national purpose and take on new roles and responsibilities, it may be that they will underestimate or lose sight of what they have previously done right.

The Benefits of the Past

To some, Habermas's point about the past being a *useful* and not merely odious or burdensome heritage may appear self-evident. Is not the past always a logical starting point for reflecting upon a country's options and assessing where it might be going? But perhaps Kohl's and other policymakers' current inclination to invoke the image of a Germany

[26] This turns out not to have been a bad prediction. For just such an about-face, see the very similar reflections by Green Party leader Joschka Fischer, "Für neue Abenteuer fehlt hoffentlich die Mehrheit," *Die Zeit*, July 21, 1995, p. 3. See also Fischer, *Risiko Deutschlands: Krise und Zukunft der deutschen Politik* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1994).

[27] Notably, Habermas also shows himself to be a supporter, albeit a cautious one, of the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, at the time a divisive subject among the German left. In Habermas's view, the war was legitimate both because it was a war against tyranny and because the West's decision to conduct the campaign under the umbrella of the United Nations approximated a Kantian vision of a "cosmopolitan state" (pp. 5–31).

[28] For accounts sympathetic to Habermas's position, see Manfred Frank, "Nationality and Democracy," *Common Knowledge* (Winter 1993); and Heinrich August Winkler, "Rebuilding a Nation: The Germans before and after Unification," in the issue of *Daedalus* under review in this essay (esp. pp. 121–23).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that is already no different from any other state is a sign that the FRG's leaders are losing sight of this potential advantage. Of course, German politicians still regularly appeal to the duty (*Pflicht*) borne by all Germans to keep alive the memory of the Holocaust. But with the passage of time since the founding of the Federal Republic it is also true that their sermons about German responsibility have taken on a pro forma quality.[29] Without disagreeing with these obligations at all, Habermas would have his countrymen recognize that such reminders of the horrors of National Socialism need not be viewed exclusively in negative terms. One can also see the historical experiences that have made the Germans so different from their neighbors, in some respects horrifically so, as positive testimony to the choices involved in the decision to embrace democracy after World War II.

The possible gains from adopting Habermas's "dialectic of normalization" are suggested in a 1994 issue of the journal *Daedalus*, which is devoted entirely to the subject of "Germany in Transition." In numerous essays the contributors to this volume give us reason to believe that Helmut Kohl will not be the last German leader to succumb to the temptation of proclaiming his country's normalcy and urging its citizens to get on with their daily affairs. It is not only that many Germans have tired of hearing the familiar platitudes about their nation's debt to history. With the emergence of new generations on both sides of the old national divide (ones that, even more than their chancellor, really were "born late"), many younger Germans appear to be even less aware of the close relationship between the Federal Republic's democratic achievements and its past.

In Germany's western *Länder* (states), this lack of historical perspective has increasingly taken the form of a widespread social and political malaise. According to Freiburg political scientist Ludger Kühnhardt, many of those among the FRG's citizenry who have benefited most from postwar affluence have not the slightest understanding of what makes their system function. As a result, Kühnhardt argues, the consensus-forming mechanisms that were once the hallmark of western German democracy—"coalition talks, compromises on a common denominator, seeking to please as many as possible, and the distribution system guaranteed by the welfare state"—have steadily given way to purely egotistical calculations, apathy, and stagnation (p. 207). Similarly, in his

[29] For example, consider Helmut Kohl's remarks at the opening of a national museum in Bonn devoted to the history of the Federal Republic, on June 14, 1994, in *Bulletin*, no. 59 (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt, June 17, 1994), 557–59. On the German government's shifting approaches to this burden, see Buruma (fn. 6).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contribution to the *Daedalus* volume, Kohl adviser Michael Mertes worries about the glaring absence in the German capital of a successor generation of young leaders ("a self-confident and coherent German *classe politique*") to whom one might look in coming years to provide a convincing vision of the FRG's "roles and duties, its status in the community of nations" (pp. 15–17).

More worrisome, however, is the fact that in the East, the citizens of the former GDR, young and old, have much less of a collective memory to draw upon in their need to make sense of German democracy. As both Mertes and former Johns Hopkins president Steven Muller point out in their essays, eastern Germans as a people lack the direct experience with democratic institutions and practices that their western counterparts were fortunate to have enjoyed since the late 1940s (Mertes, 22; Muller, 43). Thus, in many ways, they still have to grow into the (West) German system. Furthermore, and of even greater concern, as both the Berlin social historian Jürgen Kocka and the French political scientist Anne-Marie Le Gloannec suggest in their contributions to *Daedalus*, the majority of eastern Germans have been raised according to a value system profoundly different from that of their western cousins. In particular, they were never really given a full opportunity to come to terms with their nation's responsibility for Nazism. The communists' emphasis on the GDR's supposedly "anti-fascist" credentials had the effect of "[removing] the Nazi experience from the historical self-definition of many East Germans" (Kocka, 187) and allowing them to see themselves not as participants but as "victims to history" (Le Gloannec, 136). As a consequence, many eastern Germans have become citizens of the Federal Republic with a strong sense of entitlement to guide them but only a very incomplete understanding of the original purposes of German democracy.

Does this mean, then, that younger Germans will be less inclined to take an interest in their country's past? Will they therefore be ideal candidates for efforts by Kohl and others to neutralize those factors that continue to make the German nation different? At least for the foreseeable future, there are two good reasons for thinking this will not be the case. For one thing, regardless of whether eastern or western Germans feel personally responsible for the crimes of Nazism, it is likely that the majority will still be aware of the distinctly tumultuous character of their nation's history over the past century. Muller makes this point in his *Daedalus* essay, emphasizing that the twentieth century has been an unprecedented "succession of traumas" for Germany and the Germans, as shown by the First World War, the weaknesses of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Weimar Republic, the Versailles treaty, the hyperinflation of the 1920s, the National Socialist dictatorship, the resulting Second World War, and the subsequent division of the nation. "Normal," he notes, "is defined as usual, regular, natural: the one and only decade of the twentieth century which German national life could be described as normal was the first" (p. 33). As a consequence, it is likely that even younger Germans, who did not live through these trials and catastrophes, are bound to feel that they are still, in some essential if ineffable respects, different from other Europeans.

But second, it is also reasonable to suspect that the appeal to German normalcy will be challenged by the equally unique demands of national unification in the 1990s. Although they do not have many answers, the authors in the *Daedalus* collection pose many questions about how the political culture of modern Germany will be transformed as a result of the inclusion of the eastern German population in the Federal Republic. Kocka worries about the impact upon German society of a comparatively greater aversion to risk taking in the East; he is also concerned about the tendency of the GDR's former citizens to value a more paternalistic style of political decision making (pp. 185–87). Humboldt University historian Heinrich August Winkler wonders about how open eastern Germans will be to the ideal of European integration, given their decades of isolation from the West; for similar reasons, he worries about their receptivity to living with foreigners (pp. 120–21). For his part, *Die Welt* editor Jochen Thies is frankly fearful of the consequences for western German culture of what he regards as a widespread eastern parochialism (p. 266).

Notably, like Marsh and Fisher, all of these authors are basically of one mind in treating the absorption of eastern Germany into the Federal Republic mainly as a social and political burden that Bonn must still overcome. Yet, as Habermas would advise us, we should also be open to the possibility that even the eastern German past could bring unanticipated benefits in the development of German democracy. For example, in his *Daedalus* essay, Mertes makes the interesting observation that the critical culture nurtured among East German dissidents during their years of opposition to communist rule may someday prove to be a revitalizing force in German politics. "In [western] Germany," he writes,

> as in most Western democracies, the electronic media contribute to a depoliticization of the public, degrading politics, making it a sector of increasingly trivial entertainment. This encourages a trend [in the West] toward carefully groomed political showmasters—a tendency that may be countered, at least for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a time, by the new style introduced by East German politicians. Many, though not including the old Communists, bring a refreshing element of authenticity to their work, deeply rooted in their bitter experience under the GDR regime. No jargon. No worn-out formulas. No 'keep smiling.' While some may see it as unprofessional, it contributes to a regeneration of the overall political atmosphere." (p. 16)[30]

In calling our attention to this potential contribution, Mertes would appear to be in good company. In an important but not widely cited speech on May 8, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, the FRG's president, Roman Herzog, adopted a very similar tone in noting that the GDR's peaceful revolution against communism could have an unexpectedly positive effect upon the Federal Republic. Not only was it proof that totalitarian thinking would no longer find a receptive home among the German people, but more significant, it also demonstrated that German democracy would henceforth be based upon "two equally strong legs," on the one side, upon those founding experiences that took root in western Germany after the war and, on the other, upon "the eastern German revolution of 1989."[31]

As one might expect of an individual acting in the largely symbolic capacity of the Federal presidency, Herzog had few specifics to impart about how this eastern German contribution was to be made. One could ask: What aspects of the GDR's revolution in the streets were worth carrying over to German democracy? In what ways had the FRG's system of governance possibly been incomplete or unfulfilled in the period before 1989? However, for our purposes, Herzog's approving words about the eastern German experience stand in striking contrast to the position taken by many of his colleagues in the German government. Whereas, as we have seen, leaders such as Kohl have frequently sought to depict a Germany that is largely a finished construct as a result of national unification, Herzog's approach to the events of 1989–90 appears much more open-ended. Far from assuming that the promise of German democracy has been fully realized, he at least leaves room for the possibility that the Federal Republic still has considerable

[30] Mertes's point is a good one. Based upon the surprising, mid-1990s electoral successes in the east of the Party of Democratic Socialism, the successor to the former East German regime, one might only object that he should not have underestimated the ability of the "old Communists" to harness this authenticity.

[31] "Zum 50. Jahrestag des Endes des Zweiten Weltkrieges," *Bulletin*, no. 38 (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, May 12, 1995), 330–31. For an extremely insightful analysis of the ways the Kohl government has sought to exploit the theme of the East German revolution to its electoral benefit without, however, adopting any of its lessons, see Gregg Kvistad, "Parties and Citizens in the Western German Unification Debate," *German Politics and Society*, no. 30 (Fall 1993).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ground to cover (to quote an unlikely intellectual ally, Jürgen Habermas) "along the path toward political civilization."

Would such a Germany necessarily be a normal country? As we have seen throughout this review, the conceptions of German normalcy are so disparate, and the expectations of both politicians and analysts so varied, that it is hard to imagine there ever being any agreement on this question. But then again, perhaps the search for such a common definition is misguided anyway. As we have also found in reflecting upon some recent examples of contemporary scholarship, the more important requirement for both the Federal president and any other commentator on the German condition is that they define their terms in such a way that they are seeking a Germany that is both worth pursuing and realizable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY

EDITORS
Marc F. Plattner
Larry Diamond

EDITORIAL BOARD
Chinua Achebe
Shaul Bakhash
Nancy Bermeo
Daniel Brumberg
Naomi Chazan
Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr.
Francis Fukuyama
Harry Harding
Donald L. Horowitz
Samuel P. Huntington
Atul Kohli
Leszek Kolakowski
Liang Heng
Arend Lijphart
Juan J. Linz
Seymour Martin Lipset
Joshua Muravchik
Ergun Özbudun
Octavio Paz
Susan Kaufman Purcell
Peter Reddaway
Condoleezza Rice
Philippe Schmitter
Alfred Stepan
Vladimir Tismaneanu
Arturo Valenzuela
(on leave)
Ernest J. Wilson III

SINCE ITS INCEPTION IN 1990, the *Journal of Democracy* has become an influential international forum for scholarly analysis and competing democratic viewpoints. Focusing exclusively on democracy, the *Journal* monitors and analyzes democratic regimes and movements in scores of countries around the world. *Published quarterly in January, April, July, and October for the National Endowment for Democracy.*

October 1996 (Volume 7, Number 4) includes:

- The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict
- How Different Are Postcommunist Transitions?
- Venezuela: Democracy Hangs On
- China's Constitutionalist Option
- Indonesia: Suharto's Tightening Grip
- Vietnam's Tentative Transformation
- Burma's Uneven Struggle
- Soft Authoritarianism in Malysia and Singapore
- Making Amends After Communism
- Reform and Frustration in Egypt
- Kant, Democracy, and History
- Debate: Democratic Consolidation
  - I. O'Donnell's "Illusions": A Rejoinder
  - II. Illusions and Conceptual Flaws
- Books in Review: Two Views of Liberalism
  Latin America's Parties
- AND MORE...

Prepayment is required. **Annual Subscriptions:** $29.00, individuals; $65.00, institutions. **Foreign postage:** $4.80, Canada & Mexico; $6.85, outside North America. **Single-issue prices:** $8.00, individuals; $17.00, institutions. Payment must be drawn on a U.S. bank in U.S. dollars or made by international money order. MD residents add 5% sales tax. For orders shipped to Canada add 7% GST (#124004946RT).

Send orders to: The Johns Hopkins University Press, P.O. Box 19966, Baltimore, MD 21211-0966, U.S.A. To place an order using Visa or MasterCard, call toll-free 1-800-548-1784, FAX us at (410) 516-6968, or send Visa/MasterCard orders to this E-mail address: jlorder@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu

EA7

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Global Politics

Democracy and the Global Order

From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance

David Held

"I regard this book as indispensable reading for scholars and citizens alike—a comprehensive rethinking and remapping of the terrain of democracy."
—Richard Falk, Princeton University

$16.95 paper $49.50 cloth

Industrial Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining

Designing Nuclear Industries in Argentina and Brazil

Etel Solingen

This book highlights the conceptual utility of relying on macropolitical consensus and lateral autonomy for understanding industrial policy, international bargaining, and technological development, via an unprecedented systematic and multidisciplinary comparison of the Brazilian and Argentine nuclear industries.

$47.50 cloth

The Face of the Nation

Immigration, the State, and the National Identity

Keith Fitzgerald

This innovative work provides both a historical account of the crazy-quilt of legislation dealing with immigration that Congress has passed over the years and a theoretical explanation, building on the "new institutionalism," of how these laws came to be passed. The author shows why immigration is a policy arena in which a polity chooses what it will be.

$39.50 cloth

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From Stanford

American Images of China, 1931-1949

T. Christopher Jespersen

This book shows how the notion of the Chinese as aspiring Americans helped shape American opinion and policies toward Asia for almost twenty years. This notion derived less from the reality of Chinese historical or cultural similarities than from a projection of American values and culture; in the American view, fueled by various political, economic, and religious interests, China was less a geographical entity than a symbol of American hopes and fears.

$39.50 cloth

Calamity and Reform in China

State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap Famine

Dali L. Yang

"This is a very impressive achievement. What is so good about it is the theoretical and statistical sophistication, the emphasis on regional variation, and the learning it displays, not only with regard to China but in general. It contains much new material of enormous value."

—Thomas P. Bernstein, Columbia University

$49.50 cloth

Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity

The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao

Xiaobing Tang

This book reexamines the historical thinking of Liang Qichao (1873-1929), one of the few modern Chinese thinkers and cultural critics whose appreciation of the question of modernity was based on first-hand experience of the world space in which China had to function as a nation-state.

$39.50 cloth

Tethered Deer

Government and Economy in a Chinese County

Marc Blecher and Vivienne Shue

This is the first systematic, longitudinal study of the organization and operations of Chinese government at the county level. Highlighting the relationships between county officials and the administrative and production units above and below them, the authors open a window on the vast bureaucratic middle ground between Beijing policymaking and community-level politics.

$39.50 cloth

Available in bookstores or from

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Stanford, CA 94305-2235 (415) 723-1593 or fax (415) 725-3457

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CHINA JOURNAL

Consistently penetrating commentary.
Lowell Dittmer, University of California, Berkeley

Up-to-date research, fresh ideas, and the thoughts of the leading specialists on all aspects of contemporary China.
Lucien Pye, MIT

Has now become must reading for any serious student of contemporary China.
Martin K. Whyte, George Washington University

Should be regularly consulted by everybody who wants to keep abreast of developments in the academic disciplines concerned with China.
Jurgen Domes, University of Saarlandes, Germany

SPECIAL OFFER TO NEW SUBSCRIBERS
1½ years for the price of a 1-year subscription

Fast becoming *the* leading journal of contemporary Chinese studies. This is one of the few journals that I read cover to cover.
James L. Watson, Harvard University

Subscription Rates (two 230-page issues per year — **plus** a free issue for new subscribers): *Within Australia:* $25 per year, students $20, institutions $30. *Outside Australia:* US$25 per year, students US$20, institutions US$30; or the equivalent in other currencies. New 3-year subscriptions: $60/US$60, institutions $75 — plus 2 complimentary issues.

I would like a: ☐ 1-year ☐ 3-year subscription
☐ Enclosed is my check (payable to **The China Journal**)
☐ Please charge to my ☐ Bankcard ☐ Mastercard ☐ Visa

Card No. _____ Exp. Date _____

Name _____ Signature _____

Address _____

Payments to: Contemporary China Centre, RSPAS, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOW IN ITS 10TH YEAR

THE PACIFIC REVIEW

EDITOR: PROFESSOR RICHARD HIGGOTT, UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK, U.K.

THE PACIFIC REVIEW is now in its tenth year and a major success. It provides an important platform for the study of the Pacific basin and an interdisciplinary forum for the exchange of ideas on this important region.

As well as its customary analysis of international relations and security issues, THE PACIFIC REVIEW is now expanding its coverage to provide enhanced economic analysis of the Pacific area. It will feature articles at the interface of the economic and the political, and will include papers from other relevant disciplines—such as contemporary history, geography and sociology.

Fully refereed, THE PACIFIC REVIEW continues to provide fast and forceful commentary on immediate policy issues.

SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

Please return this to:
USA/Canada: Koren Thomas, Routledge Journals Dept., 29 West 35th Street, New York, N.Y. 10001-2299
Tel: (212)244 3336 ext 335 Fax: (212) 564 7854
UK/EU/RoW: Nicki Stow, Routledge Subscriptions, ITPS, Cheriton House, North Way, Andover, SP10 5BE, UK.
Tel: +44(0)1264 342755/780 Fax: +44(0)1264 343005 email:info.journals@routledge.com

☐ I would like to subscribe to THE PACIFIC REVIEW
☐ Please send me a FREE sample copy of THE PACIFIC REVIEW
☐ I enclose a cheque for made payable to Routledge Journals

Please invoice me:
Purchase Order no.
Please charge my Visa/Access/Amex/Diners Club card (delete as appropriate)

Account No.

Name

Address

Country Post/ZipCode

4 issues per volume
Subscription Rates 1997

N. America: Institution/Individual	US$135/US$55
EU: Institution/Individual	£98/£37
Rest of World: Institution/Individual	£98/£37

Code: 1

Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane
London EC4P 4EE, UK
Tel: 0171 583 9855/Fax: 0171 842 2303

ROUTLEDGE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Journals from SAGE

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF

International Relations

Published under the auspices of the **Standing Group on International Relations of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)**

Edited by **Walter Carlsnaes** *Uppsala University*

"The establishment of a specifically European journal of international relations must surely be welcome." **Times Higher Education Supplement**

The *European Journal of International Relations* is dedicated to the stimulation and dissemination of research and scholarship in International Relations throughout the academic community in all parts of Europe and beyond. It pays special attention to conceptual, normative and formal theories, seeking in particular to foster an awareness of methodological and epistemological questions in the study of International Relations. It reflects research and developments of both a theoretical and an empirical nature in the major sub-areas of the field, including Foreign Policy Analysis, International Organization, Strategy and Conflict, International Law and International Political Economy.

ISSN: 1354-0661Published quarterly in March, June, September and December

Order Form for New Subscribers - Subscribe at the Introductory Rate

SAGE Publications Ltd, 6 Bonhill Street, London EC2A 4PU, UK
Tel: +44 (0)171 374 0645

USA orders to be sent to:
PO Box 5096, Thousand Oaks, CA 91359

Name_____

Address_____

_____

_____ 6J91

❑ Yes! I want to subscribe to the ***European Journal of International Relations*** starting with Volume 3 (1997)

❑ **Introductory Rate for Individuals** £27 /$43(Usual Rate £34/$54)

❑ **Institutional Rate** £110 /$176

Methods of Payment

❑ I enclose a cheque (made payable to **SAGE Publications Ltd**) for: _____

Please invoice my credit card
❑ Mastercard ❑ Visa Amount: _____

Card No: _____

Expiry Date: /

Signature:_____ Date: / /

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INSIGHT INTO THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The 50th Anniversary Annual Report on the Work of the United Nations
by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 5th Annual Report to the General Assembly depicts a United Nations in the midst of a dramatic transformation. The book provides a description of the Organization as it continues to adapt peace-keeping to new circumstances, bring greater coherence to development efforts and move definitively towards creating an institution devoted to enhanced performance, full accountability and increased cost-effectiveness.
E.96.I.19 92-1-100615-5 376 pp. $14.95

UN21 - Better Service, Better Value, Better Management
Progress Report of the Efficiency Board to the Secretary-General.

Reporting on efficiencies already achieved and outlining those to be implemented, UN21 details how the United Nations is trying to improve its cost-effectiveness in providing services and programmes to Member States.
E.96.I.28 92-1-100624-4 60 pp. $4.95

The United Nations Blue Books Series

This new series of publications will prove an invaluable research and reference tool for academics, policy-makers, journalists and others interested in gaining a deeper understanding of the work of the United Nations in dealing with the major issues of concern to humanity.
All the volumes will include an extensive introduction by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a detailed chronology of events and a collection of documents and related information.

Titles in the Series include:

- The United Nations and Apartheid, 1948-1994
- The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995
- The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation
- The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945-1995
- The United Nations and El Salvador, 1990-1995
- The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995
- The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996
- The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996

Call or write today for a free brochure containing detailed information on all the volumes and languages available.

Each available at $29.95
- The United Nations and The Advancement of Women, 1945-1996
- The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996

Each available at $49.95

United Nations Publications
Sales and Marketing Section, Room DC2-0853, Dept. A022, New York, N.Y. 10017
Tel. (800) 253-9646, (212) 963-8302; Fax. (212) 963-3489
E-Mail: publications@un.org **Internet:** http://www.un.org/Pubs/sales.htm
Visa, MC and AMEX accepted. Please add 5% of gross ($5.00 minimum) for shipping and handling.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISSN 0020 - 8345

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS
DOCUMENTATION POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE
27, rue Saint-Guillaume, 75337 PARIS CEDEX 07, FRANCE
Fax : + 33. 1 45 49 01 49

Published since 1951 by the International Political Science Association **(all back volumes are available),** the *Abstracts* is a **major source of bibliographic information in political science.** It publishes abstracts of articles in specialized and non specialized periodicals, including major yearbooks. Articles in English are abstracted in English; those in other languages (about one fourth of the total) are abstracted in French, with all titles translated into English. In 1996 it published 7,130 abstracts from nearly 1,000 journals, in six issues. Each issue carries a detailed subject index and a list of the periodicals examined. The *final issue of each volume provides a* ***cumulative subject index*** *and an* ***author index.***

SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY OFFER
FREE EXAMINATION COPY
TWO YEARS AT HALF PRICE
WITH ONE ADDITIONAL YEAR FREE

For volumes 46 (1996) and 47 (1997), new institutional subscribers are granted a 50 percent reduction, and pay only US $ 204 per volume, instead of approximately US $ 408 (the equivalent of French francs 2,100). Payment may be made for volume 47 only, or for both volumes 46 and 47. On request, new subscribers will receive all issues of volume 45 (1995) as an introductory present. Do not hesitate to request a *free examination copy.*

NOW ALSO AVAILABLE ON CD-ROM

International Political Science Abstracts on CD-Rom now (1989 - 1996) contains 49,000 records. The database is updated three times a year.

Publisher : **SilverPlatter Information B.V.**
Nieuwe Herengracht 49
NL-1011 RN Amsterdam, The Netherlands
tel: +31 20 625 9650 fax : +31 20 623 7408

Pricing : US $ 1195
$ 995 for print subscribers

The above prices are for stand alone subscriptions: for networking prices please call SilverPlatter. A 50% discount is available for end-users in developing countries.

For the above mentioned prices you will receive: a yearly subscription to International Political Science Abstracts on CD-Rom with the updates; SilverPlatter retrieval software for the DOS, Macintosh or Windows environment with installation manual. The CD-Rom is also accessible on the Internet.

NEW : ALSO AVAILABLE ON-LINE

The data base described above is also accessible on-line, through **NlightN,** a division of The Library Corporation, 1807 Michael Faraday Court, Reston, Virginia 22090 (Tel.: 1-800-NLIGHTN; 1-703-904-1010; Fax: 1-703-904-8238; E-mail: help @ nlightn.com. ; Internet : Web browsers: http: //www.nlightn.com.)

Pricing : $.10 per citation; $.50 per abstract; $1200 for unlimited annual lease.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 90s— AND BEYOND

"This excellent study seeks to articulate the policies of cooperative security and economic multilateralism necessary in America's 'third attempt' at establishing world order in the twentieth century. [WINNING THE PEACE] ranks among the best of recent attempts to describe the lineaments of the world order the United States and its partners should build in the future."
—David C. Hendrickson, *Foreign Affairs*



"John Ruggie's WINNING THE PEACE puts the years since the end of the cold war in their proper historical context. Notwithstanding popular catchphrases, world affairs are never orderly in practice. Yet, with Ruggie's insight, we can at least bring some structure to how we perceive the world."
—J. Robert Kerrey, U.S. Senator

A Twentieth Century Fund Book
288 pages / $27.95, cloth

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
At bookstores now.
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/cup

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The China Quarterly



"The China Quarterly *is an invaluable resource for foreign journalists in China. It provides the background and scholarly analysis we need to place today's events into proper perspective."*
James Macgregor,
Beijing Bureau Chief
Wall Street Journal

"The importance of **The China Quarterly** *as the oldest, by far the most widely subscribed, the most comprehensive in coverage, and most high quality journal on contemporary China cannot be overstated."*
Frederick Teiwes,
University of Sydney

1997 Order Form

■ Institutions US$90/£50 ■ Individuals US$64/£36 ■ Students US$32/£18**

☐ Please send me a free sample copy.
☐ Please enter my 1997 subscription to **The China Quarterly**
☐ I enclose a check payable to Oxford University Press.
☐ Please charge my Mastercard/Visa/American Express/Diners/JCB Card.

Card Number: ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Exp. Date: ☐☐☐☐

Signature.....

*Please note: £ Sterling rates apply in UK and Europe. US$ rates elsewhere.Customers in the EU and Canada are subject to their own local sales tax.
**Students must enclose proof of student status

PLEASE PRINT DETAILS

Name.....
Address.....
City/State.....
Zipcode.....

Oxford University Press Journals Marketing (X97) 2001 Evans Road Cary NC 27513 USA
Tel: USA & Canada Only 1 800 852 7323 or 919 677 0977 Fax: 919 677 1714

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RELIGION,

The Suitcase

Refugee Voices from Bosnia and Croatia
Edited by JULIE MERTUS, JASMINA TESANOVIC, HABIBA METIKOS, and RADA BORIC
Foreword by CORNEL WEST
"There are more than two million displaced people from the war in Bosnia. This collection at last gives a voice to those silent millions. Their stories are moving, harrowing, and faithfully reflected in this authentic work."
—Laura Silber, coauthor of *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*
$48.00 cloth, $16.95 paper, illustrated

The Bridge Betrayed

Religion and Genocide in Bosnia
MICHAEL A. SELLS
"A penetrating argument. . . . His book is both a condemnation of anti-Muslim religious stereotyping by Serbs and Croats, and an impassioned argument that the genocide in Bosnia is 'grounded in religious symbols'. . . . Sells's well-written, impassioned, and informed book represents a deepening of the ongoing discourse about the collapse of Yugoslavia."—*Kirkus Reviews*
$19.95 hardcover

IDENTITY,

Changing the Rules

The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania
AILI MARI TRIPP
In this impressively researched and highly original study, Aili Mari Tripp shows how the people of Dar es Salaam, through creativity and considerable ingenuity, supply for themselves the various goods and services that the government can no longer provide.
$48.00 cloth, $18.00 paper

Politician's Dilemma

Building State Capacity in Latin America
BARBARA GEDDES
New in paper—"An important and intelligent book on a timely subject."
—*American Political Science Review*
"Geddes uses a 'soft' rational choice approach to explain both the obstacles to and the opportunities for enacting administrative reforms in Latin America's patronage-ridden politics."
—*The Journal of Politics*
California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy, $16.95 paper

& POLITICS

At bookstores or order 1-800-822-6657

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE MILLER CENTER *of* PUBLIC AFFAIRS

The University of Virginia

Miller Center Journal

Kenneth Thompson, Editor

The *Miller Center Journal* continues to provide fresh perspectives by scholars and practitioners in three major areas: the presidency, governance, and foreign views of American governance. Our readers have praised both the scholarly depth of the *Journal* as well as its readability.

Our volumes have studied the presidency with such contributions as a biographical essay about Bill Clinton by **David Maraniss** of *The Washington Post*; an article on the Reagan administration by **Frank Carlucci**, former United States Secretary of Defense and Ambassador to Portugal; an interview with **Lloyd Cutler**, former Counsel to the president; and remarks by **Herbert Brownell** about being the Attorney General of the United States.

The *Journal* has addressed governance with essays on the budget deficit and national debt by **Alan Murray**, the Bureau Chief of the Washington Bureau of *The Wall Street Journal*; the ethics of intervention by **Alberto Coll** of the Naval War College; American Federalism by **Martha Derthick** of the University of Virginia; and other topics.

Andrew Goodpaster, retired General of the United States Army and former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, has contributed an article on U.S.-Russian relations to the *Journal's* discourse on foreign views of governance. Other contributions have included essays like **Hugh Sidey's** reflections on presidential character and **R.W. Apple's** comments on the Gulf War.

Your subscription to the *Miller Center Journal* will engage your mind with substantive and probing articles on timely and important issues of American governance. Subscribe today!

To subscribe,
please send your name, address, and a check or money order to:

Miller Center Journal
2201 Old Ivy Road
P.O. Box 5106
Charlottesville, VA 22905

Two years...$12.50 Three years...$20.00

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW FROM DUKE

ECO-NATIONALISM
Anti-nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine
Jane I. Dawson
240 pages, 8 b&w photographs, 1 map, paper $16.95, library cloth edition, $49.95

DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN POLITICS 2
Gordon Smith, William E. Paterson, and Stephen Padgett, editors
368 pages, paper $22.95, library cloth edition $59.95

THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Second Edition, Revised and Expanded
Donald P. Kommers
696 pages, paper $34.95, library cloth edition, $75.00

LENINISM
Neil Harding
356 pages, paper $17.95, library cloth edition, $49.95

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
From the Twentieth to the Twenty-First Century
Third Edition
Lynton Keith Caldwell
Revised and Updated with the Assistance of Paul Stanley Weiland
504 pages, paper $22.95, library cloth edition, $59.95

CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN THE REGION OF FORMER SOVIET DOMINANCE
Rett R. Ludwikowski
With full texts of all new constitutions ratified through 1995
568 pages, cloth $75.00

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Box 90660
Durham, North Carolina
27708-0660
http://www.duke.edu/web/dupress/

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE WORLD REACTS TO THE HOLOCAUST

David S. Wyman, Editor
Charles H. Rosenzveig, Project Director

Sponsored by the Holocaust Memorial Center, *The World Reacts to the Holocaust* is a major new compendium that chronicles in one volume the impact of the Holocaust in twenty-two countries and the United Nations. Country-by-country, the volume carefully traces specific and widespread responses to the Holocaust, beginning with the prewar status of Jews in each country, and moving to the attitudes and perceptions of 1945 and the political, economic, and cultural legacies reaching down to the present.

"Unique historical circumstances affected each country's behavior during the war and the Holocaust. These circumstances, coupled with wartime experiences, influenced how each country has reacted to the Holocaust over time. Some have denied the Holocaust, some have denationalized it, some have trivialized it, some have rationalized it, all have universalized it. Some countries have adopted every one of these positions in the period since 1945."

from the foreword,
by Rabbi Charles H. Rosenzveig

$65.00 hardcover

Countries

Austria • Bulgaria • Canada • Cuba • Czechoslovakia • East Germany • France • Great Britain • Hungary • Ireland • Israel • Italy • Japan • Latvia • Lithuania • The Netherlands • Poland • Romania • South Africa • Soviet Union • United States • West Germany • United Nations

Contributors

Irving Abella • Franklin Bialystok • Randolph L. Braham • David Cesaran • Frederick B. Chary • Debórah Dwork • Andrew Ezergailis • Seymour Maxwell Finger • Zvi Gitelman • Radu Ioanid • Dermot Keogh • Tetsu Kohno • David Kranzler • Dov Levin • Robert M. Levine • Andrei S. Markovits • Meir Michaelis • Beth Simone Noveck • Dalia Ofer • Bruce F. Pauley • Jeffrey M. Peck • Charles H. Rosenzveig • Livia Rothkirchen • Milton Shain • Michael C. Steinlauf • Robert-Jan van Pelt • David Weinberg • David S. Wyman

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS
Hampden Station, Baltimore, Maryland 21211
1-800-537-5487 • http://jhupress.jhu.edu/home.html

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Journal of

Policy Reform

Edited by

Arvind Panagariya, *University of Maryland at College Park, USA* and

Dani Rodrik, *Harvard University, USA*

The Journal of Policy Reform serves as the primary outlet for analytical work on policy reform in developing and transitional economies. All areas of policy reform are examined, including: privatization and restructuring; tax and financial sector reform; the environment; and the world trading system. Submission of all forms of work is encouraged, but applied theoretical analyses, econometric and other empirical work, country studies, and political economy analyses are particularly welcome.

4 Issues per Volume • ISSN: 1384-1289 • Current Subscription: Volume 1

E-mail: info@gbhap.com

For further information, or for your FREE sample copy, please contact

Harwood Academic Publishers, c/o International Publishers Distributor,

PO Box 27542, Newark, NJ 07101-8742, USA • Tel: +1 (800) 545-8308 • Fax: +1 215 750-6343 or

PO Box 90, Reading, Berkshire, RG1 8JL, UK • Tel: +44 (0) 1734 568080 • Fax: +44 (0) 1734 568211

Harwood Academic Publishers is a member of the Gordon and Breach Publishing Group

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION, 10/1/96

Title: *World Politics*. Pub. No. 0043-8871. Frequency: Quarterly. Four issues published annually. Subscription price: $56.00 institutions, $25.00 individuals. Location of office of publication: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2715 North Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218. Headquarters of publishers: Same. Publisher: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2715 North Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218. Editor: John Waterbury, World Politics, Bendheim Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544. Owner: Princeton University. The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months.

Extent and nature of circulation		Av. no. copies each issue preceding 12 mos.	Actual no. copies single issue pub. nearest to filing date
A	Total no. copies printed	4500	4500
B.	Paid circulation, mail subscriptions	3515	3622
C.	Total paid circulation	3528	3725
F.	Free distribution	117	90
G.	Total distribution	3645	3725
H.	Copies not distributed	855	775
I.	Total	4500	4500

I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete. Marie R. Hansen, Associate Director.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRACY

edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner

The end of the Cold War and the global advance of democracy have significantly altered both the external and internal security environments for many of the world's militaries. Under these new conditions, how will civil-military relations affect efforts to consolidate new democracies in developing and post-Communist countries? How should governments go about establishing civilian control of the armed forces or limiting military intervention in politics?

A Journal of Democracy Book

$13.95 paperback

LABOR MOVEMENTS AND DICTATORSHIPS

The Southern Cone in Comparative Perspective

Paul W. Drake

"Drake has made an important contribution to comparative labor studies and to comparative politics, particularly to the literature on democratic breakdowns, authoritarian regimes, and transitions to democracy, where the role of labor has been generally neglected."—Peter Winn, Tufts University

$15.95 paperback

WITNESSES TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR

edited by William C. Wohlforth

Why did the Cold War end so peacefully, and so suddenly? In February 1993, key diplomatic players—including former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and former Soviet foreign minister Alexander Bessmertnykh—gathered at Princeton University to exchange views on the transition to the post-Cold War world. Here are collected the complete transcripts of this historic three-day conference, supplemented by incisive interpretive essays.

$39.95 hardcover

PRESIDENTIAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

Comparing Regional and National Contexts

edited by Kurt von Mettenheim

Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics offers in-depth analyses of the dangers and benefits to democracy of presidential systems in the United States, Europe, and Latin America. Although political scientists have long acknowledged parliamentary government as essential for stable democracy, contributors to this volume argue that the presidential system, which separates and diffuses power, can provide new perspectives for leaders in emerging democracies around the world.

$15.95 paperback

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

Hampden Station
Baltimore, MD 21211
1-800-537-5487
http://jhupress.jhu.edu/home.html

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE STATE OF WAR AND PEACE ATLAS

THIRD EDITION ■ DAN SMITH

PRAISE FOR PREVIOUS EDITIONS:

PENGUIN REFERENCE

"Brilliant maps and sharp comment."

—*Seattle Times*

"The book's greatest strength is the clear, if numbing, perspective it provides."

—*Publishers Weekly*

Wars are fought for territory and power. Most of today's wars are civil wars fought to preserve ethnic or religious identity, as a response to poverty, or to redress history. The unique format of *The State of War and Peace Atlas* gives shape and meaning to the statistics about volatile areas of the world and provides a global overview on such key issues as:

- international terrorism
- landmines and military dumping grounds
- arsenals and the arms trade
- military spending and nuclear testing
- NATO and the UN

The State of War and Peace Atlas begins by enumerating the painful costs of war—death tolls, the plight of refugees, the collapse of whole states—and closes on a tentative note of hope by mapping the world of peace diplomacy and our global peacekeeping processes.

PENGUIN REFERENCE 128 PP. 0-14-051373-6 $16.95 AVAILABLE FEBRUARY 1997

ALSO OF INTEREST:

THE STATE OF THE WORLD ATLAS

FIFTH EDITION ■ MICHAEL KIDRON & RONALD SEGAL



"Unique and uniquely beautiful...a discerning eye for data and a flair for the most sophisticated techniques of stylized graphic design...tells us more about the world today than a dozen statistical abstracts or scholarly tomes."—*Los Angeles Times.*

PENGUIN REFERENCE 0-14-025204-5 $16.95

PENGUIN USA

ACADEMIC MARKETING DEPARTMENT • 375 HUDSON ST. • NY, NY 10014-3657
http://www.penguin.com • For a FREE History catalog, please call 212/366-2372

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRINCETON PAPERBACKS



Intentionally excluded from formal politics in authoritarian states by reigning elites, do the common people have concrete ways of achieving community objectives? Contrary to conventional wisdom, this book demonstrates that they do. Focusing on the political life of the *sha'b* (or popular classes) in Cairo, Diane Singerman shows how men *and* women develop creative and effective strategies to accomplish shared goals, despite the dominant forces ranged against them.

"Political anthropology of a high order. Singerman shows how family ties empower people. . . . As a social scientist, she is determined to challenge the stereotype of the passive urban poor, and she makes a largely successful case for seeing politics in other than elite terms."
—William B. Quandt, *Foreign Affairs*

Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics: Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Editors
Paper: $17.95 ISBN 0-691-02568-1



"One of the most original, provocative, and important foreign policy books to appear in years."
—Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University

"Nordlinger . . . is an isolationist with a difference. . . . He departs from the isolationist tradition . . . in wanting to promote human rights and democracy through economic sanctions. . . . [His] fearless iconoclasm and dogged analytical rigor command admiration."
—*Foreign Affairs*

Paper: $17.95 ISBN 0-691-02921-0

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
AVAILABLE AT FINE BOOKSTORES OR DIRECTLY FROM THE PUBLISHER: 800-777-4726
WORLD WIDE WEB SITE: HTTP://PUP.PRINCETON.EDU

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRINCETON

Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics

Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives

Edited by Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin

Political scientists often ask themselves what might have been if history had unfolded differently. Although scholars sometimes scoff at applying hypothetical reasoning to world politics, the contributors to this volume—including James Fearon, Richard Lebow, Margaret Levi, Bruce Russett, and Barry Weingast—find such counterfactual conjectures not only useful, but necessary for drawing causal inferences from historical data.

Given the importance of counterfactuals, it is perhaps surprising that we lack standards for evaluating them. To fill this gap, Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin propose a set of criteria for distinguishing plausible from implausible counterfactual conjectures across a wide range of applications.

"[This] is an important book for all social scientists, not only those who study international relations. . . ."—Robert Keohane, Duke University

Paper: $19.95 ISBN 0-691-02791-9 Cloth: $49.50 ISBN 0-691-02792-7

The State against Society

Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe

Grzegorz Ekiert

Classical images of state-socialism developed in contemporary social sciences were founded on simple presuppositions. State-socialist regimes have been treated as basically identical in their institutional design, social and economic structures, and policies. Grzegorz Ekiert challenges this notion in a comparative analysis of the major political crises in post–1945 East Central Europe: Hungary (1956–63), Czechoslovakia (1968–76), and Poland (1980–89).

These crises shaped the political evolution of the region, produced important cross-national differences among state-socialist regimes, and contributed to the distinctive patterns of their collapse.

Paper: $19.95 ISBN 0-691-01113-3 Cloth: $59.50 ISBN 0-691-01114-1

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

AVAILABLE AT FINE BOOKSTORES OR DIRECTLY FROM THE PUBLISHER: 800-777-4726
WORLD WIDE WEB SITE: HTTP://PUP.PRINCETON.EDU

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED